116,552 research outputs found
Descartes, Husserl and radical conversion
No full textPhenomenology has been one of the most influential and far-reaching developments in 20th Century Philosophy and has had a great impact on the disciplines of philosophy of logic and math, theory of knowledge, and theory of meaning. The most profound influence on Edmund Husserl (1859 - 1938), the founder of phenomenology, was Rene Descartes (1596 - 1650), whose radical rethinking of philosophy’s overall project provided Husserl with both the historical and conceptual point of departure for his foundation of prima philosophia. Despite this explicit and well-known influence, there is no book- length study of their thematic parallels; numerous Journal articles focus almost entirely on the phenomenological reduction and, aside from this, are fairly unsatisfactory. The purpose of the present work is to elucidate systematic convergences (and divergences) between Descartes and Husserl throughout their respective philosophical developments. This comprises explication of several central topics: 1. The parallel between 17th C. skepticism, which Descartes attempted to overthrow, and 19th C. psychologism and relativism, which Husserl reacted against. 2. The striking similarity at the level of formal ontology between Descartes' simple and complex natures and Husserl's part-whole theory. 3. A clarification of the Cartesian sense of methodical doubt and how Husserl's mistaking of this shaped the initial formulation of the reduction. 4. Convergence in the maturation of the primitive notion of intuition as "clear and distinct seeing" and "seeing of essences" for both thinkers. 5. An analysis of the modes of methodical doubt, in terms of steps in the cognitive act of doubting, and not merely in the content of that which is doubted. 6. Far-reaching divergences in that Descartes was motivated to establish with scientific certainly an entirely new world of being, whereas Husserl was concerned to disclose an entirely new sense of the world. As such, thematic convergences between Descartes and Husserl are not due to accidental intersections of interest, nor are they curiosities of the comparative method in historical research. These parallels are intrinsic and systematic due to an overarching congruence in their visions of the starting point, methodological procedures, and reaction to pseudo-scientific matters-of-fact in the founding of a genuine philosophical project
Algebra and geometry in Descartes
No full textThe relations between algebra and geometry in Descartes' works are analized
O duplo significado do sentir e do pensar nas obras de Alberto Caeiro e Descartes
No full textDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Comunicação e Expressão. Programa de Pós-Graduação em LiteraturaA pretensão desta dissertação intitulada O duplo significado do sentir e do pensar nas obras de Alberto Caeiro e Descartes é investigar a relação entre o sentir e o puro pensar, usando como referência a poesia O Guardador de Rebanhos, de Alberto Caeiro, que apresenta de forma evidente o tema; e como este assunto é tratado nas Meditações Metafísicas de René Descartes, também de forma claramente visível. Podemos perceber em ambos os autores, uma diplopia, uma espécie de duplo olhar sobre a relação sentir e puro pensar. No primeiro capítulo vou falar sobre a tese do duplo olhar de Descartes, a respeito da relação sentir e puro pensar na leitura de Merleau-Ponty, salientando a visão de natureza. No segundo capítulo, parto da leitura das três primeiras Meditações Metafísicas para caracterizar a tensão que se pode verificar entre Descartes e Alberto Caeiro quando se referem ao puro pensar. O foco principal de Descartes, nas três primeiras Meditações, é o pensar puro, e neste ponto Alberto Caeiro critica o pensar puro. No terceiro capítulo, analisando as três últimas Meditações, percebe-se que há uma virada no pensamento de Descartes, no qual o autor inverte seu ponto de vista, aproximando-se da idéia de Alberto Caeiro. No quarto capítulo, mostrarei a leitura que outros autores fazem acerca do sentir e do pensar na obra de Alberto Caeiro, mostrando que assim como Descartes, este também ostenta uma diplopia, não do sentir, mas do pensar. The pretension of this work entitled O duplo significado do sentir e do pensar nas obras de Alberto Caeiro e Descartes is to investigate the relationship between the feeling and the pure thinking, using as reference the poetry O Guardador de Rebanhos, by Alberto Caeiro, that presents in an evident way this theme; and as this subject is treated in René Descartes' Metaphysical Meditations, also in a clearly visible way. It is possible to notice in both authors, the diplopy, a sort of double look about the relationship between feeling and pure thinking. The thesis about Descartes'double look regarding the relation of feeling and pure thinking, in Merleau-Ponty reading, pointing out the nature vision, will be treated in the first chapter. In the second chapter, I start from the reading of the first three Metaphysical Meditations to characterize the tension that can be verified between Descartes and Alberto Caeiro when they refer to the pure thinking. Descartes' main focus in the first three Meditations is pure thinking and, in this point, Alberto Caeiro criticizes pure thinking. In the third chapter, analyzing the last three Meditations, it is possible to notice that there is an alteration in Descartes' thought, in which the author inverts his point of view, approaching of Alberto Caeiro's idea. In the fourth chapter, I will show the reading that other authors do concerning feeling and thinking in Alberto Caeiro's work, showing that as well as Descartes, this also shows a diplopy, not of feeling, but of thinking
‘The Meditations as Meditation?: The Significance of Reading Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy from a Meditational Perspective’
No full textThis project considers the significance of the title of Descartes’ Meditations, asking questions of the nature and extent of the influence of the meditational genre on the text. Approaching the text from a meditational perspective is shown to be highly illuminative. Meditation is not just one ‘aspect’ of the text; rather, it impacts on its very nature, purpose and meaning.
