52442 research outputs found
Sort by
I’m a taxpayer … get me out of here? Evidence on attitudes towards simplifying the tax jungle
No full text
Vorvertraglicher Schutz der Entscheidungsfreiheit : das sog. Gebot fairen Verhandelns als neue Fallgruppe der culpa in contrahendo
No full text
Rethinking business process simulation: A utility-based evaluation framework
No full textBusiness process simulation (BPS) is a key tool for analyzing and optimizing organizational workflows, supporting decision-making by estimating the impact of process changes. The reliability of such estimates depends on the ability of a BPS model to accurately mimic the process under analysis, making rigorous accuracy evaluation essential. However, the state-of-the-art approach to evaluating BPS models has two key limitations. First, it treats simulation as a forecasting problem, testing whether models can predict unseen future events. This fails to assess how well a model captures the as-is process, particularly when process behavior changes from train to test period. Thus, it becomes difficult to determine whether poor results stem from an inaccurate model or the inherent complexity of the data, such as unpredictable drift. Second, the evaluation approach strongly relies on Earth Mover’s Distance-based metrics, which can obscure temporal patterns and thus yield misleading conclusions about simulation quality. To address these issues, we propose a novel framework that evaluates simulation quality based on its ability to generate representative process behavior. Instead of comparing simulated logs to future real-world executions, we evaluate whether predictive process monitoring models trained on simulated data perform comparably to those trained on real data for downstream analysis tasks. Empirical results show that our framework not only helps identify sources of discrepancies but also distinguishes between model accuracy and data complexity, offering a more meaningful way to assess BPS quality
Kant on permissive law
Full text linkThe concept of permissive law comes into play in several key passages of Kant’s writings in legal philosophy. Many scholars argue that Kant conceives of permissive laws as suspending moral demands, thus ‘permitting’ in the sense of tolerating morally wrong actions. In opposition to this view, this chapter submits that Kant takes permissive law to be a kind of moral licence. It lays the foundation of this interpretation through a reading of Kant’s discussion of permissive law in Perpetual Peace. As it argues, Kant follows Achenwall and Baumgarten in taking permissive law to be a species of prohibitive law, developing the concept of a law that specifies under which conditions certain actions are allowed. The function of the permissive law in Kant’s legal philosophy is neither to tolerate transgressions of prohibitions nor to regulate as such morally indifferent matters. As it shows, permissive laws are norms that specify under which conditions certain actions are allowed that would otherwise be forbidden. A permissive law licenses certain actions with respect to certain conditions. In the sphere of this licence, the actions are not merely tolerated, but genuinely permitted