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Two Dimensions of Rectificatory Climate Justice
Get PDFThis paper makes two points. First, García-Portela (2025) is an excellent proposal to address climate injustices and guide climate policy. García-Portela determines climate change related loss and damage by identifying the relevant injustices and linking them to climate change. Her version of the polluter pays principle overcomes relevant objections. She ensures that her proposal is feasible by engaging with attribution science and tort law practice. Secondly, one dimension of rectifying climate injustice is nonetheless underdeveloped. Many emissions happen(ed) with an attitude of disrespect for those likely to suffer from climate change. The relations between states responsible for the bulk of emissions and peoples likely to be worst affected are often already damaged through colonialism. The lack of climate action adds insult to injury. These relational climate injustices require rectification, too. García-Portela’s account is unsuccessful in grounding these but is well suited to be a part of a pluralist approach
Neutrality as a Twofold Concept
No full textUnder the circumstances of pluralism people often claim that the state ought to be neutral towards its citizens’ conceptions of the good life. However, what it means for the state to be neutral is often unclear. This is partly because there are different conceptions of neutrality and partly because what neutrality entails depends largely on the context in which neutrality is demanded. This paper discusses three different conceptions of neutrality – neutrality of impact, neutrality as equality of opportunity and justificatory neutrality – and analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the different conceptions in different contexts. It suggests that there are two common elements of neutrality in all its exemplifications: a) an element of “hands-off” and b) an element of equal treatment. It therefore argues that while justificatory neutrality is necessary for the state to be neutral it is not sufficient and claims that while conceptions of the good must not enter thejustificationof state regulations, they must be taken into consideration when deliberating theimplementation of these regulations.Il n’est pas rare, dans des sociétés pluralistes, que les citoyens exigent de leur État qu’il reste neutre eu égard à leurs conceptions de la vie bonne. Il est cependant rare que la notion de neutralité de l’État soit clairement délimitée. Ce manque de clarté s’explique de deux façons: d’une part, pour la raison qu’il existe plusieurs conceptions de la neutralité et, d’autre part, parce que la neutralité dépend essentiellement du contexte dans lequel celle-ci est requise. Cet article examine trois conceptions différentes de la neutralité - neutralité de l’impact, neutralité comme égalité des opportunités et neutralité de la justification - et analyse les forces et les faiblesses de chacune dans des contextes différents. Cette analyse suggère qu’il existe deux éléments constitutifs de la neutralité, communs à toutes ses différentes illustrations: a) un élément de non-intervention et b) un élément de traitement égal. Ainsi, cet article soutient que même si la neutralité de la justification demeure nécessaire pour assurer la neutralité de l’État, elle n’est pourtant pas suffisante, ce qui permet de soutenir que même si les conceptions de la vie bonne ne doivent pas interférer dans le processus de justification des régulations étatiques, elles doivent néanmoins être prises en considération lors des délibérations de la mise en œuvre de ces régulations
Education for Citizenship in a Changing Country
No full textThis chapter discusses some questions regarding the political theory of education in Ireland: 1. Which value commitments and attitudes should be encouraged to prepare children for their roles in society? 2. Who should decide what children learn? How is the role of the state to be balanced against that of parents and educational institutions? 3. How should education respond to increasing diversity and value pluralism? 4. To what extent should public education promote equality of opportunities? It identifies the concerns relevant to policy choices on these issues. The first section presents the basic structure of the Irish educational system. The second discusses its implications for debates on the authority and responsibility to educate, the third debates dealing with diversity, the fourth value education. The final section considers the idea of equality of opportunity in view of the different resources available to different schools
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Neutrality in political decision making
No full textLiberal neutrality – as understood in current legal and political debates – has two underlying intuitions and therefore two distinct elements. On the one hand it refers to the intuition that there are matters the state has no business getting involved in (hands-off element). On the other hand it is motivated by the idea that the state ought to treat citizens as equals and show equal respect and for their different conceptions of the good life (equality element). This thesis defends this two-fold understanding of neutrality with reference to Rawls’ conception of society as a fair system of cooperation and the idea of citizens as free and equal persons. In particular, the idea that citizens are to be treated as free justifies the hands-off element and argues that the state must be involved in nothing but justice. In the context of political decision making this requires the state to be justificatorily neutral. Treating citizens as equals requires the state to grant its citizens equal political rights and also to ensure that these rights have “fair value.” Given the danger that cultural bias undermines the equal standing of citizens the state has to ensure procedures of political decision making that are able to take citizens’ different conceptions into account. Treating citizens as free and equal therefore requires that the state bans all considerations of the good from being part of the justification of state action while at the same time taking these considerations into account when deliberating the way how these regulations are to be implemented
