189,885 research outputs found
Carnap, Kuhn, and the history of science
No full textThe purpose of this article is to respond to Thomas Uebel´s criticisms of my comments regarding the current revisionism of Carnap´s work and its relations to Kuhn. I begin by pointing out some misunderstandings in the interpretation of my article. I then discuss some aspects related to Carnap´s view of the history of science. First, I emphasize that it was not due to a supposed affinity between Kuhn´s conceptions and those of logical positivism that Kuhn was invited to write the monograph on the history of science for the Encyclopedia. Three other authors had been invited first, including George Sarton whose conception was entirely different from Kuhn´s. In addition, I try to show that Carnap attributes little importance to history of science. He seldom refers to it and, when he does, he clearly defends (like Sarton) a Whig or an “old” historiography of science, to which Kuhn opposes his “new historiography of science”. It is argued that this raises serious difficulties for those, like Uebel, who hold the view that Carnap includes the historical or the social within the rational
Kuhn and the genesis of the “new historiography” of science
No full textIn this paper I identify a tension between the two sets of works by Kuhn regarding the genesis of the “new historiography” of science. In the first, it could be said that the change from the traditional to the new historiography is strictly endogenous (referring to internal causes or reasons). In the second, the change is predominantly exogenous. To address this question, I draw on a text that is considered to be less important among Kuhn’s works, but which, as shall be argued, allows some contact between Kuhn’s two approaches via Koyré. I seek to point out and differentiate the roles of Koyré and Kuhn – from Kuhn’s point of view – in the development of the historiography of science and, as a complement, present some reflections regarding the justification of the new historiography
Kuhn, Sarton, and the history of science
No full textThe scientific work of Leonardo da Vinci may have served as the main inspiration for the historical research of George Sarton. Although he never produced a work he felt was worthy of its subject, the little that he did write about Leonardo reveals the importance he attributed to him in the history of science. This is especially clear in Sarton´s treatment of Leonardo and a discovery he did not make: William Harvey´s discovery of blood circulation in the 17th Century. In this article, we refer to this particular episode to trace Sarton´s conception of the development of science. It is a conception that illustrates well the traditional historiographic perspective that is the target of Thomas Kuhn´s criticisms. Although Kuhn never wrote about Leonardo or Harvey, we aim to show that he clearly positioned himself contrary to Sarton, albeit indirectly, with respect to this particular historical episode, as well
CSI : Kuhn and Latour
No full textI have been always most moved by those whose views I have ended up opposing. I say
'ended up' because the views are typically ones in which I originally invested considerable
study and interest. But then a version of the 'familiarity breeds contempt' principle
sets in, and my intellectual immune system generates antibodies that ward off later, more
virulent strains of such thinkers' thoughts. So fortified, I welcome the opportunity to
reflect on the significance of Kuhn (1962) and Latour (1987), who have been influential
figures in my thinking about science and technology studies (STS) ever since I began to
encounter the field as a graduate student in the early 1980s. In fact, I had read The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions (SSR) as part of Columbia University's required general education
course, 'Contemporary Civilization', in 1976. As for Latour's work, I first read
Laboratory Life in Mary Hesse’s MPhil seminar at Cambridge in 1980, and I remember
purchasing my copy of Science in Action (SIA) in the Brunel University bookshop shortly
after it came out in 1987. I had been there, I believe, courtesy of early Latour collaborator
Steve Woolgar. The trip also coincided with the founding of the journal Social Epistemology
at the Taylor & Francis headquarters in London. In both cases, my first impression was
very favourable – in a way that did not extend to the rest of their works
Análise e crítica do conceito de ciência normal de Thomas Kuhn e sua filosofia da ciência de viés histórico
No full textDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. Programa de Pós-Graduação em FilosofiaA obra Estrutura das Revoluções Científicas (1962), de Thomas S. Kuhn, foi responsável por promover diversos conceitos na área da Filosofia da Ciência relacionados a uma abordagem sócio-histórica da noção de ciência. Inspirado em filósofos e historiadores da ciência da primeira metade do século XX, Thomas Kuhn reuniu uma série de formulações e reflexões anteriores para dar origem a sua própria visão de ciência, uma contrapartida da visão estritamente analítica do fazer científico. Desse resultado, tomamos a ideia kuhniana de "ciência normal" a fim de estender sua compreensão em relação a outros conceitos já bastante aventados, como "paradigma" e "revolução científica". Tendo em consideração que o próprio filósofo encarregou-se de rever suas afirmações sobre esses conceitos, interessa-nos verificar até que ponto manteve a consistência de uma ideia de ciência normal em face das principais críticas que apontam, sobretudo, para o relativismo e o aspecto meramente rotineiro que Kuhn emprestaria ao fazer científico. Finalmente, buscaremos avaliar a sua elaboração e consistência conceitual no horizonte proposto por Kuhn que consiste em uma abordagem em Filosofia da Ciência que privilegia o viés históric
What can cognitive science tell us about scientific revolutions?
