281 research outputs found
sj-pdf-1-mpp-10.1177_23814683221113573 – Supplemental material for Polarized Citizen Preferences for the Ethical Allocation of Scarce Medical Resources in 20 Countries
No full textSupplemental material, sj-pdf-1-mpp-10.1177_23814683221113573 for Polarized Citizen Preferences for the Ethical Allocation of Scarce Medical Resources in 20 Countries by Edmond Awad, Bence Bago, Jean-François Bonnefon, Nicholas A. Christakis, Iyad Rahwan and Azim Shariff in MDM Policy & Practice</p
From Philosophy of Science to Philosophy of Literature (and Back) via Philosophy of Mind: Philip Kitcher’s Philosophical Pendulum
Get PDFA recent focus of Philip Kitcher’s research has been, somewhat surprisingly in the light of his earlier
work, the philosophical analyses of literary works and operas. Some may see a discontinuity in Kitcher’s
oeuvre in this respect—it may be difficult to see how his earlier contributions to philosophy of science relate
to this much less mainstream approach to philosophy. The aim of this paper is to show that there is no
such discontinuity: Kitcher’s contributions to the philosophy of science and his more recent endeavors into
the philosophy of literature and of music are grounded in the same big picture attitude towards the human
mind—an attitude that he would undoubtedly call ‘pragmatic’: one that emphasizes the importance of those
mental processes that are not (or not entirely) rational.
El análisis filosófico de obras literarias y óperas se ha convertido en un objeto de estudio reciente para
Philip Kitcher, algo quizá sorprendente a la vista de su trabajo anterior. Hay quien puede percibir una discontinuidad
en la obra de Kitcher a este respecto: puede ser difícil apreciar cómo sus anteriores contribuciones
a la filosofía de la ciencia se relacionan con este otro tipo menos mayoritario de filosofía. El propósito
de este artículo es mostrar que no hay tal discontinuidad: las contribuciones de Kitcher a la filosofía de la
ciencia y sus empresas más recientes en filosofía de la literatura y de la música se basan en la misma visión
general del espíritu humano, una actitud que indudablemente él denominaría pragmática: enfatiza la importancia
de los procesos mentales que no son (o no completamente) racionales.
Copolymer-assisted nanodisc strategies for membrane protein purification, labeling, reconstitution and analysis
No full textAuthor Bence EzsiasDissertation Johannes Kepler Universität Linz 2024Arbeit nach Ablauf der Sperre auf den öffentlichen PCs in den Bibliotheken der JKU+Medizin abrufba
Copolymer-assisted nanodisc strategies for membrane protein purification, labeling, reconstitution and analysis
No full textAuthor Bence EzsiasDissertation Johannes Kepler Universität Linz 2024Arbeit nach Ablauf der Sperre auf den öffentlichen PCs in den Bibliotheken der JKU+Medizin abrufba
JOHANNES AQUILA\u27S WALLPAINTING FRAGMENTS FROM THE OLD PARISH CHURCH IN TURNIŠČE
Get PDFKljub temu, da je stara župnijska cerkev Marijinega vnebovzetja v Turnišču dobro znan spomenik gotskega stenskega slikarstva, se zahvaljujoč zanimanju številnih raziskovalcev vrednotenje njenega umetnostnozgodovinskega konteksta venomer dopolnjuje. Del k temu predstavljajo tudi »ponovno odkriti« fragmenti Akvilove stenske poslikave, ki so bili sneti ob zadnjih večjih konservatorsko-restavratorskih delih v sedemdesetih letih 20. stoletja. Od takrat pa so bili shranjeni v depojih Restavratorskega centra Zavoda za varstvo kulturne dediščine Slovenije v Ljubljani. Danes jih hrani Pomurski muzej v Murski Soboti. Gre za t. i. fragment s svetniškimi glavami in fragment z arhitekturnim členom iz prizora Marijine smrti in pogreba, ki sta se nahajala ob srednji konzoli južne stene prezbiterija, in z južne zunanjščine cerkvene ladje snet del monumentalne upodobitve svetega Krištofa. Ob že znanih fragmentih, uničene donatorske podobe dolnjelendavskih Bánfijev in Marije z Jezusom iz Narodne galerije v Ljubljani, predstavljajo slednji pravo novost, ki jim je do sedaj zaradi premajhne pričevalnosti in nedostopnosti bilo namenjeno razmeroma malo pozornosti.
