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Brasilien und das Parteiensystem: Reformen und Kontinuität
No full textVor allem seit dem Amtsenthebungsverfahren von Präsidentin Dilma Rousseff im Jahr 2016 ist eine zunehmende politische Instabilität in Brasilien zu verzeichnen. Bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt hatte das Land noch nie so lange in einer Demokratie gelebt, doch angesichts der sich abzeichnenden akuten Schwachstellen entfachte sich erneut eine Diskussion über die Notwendigkeit, Anpassungen am politischen System vorzunehmen. Die angestrebten Veränderungen bezogen sich auf die Wahlen von 2018 und die Regierungsfähigkeit des nächsten gewählten Präsidenten. Auf der Grundlage einer empirischen Bewertung der 2017 vom brasilianischen Kongress verabschiedeten Minireform analysiert der Beitrag Daten der brasilianischen Wahlen auf Bundesebene und Ebene der Bundesstaaten (eleições gerais) von 2014 und 2018 sowie der Kommunalwahlen von 2016 und 2020. Ziel der Untersuchung ist, die Folgen der (Mini-)Wahlreform von 2017 auf das Parteiensystem zu untersuchen und die Auswirkungen auf den politischen Wettbewerb im Hinblick auf drei Aspekte zu prüfen: 1) die Auswirkungen der 2018 eingeführten Leistungsklausel (cláusula de desempenho), die auch als Sperrklausel bezeichnet wird, aber nicht wirklich der deutschen Klausel entspricht, da sie den Zugang zur Finanzierung einschränkt, aber nicht die Repräsentation im brasilianischen Parlament, 2) die Auswirkungen des Verbots von Wahlkoalitionen bei Verhältniswahlen auf kommunaler Eben (coligações proporcionais) und 3) die neuen Regeln der Wahlkampffinanzierung
Adverbial Account of Intransitive Self-Consciousness
No full textThis paper has two aims. First, it aims to provide an adverbial account of the idea of an intransitive self-consciousness and, second, it aims to argue in favor of this account. These aims both require a new framework that emerges from a critical review of Perry’s famous notion of the “unarticulated constituents” of propositional content (1986). First, I aim to show that the idea of an intransitive self-consciousness can be phenomenologically described in an analogy with the adverbial theory of perception. In an adverbial theory of perception, we do not see a blue sense-data, but we see something blue-ly, whereas in intransitive self-consciousness we are not conscious of ourselves when we undergo a conscious experience—instead, we experience something self-consciously. But what does this mean precisely? First, I take transitive self-consciousness to be the first-person operator that prefixes the content of any experience that the subject undergoes, regardless of whether or not the subject is self-referred. Further, I argue that this first-person adverbial way of entertaining a content of any experience in Perry’s revised framework fixes the subject as part of the circumstance of the evaluation of the content of her own experience. We can only evaluate whether the content is veridical of falsidical relative to the subject undergoing the experience. This is referred to here as “self-concernment without self-reference.” When I am absorbed reading a book, I do not self-represent my own experience of reading a book, let alone see myself as a constituent of the content of this experience. Even so, I experience that reading self-consciously in the precise sense that I do belong the circumstance of the evaluation of the selfless content of my experience of reading the book. The content of the experience of reading a book is simply a propositional function, true or false of myself
Social Ontology and Social Cognition
No full textThe aim of this paper is to show that there is a reciprocal dependency relationship between social cognition and social ontology. It is argued that, on the one hand, the existence conditions of socially meaningful objects and of social groups are about subjects’ social cognitive processes and interactive patterns and, on the other hand, social cognitive processes and interactive patterns are modulated by socially meaningful objects and social groups. I proceed from a historically informed distinction between social ontologies – between what might be called constructivist and emergentist theories of social reality. I then distinguish three theories of social cognition, theory-theory, simulation theory, and interaction theory, and argue that the first distinction and the latter map onto each other. Finally I argue that the reciprocal dependency between social ontology and social cognition can be justifiably though of as causal in Di Paolo et. al.’s (2010) sense of “downward” or “circular” causation.
It is concluded that the dependency between social ontology and social cognition pertain to both a methodological and a phenomenal level. First, research on social ontology depends on research on social cognition; and, secondly, social phenomena, involving socially meaningful objects and groups, influence social cognitive processes and interaction, which in turn influence social phenomena
The Two-Component Theory of Proper Names and Kripke’s Puzzle
No full textThis paper provides a defense of the description theory of proper names by constructing a ‘two-component’ theory of names. Using Kripke’s puzzle about belief as the stepping stone, this paper first points out problems with Kripke’s direct reference theory of names. It then presents the two-component theory of names and defends it against Kripke’s general criticisms of the description theory. It also compares the two-component theory of names against other leading description theories and shows how the two-component theory provides a better analysis of names. The paper offers a comprehensive summary of the debate between the description theory and the direct reference theory of names. At the end, it shows how the two-component theory of names can deal with Kripke’s puzzle and more
Reconsidering the Epistemology of Deductive-Inferential Validity
No full textUntil quite recently, the epistemology of logical laws has not been much discussed and neither has how one can be justified in claiming that a particular inference is valid. The transfer of warrant from premises to conclusion(s) in modus ponens will be examined in the paper through assessing Paul Boghossian\u27s inferentialist proposal of assuming \u27blind reasoning\u27. It will be argued that merely being justified in inferring according to a logical law a priori is worthless un-less one can also be justified in claiming that the inference is valid. An alternative to Boghossian\u27s solution will be presented which addresses this need as well as the needs Boghossian had iden-tified previously
Propositions: What They Could and What They Could not Be
No full textI defend the Fregean model of propositions: propositions are (a) the referents of that-clauses and (b) structured entities made of concepts. Schiffer (2003) has presented a group of arguments against the Fregean model and advanced an alternative view: propositions are unstructured pleonastic entities. My purpose is twofold: (i) to counter each of his arguments sketching the guidelines for a theory of concepts as basic constituents of propositions; (ii) to maintain that the notion of pleonastic entity is not robust enough for claiming the existence of propositions