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Compulsory Voting: A Mathematical Analysis
No full textTo address the policy question of whether a country should adopt compulsory voting, this thesis develops a novel mathematical framework for evaluating the trade-offs between compulsory and voluntary voting. We use a heterogeneous preference model with costly voting to quantify the social-welfare implications of both systems. Our analysis reveals that, although compulsory voting incurs higher participation costs, it can elect a more representative candidate---particularly when socioeconomic disparities cause voting costs to be correlated with candidate preference. By deriving social-welfare equations, we identify the conditions under which a switch to compulsory voting is beneficial; namely, when the benefit of electing a more representative candidate exceeds the additional voting costs.
Furthermore, we extend the framework to capture the dynamics of close elections and polarization, enhancing the model's realism. In doing so, we account for how ideological divides affect voter turnout and election outcomes. Finally, we apply our model to analyze U.S. presidential elections, providing an empirical example that demonstrates its real-world applicability. Overall, this thesis provides a quantitative foundation for policymakers considering electoral reform.Computer Scienc
PERCEPTRON VERSUS AUTOMATON∗
Full text linkWe study the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which the players are restricted to choosing strategies which are implementable by a machine with a bound on its complexity. One player must use a finite automaton while the other player must use a finite perceptron. Some examples illustrate that the sets of strategies which are induced by these two types of machines are different and not ordered by set inclusion. The main result establishes that a cooperation in almost all stages of the game is an equilibrium outcome if the complexity of the machines players may use is limited enough. This result persists when there are more than T states in the player’s automaton, where T is the duration of the repeated game. We further consider the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which the two players are restricted to choosing strategies which are implementable by perceptrons and prove that players can cooperate in most of the stages provided that the complexity of their perceptrons is sufficiently reduced.
Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers
Full text linkThis paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. It is shown that all public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments. A fast algorithm is developed that exactly computes the set of pure strategies equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors
In?nitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers
Full text linkIn this paper, we study in?nitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. We develop an effcient algorithm to compute the set of pure strategy public perfect equilibrium payoffs for each discount factor. We also show how all equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments.
Mechanism design theory: how to implement social goals
No full textConferenciaVideo realizado en la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas donde el Dr. Eric Maskin - Premio Nobel de Economía 2007 - brinda una conferencia en el día 10 de Octubre de 200
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
The Accidental Player: The EU and the Global Economy. Bruegel Working Papers, November 2005
Full text linkPaper prepared for a lecture at the Indian Centre for Research on International Economic Relations in New Delhi, 25 November 2005. Jean Pisani-Ferry says that while the US exercises leadership over the entire scope of international economic relations, Europe can be characterised as an ‘accidental player’ whose international behaviour lacks consistency
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