Climate change and international ethics 1
Get PDFClimate change is a complex collective action problem on a global and intergenerational scale. All sorts of otherwise unproblematic activities become morally questionable due to their contribution to the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. All sorts of pre-existing vulnerabilities increase the danger that changes in climatic patterns result in humanitarian catastrophes. Climate change thus poses challenges for normative theory as such. There are ethical questions such as: How to balance the right to development and poverty reduction with our duties to reduce greenhouse gases for the sake of future generations? There are conceptual questions like: How are we to understand normatively significant responsibility in the context of complex collective action problems? There are questions relating to ethical guidelines in circumstances of risk and uncertainty. Finally, there is the question of to how to motivate people to do the right thing where there is so much distance in time and space between those incurring the costs of combatting climate change and those most benefitting from preventing it. This links to policy questions as to what kind of political institutions are realistic, legitimate, and efficient in providing climate protections. There are particular challenges which require us to reassess our approaches to ethics in international relations: How are we to deal with the situation that those who hold the most power and have the greatest capacities for realising an effective global climate policy have the least incentives to do so? How are we to assess the relevant normative concerns when they involve issues more complex than those enshrined in the minimal ethical consensus of formal human rights? In particular, what kind of normative framework is suitable to evaluate across cultural differences issues as distinct as raising energy prices, job losses, increased risks relating to extreme weather events, threats to cultural traditions (e.g. Inuit relying on a particular quality of snow and Americans used to going for a Sunday drive in a powerful car), and the loss of statehood for low lying Small Island States doomed by raising sea levels? This chapter will not attempt to answer any of these questions. Instead it will analyse the different strands of these interconnected questions and present an overview of the current approaches. To do so, the first section briefly presents the current understanding of climate science that forms the background of the debate and explains which features are deemed as normatively significant. The second section identifies the different (yet interconnected) angles of debates on justice in the context of climate change. The third section takes a look at the different theories of justice most prominent in influencing the current debates and their shortcomings. The forth section hones in on the particular role of international relations in the latest approaches to climate justice focusing on the need for discursive and relational approaches to justice. The final section concludes this chapter highlighting the importance of continued commitment to the values underlying human rights in the context of demands for mutual recognition and a better understanding of the global public sphere.European Commission Horizon 202
Variations on the Author
Get PDF“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Neutrality as a Twofold Concept
No full text159 Under the circumstances of pluralism people often claim that the state ought to be neutral towards its citizens’ conceptions of the good life. However, what it means for the state to be neutral is often unclear. This is partly because there are different conceptions of neutrality and partly because what neutrality entails depends largely on the context in which neutrality is demanded. This paper discusses three different conceptions of neutrality – neutrality of impact, neutrality as equality of opportunity and justificatory neutrality – and analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the different conceptions in different contexts. It suggests that there are two common elements of neutrality in all its exemplifications: a) an element of “hands-off” and b) an element of equal treatment. It therefore argues that while justificatory neutrality is necessary for the state to be neutral it is not sufficient and claims that while conceptions of the good must not enter thejustificationof state regulations, they must be taken into consideration when deliberating theimplementation of these regulations. Il n’est pas rare, dans des sociétés pluralistes, que les citoyens exigent de leur État qu’il reste neutre eu égard à leurs conceptions de la vie bonne. Il est cependant rare que la notion de neutralité de l’État soit clairement délimitée. Ce manque de clarté s’explique de deux façons: d’une part, pour la raison qu’il existe plusieurs conceptions de la neutralité et, d’autre part, parce que la neutralité dépend essentiellement du contexte dans lequel celle-ci est requise. Cet article examine trois conceptions différentes de la neutralité - neutralité de l’impact, neutralité comme égalité des opportunités et neutralité de la justification - et analyse les forces et les faiblesses de chacune dans des contextes différents. Cette analyse suggère qu’il existe deux éléments constitutifs de la neutralité, communs à toutes ses différentes illustrations: a) un élément de non-intervention et b) un élément de traitement égal. Ainsi, cet article soutient que même si la neutralité de la justification demeure nécessaire pour assurer la neutralité de l’État, elle n’est pourtant pas suffisante, ce qui permet de soutenir que même si les conceptions de la vie bonne ne doivent pas interférer dans le processus de justification des régulations étatiques, elles doivent néanmoins être prises en considération lors des délibérations de la mise en œuvre de ces régulations
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