1,721,407 research outputs found

    Action and Interaction, Shaun Gallagher

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    En su libro introductorio a la feno- menología, en las primeras páginas, el filósofo estadounidense y profesor de la Universidad de Memphis, Shaun Gallagher, manifiesta una idea bas- tante llamativa en referencia a su interpretación de dicho método. Señala que el punto de partida del análisis fenomenológico se ubica en la concien- cia de que “nosotros, en tanto agentes que deben actuar y seres pensantes que intentan capturar lo que hacen, siempre nos encontramos ya situados en el mundo”

    Action and Interaction, Shaun Gallagher

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    Gallagher Shaun. Action and Interaction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. 301 pp.En su libro introductorio a la fenomenología, en las primeras páginas, el filósofo estadounidense y profesor de la Universidad de Memphis, Shaun Gallagher, manifiesta una idea bastante llamativa en referencia a su interpretación de dicho método. Señala que el punto de partida del análisis fenomenológico se ubica en la conciencia de que “nosotros, en tanto agentes que deben actuar y seres pensantes que intentan capturar lo que hacen, siempre nos encontramos ya situados en el mundo”

    A Review of Shaun Gallagher: How the Body Shapes the Mind

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    With 'How the body shapes the mind', Shaun Gallagher provides a general panoptic of the importance of the body in cognition, based on significant experimental results. His main goals here are (1) to describe body awareness in detail and (2) to investigate the influence of the body on self-consciousness, perception, language and social cognition. Here, I focus on two points: the distinction between the body schema and the body image and the structuring role of the body

    A Review of Shaun Gallagher: How the Body Shapes the Mind

    No full text
    With 'How the body shapes the mind', Shaun Gallagher provides a general panoptic of the importance of the body in cognition, based on significant experimental results. His main goals here are (1) to describe body awareness in detail and (2) to investigate the influence of the body on self-consciousness, perception, language and social cognition. Here, I focus on two points: the distinction between the body schema and the body image and the structuring role of the body

    El giro fenomenológico en las neurociencias cognitivas: de Fancisco Varela a Shaun Gallagher

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    [EN]Our doctoral dissertation is entitled "The phenomenological turn in cognitive neurosciences: from Francisco Varela to Shaun Gallagher". This subject is highly relevant and innovative because, as noted Edmund Husserl ([1911] 2009: 8), we are persuaded –even in our 21st century– that “it is still being discussed until today in what relation is philosophy with the sciences of nature and spirit”. This discussion has been rekindled, again and again, in the last decades with regard to natural sciences and cognitive (neuro)sciences. In this thesis, we wanted to contrast the hypotheses that drove our research: one general hypothesis and three special ones in derivation of the first one. Hence, we opted to formulate them as follows: • General Hypothesis (GH). There has been a phenomenological turn in cognitive (neuro)sciences, which was originally led by Francisco J. Varela and continued, after him, by Shaun Gallagher. o First Special Hypothesis (SH1). The above phenomenological turn is reaction and product of some particular assumptions pertaining to a naturalization project, which we intend to investigate. o Second Special Hypothesis (SH2). The above turn was originally promoted by the Chilean neurobiologist Francisco J. Varela in a determined intellectual and historical context. o Third Special Hypothesis (SH3). The above turn has been updated and ripened, without injury from other authors who claim a similar action, by the Irish-American professor Shaun Gallagher in a determined intellectual and historical context. If, on the one hand, GH comprehends all the present doctoral research, SH1 belonged to Part I, SH2 to Part II, and, as it could not be otherwise, SH3 to Part III. But before continuing, let's explain why we titled our thesis of the already enunciated form. Thus, the proposed title of this book is composed of various elements, as diverse was our standpoint: "Phenomenological turn", "cognitive neurosciences", "Francisco Varela" and "Shaun Gallagher". The very presence of these elements showed that we were faced with a research aimed to build bridges and not trenches between the different fields of knowledge. There is no work in our field of study that is strictly parallel to our chosen theme and authors. This point reinforced the originality of this book. By "phenomenological turn", an original expression of ours, we were not willing to mean the positioning towards the mind or the conscience as a problematic entity on the part of philosophy or the sciences of cognition, since it was something already done by authors like John Searle (1992 ), Ray S. Jackendoff (1987) or Owen Flanagan (1993), among others; but rather we denoted with it the exceptional turn towards phenomenology as a complementary method on the part, not of a qualified philosopher, but of a renowned neuroscientist with outstanding philosophical skills: Francisco J. Varela and his philosophical partner, Shaun Gallagher. They tried to step out “the relation between philosophy and empirical science [as] one-way enterprise [or] an application of ready-made concepts [where there is] no reciprocity, and there is no feedback. The application does not lead to a modification of the original analysis” (Zahavi 2009: 13)

    Shaun Gallagher, Ermeneutica e scienze cognitive. L’ermeneutica riconsiderata alla luce delle scienze cognitive

