1,720,970 research outputs found
El derecho como punto de partida del concepto filosófico de presunción: la contribución de Ullmann-Margalit = Law as a Point of Departure for the Philosophical Notion of Presumption: Ullmann-Margalit's Contribution
Full text linkThe present paper analyzes Edna Ullman-Margalit's contribution for the development of a philosophical concept of presumption (assume from the occurrence of a known fact the occurrence of an unknown fact in order to act on its basis). Ullman-Margalit takes the legal context as a departure point for her theory because she believes that technical legal language is more precise than ordinary language in relation to the concept of "presumption" and its terminological cousins. Given that her 1983 paper has been a reference to those who attempt to understand what it means to "presume", this paper will offer two objections to Ullman-Margalit's contributionEl presente paper analiza la contribución de Edna Ullmann-Margalit al desarrollo del concepto filosófico de presunción (asumir desde la ocurrencia de un hecho conocido la ocurrencia de un hecho no conocido a modo de actuar sobre él). Ullman-Margalit toma el contexto jurídico como punto de partida de su teoría porque, según ella, el lenguaje técnico del derecho dispone de más precisión que el lenguaje ordinario en lo que respeta a la “presunción” y sus parientes terminológicos. Dado que su paper de 1983 se haya convertido en una referencia a todos los que se dedican a qué significa “presumir”, aquí se ofrecerán dos objeciones a la contribución de Ullmann-Margali
Em defesa de um conceito jurídico de presunção
No full textThe current investigation proposes the redefinition of the legal concept of presumption. For that matter, it is taken as the starting point the conduction of a critical analysis of the treatment that procedural dogmatics has traditionally offered to presumptions. Identifying the need to develop improvements, the current investigation presents the defense of a redefinition of the concept of presumption in the field of law by reducing the application scope of said concept eliminating the ambiguities that presumptions represent when examined in contrast with other devices related to fact determination (such as burden of proof, legal fiction and probationary reasoning itself).La present investigació proposa la redefinició del concepte jurídic de presumpció.
Per a això, s'assumeix com a punt de partida una anàlisi crítica al tractament que la dogmàtica processal tradicionalment ha ofert a les presumpcions. Detectar la necessitat de desenvolupar canvis en ell, es presenta la defensa d'una redefinició del concepte de presumpció ao àmbit del dret a través de la reducció de l'àrea d'incidència d'aquest concepte, eliminant, doncs, ambigüitats que les presumpcions representen quan examinades amb altres eines relatives a la determinació dels fets (com la càrrega de la prova, les ficcions jurídiques i la pròpia noció de raonament probatori)
Em defesa de um conceito jurídico de presunção
Full text linkThe current investigation proposes the redefinition of the legal concept of presumption. For that matter, it is taken as the starting point the conduction of a critical analysis of the treatment that procedural dogmatics has traditionally offered to presumptions. Identifying the need to develop improvements, the current investigation presents the defense of a redefinition of the concept of presumption in the field of law by reducing the application scope of said concept eliminating the ambiguities that presumptions represent when examined in contrast with other devices related to fact determination (such as burden of proof, legal fiction and probationary reasoning itself).La present investigació proposa la redefinició del concepte jurídic de presumpció.
Per a això, s'assumeix com a punt de partida una anàlisi crítica al tractament que la dogmàtica processal tradicionalment ha ofert a les presumpcions. Detectar la necessitat de desenvolupar canvis en ell, es presenta la defensa d'una redefinició del concepte de presumpció ao àmbit del dret a través de la reducció de l'àrea d'incidència d'aquest concepte, eliminant, doncs, ambigüitats que les presumpcions representen quan examinades amb altres eines relatives a la determinació dels fets (com la càrrega de la prova, les ficcions jurídiques i la pròpia noció de raonament probatori)
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Full text link“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
El papel de las creencias en el control de la racionalidad judicial : una revisión crítica de la propuesta racionalista de Ferrer
No full text"Mi tesis se ubica dentro de la epistemología jurídica, es decir, bajo el estudio de cómo el juez, u otro sujeto dentro del proceso, razona y toma sus decisiones. En esta investigué si las creencias del juez deben considerarse al evaluar la racionalidad de su razonamiento y decisión. Me basé en mi análisis crítico de los planteamientos de Jordi Ferrer, que pertenece a la escuela "racionalista". De esta manera, mi tesis tiene tres capítulos: en el primero mostré los fundamentos de los deberes epistémicos del juez. En el segundo abordé las diversas posturas que conciben la diferencia entre la creencia y la aceptación. En el último, elegí el marco epistémológico que mejor podía explicar los deberes judiciales. Concluyo que si bien la aceptación es fundamental en el control de racionalidad, las creencias del juez también aportan información y otras garantías que dan cuenta de la racionalidad en su razonamiento y decisión."--Tomado del Formato de Documento de Grado."My thesis falls in the domain of legal epistemology. That is under the study of how the judge - or another subject within the process - reasons and takes his decisions. I investigated if the judge's beliefs should be considered when evaluating the rationality of his reasoning and decision making. I based my study on the critical analysis of Jordi Ferrer's "rationalist" project. My thesis is composed of three chapters: in the first I show the foundations of the judge's epistemic duties. In the second I address the various positions that conceive the difference between belief and acceptance. In the last one, I choose the epistemological framework that could best explain the judicial epistemic duties. I conclude that although acceptance is fundamental in rationality's control, the judge's beliefs also provide information and other guarantees that account for rationality in his reasoning and decision making."--Tomado del Formato de Documento de Grado.Magíster en FilosofíaMaestrí
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
Full text linkWe provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
El papel de las creencias en el control de la racionalidad judicial : una revisión crítica de la propuesta racionalista de Ferrer
No full text"Mi tesis se ubica dentro de la epistemología jurídica, es decir, bajo el estudio de cómo el juez, u otro sujeto dentro del proceso, razona y toma sus decisiones. En esta investigué si las creencias del juez deben considerarse al evaluar la racionalidad de su razonamiento y decisión. Me basé en mi análisis crítico de los planteamientos de Jordi Ferrer, que pertenece a la escuela "racionalista". De esta manera, mi tesis tiene tres capítulos: en el primero mostré los fundamentos de los deberes epistémicos del juez. En el segundo abordé las diversas posturas que conciben la diferencia entre la creencia y la aceptación. En el último, elegí el marco epistémológico que mejor podía explicar los deberes judiciales. Concluyo que si bien la aceptación es fundamental en el control de racionalidad, las creencias del juez también aportan información y otras garantías que dan cuenta de la racionalidad en su razonamiento y decisión."--Tomado del Formato de Documento de Grado."My thesis falls in the domain of legal epistemology. That is under the study of how the judge - or another subject within the process - reasons and takes his decisions. I investigated if the judge's beliefs should be considered when evaluating the rationality of his reasoning and decision making. I based my study on the critical analysis of Jordi Ferrer's "rationalist" project. My thesis is composed of three chapters: in the first I show the foundations of the judge's epistemic duties. In the second I address the various positions that conceive the difference between belief and acceptance. In the last one, I choose the epistemological framework that could best explain the judicial epistemic duties. I conclude that although acceptance is fundamental in rationality's control, the judge's beliefs also provide information and other guarantees that account for rationality in his reasoning and decision making."--Tomado del Formato de Documento de Grado.Magíster en FilosofíaMaestrí
- …
