2,160 research outputs found
Oral history interview of 1988 YMCA Hall of Fame Inductee: Walter F. Worrill
No full textThis is an oral history self interview of the 1988 YMCA Hall of fame Inductee, Walter F. Worrill. The audio lasts for around 25 minutes. According to the tape the interview is recorded on December 17, 1988. On the tape Walter F. Worrill answers seven questions submitted by Mary Hedge, the director of Archives at the New York City YMCA.For more information on Walter F. Worrill, see https://springfield.as.atlas-sys.com/agents/people/750.Digital technician who digitized file wrote, "Slightly noisy, but intelligible
Anuson Walter Vella
No full textCremation volume for Vella, Walter F. (Walter Francis), 1924-1980, American author on Thailand; comprises condolences and papers on Thailand by both crematee and others
Vitalistic information systems in the South African public health system : a transactional analysis perspective
No full textIncludes bibliographical references
W. Lewis Civil War letter
No full textThis collection contains a letter written in November 1864 by W. Lewis, then stationed at DeValls, Bluff, Ark. The author is believed to be Walter Lewis of Company F of the 20th Iowa Infantry
Lt. Walter B. Smith
No full textDistinguished Army general, diplomat, and author later in life, Lt. Walter Bedell Smith is seen here in his army uniform during World War I. He joined the Indiana National Guard in 1910, attended Officer Candidate Training Camp at Ft. Benjamin Harrison in 1917, and served as a lieutenant in France. He was a native of Indianapolis and lived at 2001 Broadway. According to the Bretzman customer card he was in the 2nd Infantry and was stationed at Camp Sherman, in Chillicothe, Ohio.This image is a preservation copy made from an unstable original nitrate negative. The image is part of Series III
Introduction: Composition, Text, and Editing zu: James Joyce: A portrait of the artist as a young man
Full text linkVoucher funds in transitional economies : the Czech and Slovak experience
Full text linkVoucher funds have arisen in the transitional economies of Eastern and Central Europe that have used voucher privatization. These funds collect vouchers from citizens and use them to buy shares in enterprises. In the Czech and Slovak Republics, voucher funds are typically organized as corporations owned by the citizens who contributed their vouchers. Recently, they have also been organized as unit trusts (either open-ended or closed). A management company manages the funds under a contract that specifies the management fee. The management company is typically owned by the initial sponsor of the fund - for example, a bank. Voucher funds can give owners a diversified and professionally managed portfolio. More important, the funds select who sits on an enterprise's governance boards (which oversee management and profitability). Although experience is limited, the funds in these two countries have probably stopped most fraud and self-serving by enterprise mangers and are beginning to encourage the restructuring needed for profitability. A few funds have replaced poorly performing or dishonest managers; more often, because qualified replacements are few, they encourage managers to improve performance. There have been complaints about funds'performance. Some have made unrealistic promises to voucher holders and have appointed poorly qualified members to management boards. There is concern about conflicts of interest in the bank-sponsored funds and excessive control of enterprises. Funds typically lack capital or expertise to undertake restructuring - but few other potential owners are likely to be better qualified. The author examines 27 regulations that have been proposed for funds. Regulations in transitional economies, unlike regulations in most western countries, should encourage funds to play a strong role in corporate governance, he contends, as few potential owners have this ability. Most important, regulations should require that funds disclose information about their operations so their owners can monitor and control fund managers. The regulatory regime, the author says, should discourage monopolies and anticompetitive behavior; create incentives for fund managers to improve fund performance; discourage self-serving or fraudulent behavior by fund managers, and conflicts of interest; and eliminate high-risk investments unacceptable to fund owners. Because there is so little experience with these funds, the regulatory regime should not be unduly restrictive. As problems arise, regulations to deal with them can be added.International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Economic Adjustment and Lending,Economic Theory&Research,Agricultural Knowledge&Information Systems,Payment Systems&Infrastructure
Equivariant geometric K-homology for compact Lie group actions
No full text25 pages. v2: some mistakes corrected, more detail added, Michael Walter as author added. To appear in Abhandlungen aus dem Mathematischen Seminar der Universität HamburgLet G be a compact Lie-group, X a compact G-CW-complex. We define equivariant geometric K-homology groups K^G_*(X), using an obvious equivariant version of the (M,E,f)-picture of Baum-Douglas for K-homology. We define explicit natural transformations to and from equivariant K-homology defined via KK-theory (the "official" equivariant K-homology groups) and show that these are isomorphism
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