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    Nell’articolo “Hermeneutics and the Cognitive Sciences”, che si propone in traduzione italiana, Shaun Gallagher riflette sui possibili legami fra ermeneutica filosofica e scienze cognitive, soffermandosi sui punti riguardo ai quali le due prospettive di indagine concordano e sui contributi che esse si potrebbero fornire a vicenda. Una particolare attenzione è dedicata alla discussione delle caratteristiche della comprensione intersoggettiva, considerata alla luce del pensiero diltheyano e dei più recenti risultati delle scienze cognitive inerenti allo studio della soggettività. All’articolo tradotto si antepone un’introduzione che, oltre a presentare gli aspetti salienti dell’argomentazione di Gallagher, si prefigge di mettere in evidenza alcuni esiti del dibattito attuale sull’interdisciplinarietà fra studi umanistici e studi cognitivisti e neuroscientifici.In “Hermeneutics and the Cognitive Sciences,” which is proposed here in translation, Shaun Gallagher considers the possible relations between hermeneutics and the cognitive sciences, focusing on the points on which the two perspectives of investigation agree and on mutual contributions that each could provide to the other. Particular attention is given to the discussion of the characteristics of intersubjective understanding, considering both Diltheyan thought and the most recent results of the study of subjectivity within the field of the cognitive sciences. The article is preceded by an introduction which, in addition to presenting the most important aspects of Gallagher\u27s argumentation, aims to highlight some of the outcomes of the current debate on the interdisciplinarity between humanities, on one side, and cognitive sciences and neuroscience, on the other

    Drumming as Embodied and Mindful Performance: Observations on the Aesthetic Theories of Bill Bruford and Shaun Gallagher

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    In this article, I explore some questions concerning the aesthetics of musical performance. I approach this topic from a perspective influenced by some theoretical works of Bill Bruford, Shaun Gallagher, and Richard Shusterman, and choose the musical practice of drumming as a promising case to exemplify certain concepts and themes. Following various insights inspired, in particular, by Bruford and Gallagher, I argue for a conception of drumming as embodied and mindful performance, in contrast to other influential conceptions (sometimes suggested by philosophers, other times by drummers) that understand musical performance in general, and the art of drumming in particular, as mindless activities; namely, as a sort of selfless ‘flow’ without thought

    A self-fulfilling prophecy: linking belief to behavior

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    Moderated by Esther Sternberg (author of Healing Spaces: The Science of Place and Well-being), philosopher Simon Critchley (the New School for Social Research), cognitive scientist Shaun Gallagher (University of Central Florida), and physicist V.V. Raman (Rochester Institute of Technology) survey how the self is shaped by interactions with the environment; how free will, responsibility, and other traits emerge; and how character and virtue become targets for constructing the self. The following is an edited transcript of the discussion that occurred April 28, 2011, 7:00-8:15 PM, at the New York Academy of Sciences in New York City. © 2011 New York Academy of Sciences

    Educating the Right Stuff: Lessons in Enactivist Learning

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    On an enactivist conception of cognition, the unit of explanation is not just the brain, not just the body, and not just the environment, but the body–brain–environment understood as a dynamically coupled structure or gestalt. On this view, referencing Viktor von Weizsäcker’s metaphor of the gestalt circle (Gestaltkreis), the brain is not in the center of a circle issuing radial commands to elements on the circumference; rather, it is one element on that circumference, along with body and environment. Taking this idea into the educational context implies that one can intervene at any point on the circle to get results. One can, for example, enhance brain function by artificial means; alternatively, one can enhance intellectual performance through the learning of skilled or expressive movements (as demonstrated by the use of gesture in math education); likewise, one can improve conceptual understanding by manipulating the material and/or social environment (for example, through the use of virtual reality). On the enactivist view, interventions at any of these “parts of the cognitive system lead to modulations in the dynamic structure itself and the overall performance of the system. In this article, Shaun Gallagher argues on pragmatic grounds that given various adverse side effects from artificial stimulation of the brain, enhancements directed at the body and the environment are less risky and, for educational purposes are, at the very least, equally effective. To support this conclusion, he cites evidence from a study that uses whole-body action in a mixed reality simulation for science education

    Educating the right stuff: Lessons in enactivist learning

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    On an enactivist conception of cognition, the unit of explanation is not just the brain, not just the body, and not just the environment, but the body-brain-environment understood as a dynamically coupled structure or gestalt. On this view, referencing Viktor von Weizsäcker's metaphor of the gestalt circle (Gestaltkreis), the brain is not in the center of a circle issuing radial commands to elements on the circumference; rather, it is one element on that circumference, along with body and environment. Taking this idea into the educational context implies that one can intervene at any point on the circle to get results. One can, for example, enhance brain function by artificial means; alternatively, one can enhance intellectual performance through the learning of skilled or expressive movements (as demonstrated by the use of gesture in math education); likewise, one can improve conceptual understanding by manipulating the material and/or social environment (for example, through the use of virtual reality). On the enactivist view, interventions at any of these "parts" of the cognitive system lead to modulations in the dynamic structure itself and the overall performance of the system. In this article, Shaun Gallagher argues on pragmatic grounds that given various adverse side effects from artificial stimulation of the brain, enhancements directed at the body and the environment are less risky and, for educational purposes are, at the very least, equally effective. To support this conclusion, he cites evidence from a study that uses whole-body action in a mixed reality simulation for science education
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