44,763 research outputs found
Buckling design of stringer-stiffened conical shells in compression
No full textThe buckling strength of conical shells subjected to axial compression may be increased by means of meridional stiffeners (stringers). Unlike stiffened cylinders, only limited research has been carried out and no design provisions exist for stringer-stiffened cones. In this paper, a design procedure for such cones is developed based on an equivalent cylinder approach. Design criteria for both local (shell panel) and global (stiffened panel) buckling modes are proposed. In the absence of experimental results, a numerical parametric study is then presented to assess the design proposal. By using finite-element models, linear and nonlinear analyses are performed to quantify critical design aspects and to calibrate buckling strength predictions derived from the design proposal
Measurement of the ratio of branching fractions B(B0→K∗0γ )/B(B0s→φγ ) and the directCP asymmetry inB 0→K∗0γ
No full textThe ratio of branching fractions of the radiative B decays B0→K⁎0γ and B0s→ϕγ has been measured using an integrated luminosity of 1.0 fb−1 of pp collision data collected by the LHCb experiment at a centre-of-mass energy of s√=7TeV. The value obtained is
B(B0→K⁎0γ)B(B0s→ϕγ)=1.23±0.06(stat.)±0.04(syst.)±0.10(fs/fd),
where the first uncertainty is statistical, the second is the experimental systematic uncertainty and the third is associated with the ratio of fragmentation fractions fs/fd. Using the world average value for B(B0→K⁎0γ), the branching fraction B(B0s→ϕγ) is measured to be (3.5±0.4)×10−5.
The direct CP asymmetry in B0→K⁎0γ decays has also been measured with the same data and found to be
ACP(B0→K⁎0γ)=(0.8±1.7(stat.)±0.9(syst.))%.
Both measurements are the most precise to date and are in agreement with the previous experimental results and theoretical expectations
The Use of Objective and Subjective Measures: Implications for Incentive System Design
No full textThis study examines the question, is the use of subjective measures an ex post adjustment of objective measures to take into account three types of risk: target difficulty (after controlling for budget loss), shared risk (after controlling for business unit strategy) and downside risk? We examine this question using data from a sample of 522 managers and professionals in period 0 (and 434 in period 1) from a large Australasian corporation over a two year period. Period 0 is a pre shock period and period 1 is a post shock period. We find that for the overall two years that the subjective is an upward adjustment to the objective to take into account: (1) target difficulty, the spread between upper limit and lower limit of unit performance; (2) shared risk, that is organizational interdependencies; and (3) downside risk, which is the opportunity loss function that the employees faced in not meeting the maximum bonus allowed.
However, in examining the pre shock period and post shock period, the results indicate that the subjective evaluation has been used differently for each period for two type of risk (target difficulty, shared risk). (1) With regard to target difficulty for the pre shock period, the subjective makes an upward adjustment to the objective; but for the post shock, the subjective makes a downward adjustment. One plausible explanation is that during the post shock, quite a few managers and professionals were already on the maximum of the objective measures (given that there may have been gamesmanship at setting targets and upper limits for an anticipated poor economic period). Therefore, the subjective can be a downward adjustment to reflect this gamesmanship. (2) In regard to shared risk (the percentage of transfer revenues), for the pre shock period the subjective was a downward adjustment, while for the post shock period the subjective adjustment is an upward adjustment to the objective measure. This implies that for the pre shock or times of economic stability, the subjective could be used to reduce some of the free rider challenges that face incentive systems. Conversely for the post shock period, or during times of economic instability, the subjective adjustment is to encourage resource sharing and greater coordination and communication. Overall, our results indicate that the subjective measure is used as an ex post adjustment to the objective measure. This could be in response to flaws in the objective (financial) performance measures as subjective measures as this enables other factors to be taken into account.UnpublishedNon Peer ReviewedAlchian, A. and Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, The American Economic Review, 62 (5), p.777-795). Anthony, R. and Govindarajan, V. (2007), Management Control Systems, 12th Edition, Irwin, Singapore. Arvey, R.D. and Murphy, K.R. (1998). Performance Evaluation in Work Settings, Annual Review of Psychology, 49, p. 141-68. Arya, A., Fellingham, J., and Glover, J., (1997). Teams, repeated tasks, and implicit incentives. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23, p.7-30.
