187,207 research outputs found

    Causality and Determinism: Tension, or Outright Conflict?

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    In the philosophical tradition, the notions of determinism and causality are strongly linked: it is assumed that in a world of deterministic laws, causality may be said to reign supreme; and in any world where the causality is strong enough, determinism must hold. I will show that these alleged linkages are based on mistakes, and in fact get things almost completely wrong. In a deterministic world that is anything like ours, there is no room for genuine causation. Though there may be stable enough macro-level regularities to serve the purposes of human agents, the sense of “causality” that can be maintained is one that will at best satisfy Humeans and pragmatists, not causal fundamentalists

    A. Tschermak und P. Hoefer: Über binokulare Tiefenwahrnehmung auf Grund von Doppelbildern. Pflügers Archiv 98, 299-321. 1903

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    A. TSCHERMAK UND P. HOEFER: ÜBER BINOKULARE TIEFENWAHRNEHMUNG AUF GRUND VON DOPPELBILDERN. PFLÜGERS ARCHIV 98, 299-321. 1903 Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane (-) Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane (37) (a0001) A. Tschermak und P. Hoefer: Über binokulare Tiefenwahrnehmung auf Grund von Doppelbildern. Pflügers Archiv 98, 299-321. 1903 (37) (p0149

    Tschermak et Hoefer, Sur la précision de la localisation en profondeur au moyen d'images doubles

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    Bourdon B. Tschermak et Hoefer, Sur la précision de la localisation en profondeur au moyen d'images doubles. In: L'année psychologique. 1903 vol. 10. p. 424

    On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Customers

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    In Stackelberg pricing a leader sets prices for items to maximize revenue from a follower purchasing a feasible subset of items. We consider computationally bounded followers who cannot optimize exactly over the range of all feasible subsets, but who apply publicly known algorithms to determine the items to purchase. This corresponds to general multidimensional pricing when customers cannot optimize their valuation functions efficiently but still aim to act rationally to the best of their ability. We consider two versions of this novel type of pricing problem. In the MIn-KNAPSACK variant items are weighted objects and the follower seeks to purchase a min-cost selection of objects of some bounded weight. When he uses a greedy 2-approximation algorithm, we provide a polynomial-time (2+ε) -approximation algorithm for the leader's revenue maximization problem based on so-called near-uniform price assignments. We also prove the problem to be strongly NP-hard. In the SET-COVER variant items are subsets of some ground set which the follower seeks to cover. When he uses a standard primal-dual approach, we prove that exact revenue maximization is possible in polynomial time when elements have frequency 2 (VERTEX-COVER variant). This stands in sharp contrast to APX-hardness for the problem with elements of frequency 3. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. NETWORKS, 201

    On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers

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    In a Stackelberg pricing game a leader aims to set prices on a subset of a given collection of items, such as to maximize her revenue from a follower purchasing a feasible subset of the items. We focus on the case of computationally bounded followers who cannot optimize exactly over the range of all feasible subsets, but apply some publicly known algorithm to determine the set of items to purchase. This corresponds to general multi-dimensional pricing assuming that consumers cannot optimize over the full domain of their valuation functions but still aim to act rationally to the best of their ability. We consider two versions of this novel type of Stackelberg pricing games. Assuming that items are weighted objects and the follower seeks to purchase a min-cost selection of objects of some minimum weight (the Min-Knapsack problem) and uses a simple greedy 2-approximate algorithm, we show how an extension of the known single-price algorithm can be used to derive a polynomial-time (2 + ε)-approximation algorithm for the leader’s revenue maximization problem based on so-called near-uniform price assignments. We also prove the problem to be strongly NP-hard. Considering the case that items are subsets of some ground set which the follower seeks to cover (the Set-Cover problem) via a standard primal-dual approach, we prove that near-uniform price assignments fail to yield a good approximation guarantee. However, in the special case of elements with frequency 2 (the Vertex-Cover problem) it turns out that exact revenue maximization can be done in polynomial-time. This stands in sharp contrast to the fact that revenue maximization becomes APX-hard already for elements with frequency 3

    The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Skeptic's Guide to Objective Chance

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    The goal of this paper is to sketch and defend a new interpretation or theory of objective chance, one that lets us be sure such chances exist and shows how they can play the roles we traditionally grant them. The subtitle obviously emulates the title of Lewis seminal 1980 paper A Subjectivist s Guide to Objective Chance while indicating an important difference in perspective. The view developed below shares two major tenets with Lewis last (1994) account of objective chance: (1) The Principal Principle tells us most of what we know about objective chance; (2) Objective chances are not primitive modal facts, propensities, or powers, but rather facts entailed by the overall pattern of events and processes in the actual world. But it differs from Lewis’ account in most other respects. Another subtitle I considered was A Humean Guide ... But while the account of chance below is compatible with any stripe of Humeanism (Lewis , Hume s, and others ), it presupposes no general Humean philosophy. Only a skeptical attitude about probability itself is presupposed (as in point (2) above); what we should say about causality, laws, modality and so on is left a separate question. Still, I will label the account to be developed “Humean objective chance”

    Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis

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    The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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