No full textKuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions is notable for the readiness with which
it drew on the results of cognitive psychology. These naturalistic elements were not well
received and Kuhn did not subsequently develop them in his published work. Nonetheless,
in a philosophical climate more receptive to naturalism, we are able to give a more positive
evaluation of Kuhn’s proposals. Recently, philosophers such as Nersessian, Nickles, Andersen,
Barker, and Chen have used the results of work on case-based reasoning, analogical
thinking, dynamic frames, and the like to illuminate and develop various aspects of Kuhn’s
thought in Structure. In particular this work aims to give depth to the Kuhnian concepts
of a paradigm and incommensurability. I review this work and identify two broad strands
of research. One emphasizes work on concepts; the other focusses on cognitive habits. Contrasting
these, I argue that the conceptual strand fails to be a complete account of scientific
revolutions. We need a broad approach that draws on a variety of resources in psychology
and cognitive science.
La estructura de las revoluciones científicas de Kuhn es destacable por la facilidad con
que aprovecha los resultados de la psicología cognitiva. Estos elementos naturalistas no tuvieron
una buena acogida y Kuhn no los desarrolló posteriormente en su trabajo publicado.
No obstante, desde un ambiente filosófico más receptivo hacia el naturalismo podemos ofrecer
una evaluación más positiva de las propuestas de Kuhn. Recientemente, algunos filósofos
como Nersessian, Nickles, Andersen, Barker y Chen han utilizado los resultados del trabajo
sobre el razonamiento basado en casos, el pensamiento analógico, los marcos dinámicos,
etc., para iluminar y desarrollar varios aspectos del pensamiento de Kuhn en La estructura.
En particular, este trabajo intenta dar profundidad a los conceptos kuhnianos de paradigma
e inconmensurabilidad. En este artículo examino dicho trabajo e identifico dos principales
corrientes de investigación. Una de ellas subraya el trabajo sobre conceptos y la otra se
centra en los hábitos cognitivos. Después de contrastar ambas, sostengo que la corriente
conceptual no logra ser una explicación completa de las revoluciones científicas. Necesitamos
una perspectiva amplia que aproveche una variedad de recursos de la psicología y la
ciencia cognitiva
[Totengedächtnis für Elisabeth Kuhn]
No full textTotengedächtnis für Elisabeth Kuhn (1775-1838)Bey C. Studer Lith. in Winterthu
Fortsetzung : [Die Geschichte der Familie Kuhn].
No full textContinuation of an unknown larger work about the history of the Kuhn family from Bissersheim/Palatinate and Worms, reaching back to late 18th century.Great-grandfather of author possessed land in the small town of Bissersheim (Palatinate). During the Napoleonic Wars he became a supplier for the French army. The grandparents of the author moved to Worms where Hermance Metzger (1864-1945) was born. A famous descendant of the Kuhn family is the American physicist Hans Bethe.Brief summary in Max Kreutzberger: "Leo Baeck Institute New York, Bibliothek und Archiv; Katalog": C 22
Five Decades of Structure: A Retrospective View
No full textThis paper is an introduction to the special issue commemorating the 50th anniversary of the publication
of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Thomas Kuhn. It introduces some main ideas of Structure, as its
change in historical perspective for the interpretation of scientific progress, the role and nature of scientific
communities, the incommensurability concept, or the new-world problem, and summarizes some philosophical
reactions. After this introduction, the special issue includes papers by Alexander Bird, Paul
Hoyningen-Huene and George Reisch on different aspects of Kuhn’s work.
Este artículo es una introducción al número monográfico que conmemora el 50º aniversario de la publicación
de La estructura de las revoluciones científicas de Thomas Kuhn. En la introducción se presentan algunas
de las ideas principales del libro, como su cambio de perspectiva histórica para la interpretación del progreso
científico, el papel y naturaleza de las comunidades científicas, el concepto de inconmensurabilidad o el
problema del cambio de mundo, y se resumen algunas reacciones filosóficas a las mismas. Tras la introducción,
el número monográfico está compuesto por artículos de Alexander Bird, Paul Hoyningen-Huene y George Reisch que versan sobre diversos aspectos de la obra de Kuhn
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