Diplomsko delo jih v smislu ikonografske rekonsktrukcije vpenja v izrazito domišljeno shemo stenske poslikave v turniški cerkvi.Johannes Aquila΄s wallpainting made the old parish church of St. Mary Assumption in Turnišče the monument of an international importance. The art history evaluation of the wallpaintings was in process simultaneously with the restoration works in the 20th century. The part of the wallpainting, which was made in the third quarter of the 14th century by the Johannes Aquila΄s workshop, was removed in the process of restoration. The first group of the wallpainting fragments consists of the two fragments which were discovered in the 1920’s by the art historian France Stelè – St. Mary with Jesus (kept in the National Gallery in Ljubljana) and the ruined donor image of Ladislaw Bánffy. The collection of Pomurje Museum in Murska Sobota includes three fragments which were removed during the restoration works of Ivan Bogovič in the 1970’s. Beside the two fragments from the south wall of the presbytery, he also removed a part of the St. Christopher image from the south outside of the church ship. The author attempts to reconstruct the iconographic involvement of the fragments in the outstandingly designed scheme of the wallpainting in Turnišče church and place this work of art in the context of artistic and cultural creativeness of the late 14th century
Examen de l'hypothèse du décours temporel dans la théorie des processus duaux du raisonnement
No full textDans le champ du raisonnement, les théories du double processus sont largement reconnues comme expliquant différents phénomènes, tels que les biais décisionnels et le raisonnement moral ou coopératif. Ces théories conçoivent le mode de pensée de l'homme comme une interaction entre un système rapide, automatique et intuitif (Système 1) et un système plus lent et contrôlé (Système 2). Le point de vue dominant sur les double processus et le modèle default-interventionist qui suppose l'existence d'une interaction sérielle entre ces systèmes. Ainsi, quand quelqu'un est affronté à un problème de raisonnement, la réponse de Système 1 se forme initialement. Puis, le Système 2 peut être impliqué dans le processus. Les théories du double processus dominantes postulent que les biais de raisonnement sont le résultat d'une réponse intuitive erronée du Système 1. Selon ces théories le Système 1 est capable de générer des réponses basées sur les indices « heuristiques », tels que les stéréotypes - mais il ne peut pas rendre compte des principes logico-mathématiques. Malgré la grande reconnaissante qu'elle a reçu, cette théorie contient une présomption jamais testée, notamment la présomption « corrective ». Celle-ci postule que dans les situations où les indices heuristiques sont en conflit avec les principes logico-mathématiques, le Système 2 devient obligatoirement impliqué afin de corriger la réponse erronée de Système 1 et ainsi arrive à une réponse utilisant les principes logiques. Il semble donc crucial de tester cette présomption, qui est la question centrale de cette thèse. Dans l’Étude 1, j'ai utilisé des versions modifiées du paradigme de deux réponses afin de tester la présomption corrective utilisant deux problèmes classiques du raisonnement (problèmes de taux de base et de raisonnement syllogistique). Dans ce paradigme, les participants résolvent la même tâche deux fois. D'abord, ils doivent donner une réponse très rapidement. Après, ils font face à la même tâche sans contrainte temporelle. Afin de vérifier que la première réponse est intuitive, on a employé quatre méthodes : des instructions, une charge concomitante, un temps limite de réponse, ainsi que la charge concomitante et le temps limite simultanément. La théorie du double processus prédit que les réponses logiquement correctes n'apparaissent que dans l'étape finale. A contrario, j'ai trouvé que la plupart des participants ayant donné la bonne réponse à l'étape finale l'avaient déjà donnée lors de la phase initiale. Cet effet était présent dans toutes les procédures expérimentales et dans les 2 problèmes de raisonnement. Dans l’Étude 2, j'ai testé la même présomption avec un problème de raisonnement plus difficile, le problème de la « batte-et-balle ». J'ai conduit 7 expériences avec le paradigme de deux réponses et j'ai trouvé que les personnes ayant donné la réponse correcte à la fin l'ont déjà générée lors de la réponse initiale - donc, il semblerait que les participants l'ont fait intuitivement. Ces résultats m'ont amené à réviser le cadre default-interventionist et à proposer une théorie du double processus hybride qui suppose que le Système 1 génère deux différentes réponses intuitives dont une basée sur les principes logico-mathématiques. Ces réponses possèdent une force équivoque au début - celle qui gagnera plus en force sera donnée comme la réponse initiale. J'ai testé les prédictions dérivées de ce modèle via l’Étude 3. Grâce l’Étude 4, j'ai mis au point le modèle hybride en testant les changements de force des réponses intuitives au cours du temps. Au cours de l’Étude 5, j'ai commencé à tester la possibilité de généraliser ce modèle hybride et j'ai étudié si les patterns de réponse étaient similaires lorsque les participants répondent à des dilemmes moraux. Dans l’Étude 6, j'ai utilisé l'EEG afin de retrouver les corrélats neuronaux du traitement logique précoce au cours du raisonnement.Dual-process theories of reasoning have become widely recognized as an explanation for various phenomena, such as thinking biases, moral or cooperative reasoning. Dual-process theory conceives human thinking as the interaction of a fast, more automatic, intuitive system (System 1) and a slower, controlled, more deliberative one (System 2). Arguably, the most dominant view on dual processes is the default-interventionist model. This posits a serial interaction between the two systems. When someone is faced with a reasoning problem, initially a System 1 intuitive response is formed. Then, afterwards, System 2 might get engaged in the process. Prominent dual-process theorists argue that reasoning bias occurs as a result of erroneous System 1 intuition. System 1 is thought to be able to generate responses based on "heuristic" cues, such as stereotypes - and cannot account for logico-mathematical principles. Despite its huge recognition, this theory comes with an untested assumption: the corrective (time-course) assumption. This posits that in cases when heuristic cues are in conflict with logico-mathematical principles, System 2 needs to engage in order to correct initially formed System 1 intuitions, and form a judgement based on logical principles. Testing this