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Elephants or onions? Paying for nature in Amboseli, Kenya
No full textTraditional grazing grounds near Amboseli National Park (Kenya) are being rapidly converted to cropland – a process that closes important wildlife corridors. We use a spatially explicit simulation model that integrates ecosystem dynamics and pastoral decision-making to explore the scope for introducing a ‘payments for ecosystem services’ scheme to compensate pastoralists for spillover benefits associated with forms of land use that are compatible with wildlife conservation. Our break-even cost analysis suggests that the benefits of such a scheme likely exceed its costs for a large part of the study area, but that ‘leakage effects’ through excessive stocking rates warrant close scrutiny.Erwin H. Bulte, Randall B. Boone, Randy Stringer and Philip K. Thornto
∑_(l+m=k,l,m≥0) ((α+l-1)¦l) ((β+m-1)¦m)=((α+β+k-1)¦k) and its application to negative binomial distribution
No full textWe prove here the following equation: ∑_(l+m=k,l,m≥0) ((α+l-1)¦l) ((β+m-1)¦m)=((α+β+k-1)¦k) and give its application to prove the reproductive property of the negative binomial distribution.
These finite sum equation involving binomial coefficients and proof of the reproductive property are not known as far as the author knows.論文(Article)departmental bulletin pape
The implementation of the single perturbation load approach to axially-compressed stiffened-stringer cylinder
No full textThis work study the influence of imperfections on axially compressed stiffened-stringer cylindrical shells for different geometries and materials that include aluminum and Carbon Fibre Reinforced Polymer (CFRP) using the finite element (FE) analysis. The imperfection technique called the single perturbation load approach (SPLA) is adopted. The verification analysis was performed with two cases reported in previous studies. Conversely, the parametric investigation was conducted focusing on the stiffener flange profile that varies its thickness and width. From the verification analyses SPLA demonstrated its attractive ability for designing imperfections in axially compressed aluminum stiffened cylindrical shells with fair agreement acquires. Finally, several design guidelines have been highlighted according to the parametric study and further deduced as imperfection sensitivity, buckling and post-buckling behaviour together with its collapse load and knockdown factor (KDF) of stringer stiffened cylindrical shells under axial compression primarily depend on the properties of shell and stiffeners themselves
First observation of the decay Bs0→K*0K*0
No full textThe first observation of the decay B0s→K∗0K∗0 is reported using 35 pb−1 of data collected by LHCb in proton–proton collisions at a centre-of-mass energy of 7 TeV. A total of 49.8±7.5 B0s→(K+π−)(K−π+) events are observed within ±50 MeV/c2 of the B0s mass and 746 MeV/c2 < mKπ < 1046 MeV/c2, mostly coming from a resonant B0s→K∗0K∗0 signal. The branching fraction and the CP-averaged K∗0 longitudinal polarization fraction are measured to be B(B0s→K∗0K∗0)=(2.81±0.46(stat.)±0.45(syst.)±0.34(fs/ fd))×10−5 and fL =0.31±0.12(stat.)±0.04(syst.)
Caratterizzazione di un riarrangiamento non clonale tra i geni H4 e PTEN (H4/PTEN) in cellule tiroidee umane e in campioni di carcinoma papillare della tiroide
No full textBranching fraction and CP asymmetry of the decays B+→K0Sπ+ and B+→K0SK+
No full textAn analysis of B+ → K0
Sπ+ and B+ → K0
S K+ decays is performed with the LHCb experiment. The pp
collision data used correspond to integrated luminosities of 1 fb−1 and 2 fb−1 collected at centre-ofmass
energies of
√
s = 7 TeV and
√
s = 8 TeV, respectively. The ratio of branching fractions and the
direct CP asymmetries are measured to be B(B+ → K0
S K+
)/B(B+ → K0
Sπ+
) = 0.064 ± 0.009 (stat.) ±
0.004 (syst.), ACP(B+ → K0
Sπ+
) = −0.022 ± 0.025 (stat.) ± 0.010 (syst.) and ACP(B+ → K0
S K+
) =
−0.21 ± 0.14 (stat.) ± 0.01 (syst.). The data sample taken at
√
s = 7 TeV is used to search for
B+
c
→ K0
S K+ decays and results in the upper limit ( fc · B(B+
c
→ K0
S K+
))/( fu · B(B+ → K0
Sπ+
)) <
5.8 × 10−2 at 90% confidence level, where fc and fu denote the hadronisation fractions of a ¯b
quark
into a B+
c or a B+ meson, respectively
Dispelling the Myths Behind First-author Citation Counts
No full textWe conducted a full-scale evaluative citation analysis study of scholars in the XML research field to explore just how different from each other author rankings resulting from different citation counting methods actually are, and to demonstrate the capability of emerging data and tools on the Web in supporting more realistic citation counting methods. Our results contest some common arguments for the continued
use of first-author citation counts in the evaluation of scholars, such as high correlations between author rankings by first-author citation counts and other citation
counting methods, and high costs of using more realistic citation counting methods that are not well-supported by the ISI databases. It is argued that increasingly available digital full text research papers make it possible for citation analysis studies to go beyond what the ISI databases have directly supported and to employ more
sophisticated methods
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