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Are synthetic a priori propositions informative?
Full text linkAccording to rationalists, synthetic a priori propositions convey new knowledge, whereas analytic propositions are non-informative or vacuous conceptual truths. However, as we argue in this article, each a priori proposition is necessarily true because of its semantic constituents and the way they are combined, and hence can be transformed into its equivalent analytic form. So each synthetic a priori proposition conveys only non-informative conceptual truths like analytic propositions
What is the history of philosophy of experimentation a history of? The cases of Hugo Dingler and Gaston Bachelard
Full text linkThough ‘experimentation’ as a philosophical topic is typically seen as a product of the 1980s, reflections on experimentation have a longer history. This longer history can be read as a hotbed of different ways in which the aim of philosophy of science was understood. This article illustrates this through an examination of Hugo Dingler and Gaston Bachelard, embodying different conceptions of what philosophy of science should aim for, and how reflecting on experimentation is part of that project. Therefore, to understand the history of philosophy of experimentation, we need to write a history of the aims of philosophy of science
Half Gauge-Dependent, Half Gauge-Invariant: The Aharonov-Bohm Effect Reconsidered
Full text linkThe standard semiclassical treatment of the Aharonov-Bohm (AB) effect, which predicts no observable phase shift for open electron paths in field-free regions due to gauge dependence, is shown to be incomplete. By fully quantizing both the probe electron and the electromagnetic source within quantum electrodynamics (QED), we derive an effective action that decomposes the AB phase into two equal contributions: a gauge-dependent probe phase from the source's potential acting on the electron, and a gauge-invariant source phase arising from the electron's quantum backreaction on the source via virtual-photon exchange. For open paths, where the probe phase vanishes under gauge choice, the source phase persists as a measurable part of the closed-loop value, isolated through a polarization--magnetization decomposition that separates its invariant bulk from a gauge-dependent boundary term. This uncovers a leading-order QED correction to nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, resolves longstanding debates on the AB phase's origin and locality, and refines gauge principles by revealing hidden gauge invariants in formally gauge-dependent quantities. While challenging to test directly, a conceptual scheme involving phase transfer to auxiliary qubits illustrates its potential observability, emphasizing its novelty beyond conventional closed-loop paradigms
Much ado about ‘n’othing
Full text linkThis article argues that a core area of the philosophy of biology—the philosophy of fitness—has for decades rested on fundamental conceptual and mathematical errors. These errors have been leveraged to support the position in the philosophy of biology known as statisticalism, which holds that biological fitness does not cause evolution, but is merely a kind of statistical summary of evolutionary outcomes. This is opposed to causalism, which holds that fitness is based on (causally efficacious) probabilistic propensities, a position known as the propensity interpretation of fitness. The error I focus on is the idea that fitness depends on population size, n, and because population size is not a causal quantity, fitness cannot be causal. In this paper, I show that fitness is not dependent on n and therefore a central critique of the propensity interpretation of fitness is ill founded
Perspectives on Quantum Theory
Full text linkThis paper considers the prospects for a quantum perspectivism that seeks to reconcile competing approaches to quantum theory as distinct scientific perspectives on quantum reality. In other areas of the philosophy of science, perspectivism holds the promise of a way to embrace pluralism without contradiction---what appear to be competing theories can be accepted because they each provide a distinct ``window on the same reality.'' The contemporary situation in quantum foundations is arguably a case of underdetermination. If this is so, this brand of perspectivism may offer a resolution
Foundations of Causation
Full text linkDrawing on historical episodes where new fields of science branch out of philosophy, I offer six distinctive developments involved in such episodes as a template that can be applied to the contemporary example of causation branching out of philosophy to become a new science. In a potted history of major developments in causation since the beginning of the 20th century, I illustrate how these developments occurred in important points in the ongoing discussion around causation. I conclude by giving a general characterization of what it is that foundations do in any science, what they do in causation, and where the next steps are needed to finalize this process of launching causation as an independent science
Positive Possibility and Representation in Modeling
Full text linkApparently modally laden terms and relations figure in scientific models, especially though not only possibility. There is an old empiricist tension between measurements as returning actual values, and stronger forms of modality. How could we measure what didn't happen, or use measurement to distinguish what didn't happen but could have, from that which did not happen and could not have? I offer several pragmatist points in the context of modeling and possibility specifically, by which to see this tension as a fruitful one. Peirce offers a view of positive possibility, where it prior to and required for actuality, and which can be differentiated from merely in-principle possibility. He also offers a view of doubt where it requires one suspend use of a belief and initiate an inquiry; views of possibility like those in Humean accounts, even pragmatic Humean views, are offering what amounts to a doubt about models that do not represent these, and only represent positive possibilities. This leads to a distinction by Price between e-representation and i-representation, where some representation is constrained externally by the environment, and some constrained internally by inferential connections. Putting these together provides a better way to understand how models can represent modality such as positive possibility, and how models can be used in ways that settle direction of fit
Mathematical Understanding
Full text linkThe philosophy of mathematics has traditionally been concerned with questions about the proper justification of claims to knowledge. The goals of mathematics, however, are not limited to making true mathematical statements; ultimately, we look to mathematics for understanding. This chapter considers the ways we talk about mathematical understanding in our assessments of historical and contemporary mathematical results, in our discussions of computers in mathematics, and in mathematics education. It argues that a theory of mathematical understanding should be a theory of abilities to think and reason mathematically, and that such a theory should inform, and be informed by, practical applications. It also situates models of reasoning and understanding in the context of symbolic and neural AI, which offer complementary perspectives
Defending constructive empiricism
Full text linkBas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism has significantly shaped the debate on scientific realism. However, many commentators have been puzzled by the precise nature of the argument for this position. This paper reconstructs that argument. The first half of the paper distinguishes between van Fraassen’s defensive moves and what he has called the “positive argument” for the position. Particular attention is given to elaborating this positive argument – namely, that constructive empiricism offers the best interpretation of scientific practice. The second half reflects on what it can mean to justify an interpretation of science, and it considers the implications for the scientific realism debate. It is shown that a crucial distinction must be made. On the one hand, the aim of science is historically instituted by scientific practice as a collective endeavor. On the other hand, the question of what to believe is determined by an epistemic policy for which each individual must take responsibility through the stance they adopt towards this collective practice. The overall aim of the paper is to demonstrate that constructive empiricism remains a very appealing position, grounded in a deep appreciation of the pluralist and historical dimensions of scientific practice – aspects further highlighted by the empiricist stance
Autonomy and Heterarchy: Organizing Control in Biological Organisms
Full text linkIn order to maintain themselves as systems far from equilibrium with their environment, organisms must control the operation of numerous production mechanisms. Control involves mechanisms that make or are responsive to measurements of conditions within or in the environment of the organism and that operate on flexible constraints in other mechanisms to adjust their operation. A frequent assumption of humans is that control mechanisms are organized in a hierarchical pyramid. However, control in biological organisms commonly deviates from several principles of hierarchical organization and is better characterized as organized heterarchically. To provide a positive understanding of autonomy, this paper advances several features of its heterarchical organization and illustrates them using control of glucose regulation in mammals as an exemplar