assumption is inevitably important and the central question of this thesis. In Study 1, I used four modified versions of the two-response paradigm to test the corrective assumption with two different classical reasoning problems (base rate problems, syllogistic reasoning). In this paradigm, people are presented with the same problem twice. First, they are asked to give an initial, very quick response. After, they are presented with the same problem again and asked to give a final response without any constraints. To make sure that the initial response is really intuitive, we applied four different procedures: instructions, concurrent load, response deadline and load plus deadline. Dual process theory predicts that logically correct responses appear only at the final response stage. Surprisingly, I found that the majority of people who gave the logically correct response in the final response stage already gave it form the beginning. This effect was found to be consistent among all experimental procedures and both reasoning problems. In Study 2, I tried to test the same assumption, with a different -harder- reasoning problem, the bat-and-ball problem. Interestingly, I ran 7 experiments with the two-response paradigm and consistently found that correct reasoners are often able to generate the correct response from the beginning, so-to-say, intuitively. These results forced me to revise the default-interventionist framework and propose the hybrid dual process model. This model now argues that System 1 generates two kinds of intuitive responses one of which is based on mathematico-logical principles. These responses are generated with unequal strength - the one which gains the more strength will be given as the initial response. In Study 3, I directly tested predictions derived from this model. In Study 4, I further developed the hybrid model by testing the changes in the strength of intuitive responses over time. In Study 5, I started to test the hybrid model's domain generality, and test if I find similar patterns of responses when people are faced with moral dilemmas. In Study 6, I used EEG to search for the neural correlates of early logical processing in reasoning. Overall, this thesis found evidence that forces us to revise the traditional dual process view on human reasoning
Revise, resubmit and reveal? An autoethnographer’s story of facing the challenges of revealing the self through publication
No full textThis article presents a story of writing, revising and publishing an autoethnography of sporting injury. Using extracts from peer review comments and personal reflections both on these reviews and on the process more broadly, I show that although autoethnography can be a very challenging, even troubling, experience for the author, it can also be rewarding and empowering when editors and reviewers offer supportive and constructive comments and suggestions. I argue that greater consideration needs to be given to the aftermath of publication of autoethnographic accounts and call for wider debate about the ethics of asking authors to reveal more about their personal lives and weaknesses in the pursuit of academic goals. The article offers would-be autoethnographers one account of the writing, revising and publishing process in order to explore a number of relevant issues that arise when an author chooses an autoethnographic approach for conducting and presenting research
The Smart System 1: evidence for the intuitive nature of correct responding on the bat-and-ball problem
Get PDFInternational audienceInfluential work on reasoning and decision making has popularized the idea that sound reasoning requires correction of fast, intuitive thought processes by slower and more demanding deliberation. We present seven studies that question this corrective view of human thinking. We focused on the very problem that has been widely featured as the paradigmatic illustration of the corrective view, the well-known bat-and-ball problem. A two-response paradigm in which people were required to give an initial response under time-pressure and cognitive load allowed us to identify the presumed intuitive response that preceded the final response given after deliberation. Across our studies we observe that correct final responses are often non-corrective in nature. Many reasoners who manage to answer the bat-and-ball problem correctly after deliberation already solved it correctly when they reasoned under conditions that minimized deliberation in the initial response phase. This suggests that sound bat-and-ball reasoners do not necessarily need to deliberate to correct their intuitions, their intuitions are often already correct. Pace the corrective view, findings suggest that in these cases they deliberate to verify correct intuitive insights
Advancing the specification of dual process models of higher cognition: a critical test of the hybrid model view
No full textInternational audienceDual process models of higher cognition have become very influential in the cognitive sciences. The popular Default-Interventionist model has long favored a serial view on the interaction between intuitive and deliberative processing (or System 1 and System 2). Recent work has led to an alternative hybrid model view in which people's intuitive reasoning performance is assumed to be determined by the absolute and relative strength of competing intuitions. In the present study, we tested unique new predictions to validate the hybrid model. We adopted a two-response paradigm with popular base-rate neglect problems in which baserate information and a stereotypical description could cue conflicting responses. By manipulating the extremity of the base-rates in our problems we aimed to affect the strength of the "logical" intuition that is hypothesized to cue selection of the base-rate response. The two-response paradigm-in which people were required to give an initial response under time-pressure and cognitive load-allowed us to identify the presumed intuitively generated response. Consistent with the hybrid model predictions, we observed that experimentally reducing the strength of the logical intuition decreased the number of initial base-rate responses when solving problems in which base-rates and stereotypical information conflicted. Critically, reasoners who gave an initial stereotypical response were less likely to register the intrinsic conflict (as reflected in decreased confidence) in this case, whereas reasoners who gave an initial base-rate response registered more conflict. Implications and remaining challenges for dual process theorizing are discussed
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