Despite the quantity of research on the Meditations, the text often meets with heavy criticism. This is at least partly due to the way the text is approached; the compartmentalisation of ‘problems’ in the text, and the sidelining of ‘literary’ considerations in favour of the ‘philosophical’, create a fractured representation of the text. This thesis promotes philosophical and literary interdependency, by focusing the reader’s attention on the role of meditation in informing the text. It offers a fresh approach to the Meditations.
The thesis draws on comparisons with St. Ignatius of Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises, to assess if, and in what way, this type of meditational writing informed the Meditations. The thesis establishes a basic connection between Ignatius and Descartes, before giving Descartes a voice in explaining why he chose to so title his work, emphasising epistemological considerations. The final part builds a picture of how the meditational genre impacts on the reader’s interpretation of the Meditations.
By focusing on the importance of how the text is read, a consideration of the title is shown to be key in bringing about a more balanced understanding of the text. This sympathetic approach renders some of the classic ‘Cartesian problems’ less threating to Descartes’ project. Furthermore, reforming the way we read the Meditations has wider implications for handling other philosophical and theological texts. The focus on considerations of style and genre can be applied more widely, paving the way for fruitful textual interpretation
[Review of the book Essays on Descartes, by Poffman]
No full textIntroduction: Paul Hoffman's collection Essays on Descartes comes in a plain, not-quite-brown wrapper that camouflages the trailblazing work within. Hoffman is among the very first of recent Anglophone commentators to examine Descartes's anthropology (by which I mean his account of the full, embodied human being, not his fieldwork among exotic peoples). This book gathers together fourteen essays, all but two of which have been published previously, including such important works as \"The Unity of Descartes's Man\" and an abridged version of \"Three Dualist Theories of the Passions\". The essays are mostly unrevised, but the volume adds a helpful introduction and some new notes, many of which serve to cross-index views Hoffman has developed and refined over the last quarter-century. The essays cover a wide array of topics, including metaphysics, cognitive and moral psychology, and causation. Of course, not everything can be considered: the reader will find scant mention of Descartes's skepticism here, little on textbook concerns of epistemology or science, and nothing on method or mathematics, with the result that some works of Descartes come in for little discussion. Eschewing these time-worn subjects allows Hoffman to address with great thoroughness issues equally close to Descartes's heart but much less familiar to general audiences today
Descartes, pionir prosvjetiteljstva
No full textThe article addresses the fundamental elements of Descartes’ embeddedness in the mediaeval and ancient tradition. The more elaborate explication of the common elements, shared by Descartes and his predecessors, enables us to reveal more clearly the rupture point in Descartes’ thought, and shows clearly in the direction of his undisputed legacy for the later times, including French Materialism.
Special attention is paid to M. Heidegger’s claim, based on his specific understanding of the history of philosophy, that Descartes represents the paradigmatic shift in the self-understanding of man, which crucially marks the latter development of philosophy, both idealistic and materialistic. Yet another author worthy of explicating in this context is M. A. Gillespie, who clearly adopts Heidegger’s view and further corroborates Descartes’ ontological shift to be read from his markedly different theology.Članak se bavi osnovnim elementima Descartesove uklopljenosti u srednjovjekovnu i antičku tradiciju. Opširnije objašnjenje zajedničkih elemenata koje je Descartes dijelio sa svojim prethodnicima omogućuje nam da preciznije odredimo točku raskida u Descartesovoj misli te jasno ukazuje na njegovo neosporno naslijeđe za kasnija razdoblja, uključujući i francuski materijalizam.
Posebna pažnja posvećena je tvrdnji M. Heideggera, koja se temelji na njegovom specifičnom shvaćanju povijesti filozofije, da Descartes predstavlja paradigmatski pomak u samoshvaćanju čovjeka, koja je značajno obilježila kasniji razvoj filozofije, kako one idealističke tako i materijalističke. Još jedan autor kojega vrijedi spomenuti u ovom kontekstu je M. A. Gillespie, koji jasno prihvaća Heideggerov stav te nadalje potvrđuje kako bi se Descartesov ontološki pomak trebao sagledati sa stajališta njegove izrazito drukčije teologije
Descartes selon le néo-thomisme napolitain
No full textIl contributo riattraversa la lettura della neoscolastica milanese e in particolare di Gustavo contadini in relaziona allo gnoseologismo cartesiano e ai suoi effetti in Kant. Attraverso l’analisi dei testi kantiani documento la validità dell’interpretazione tesa a mostrare Descartes in Kant e Kant in Descartes proprio sulla teoria della conoscenza in relazione ai concetti di sostanza e caus
Descartes and the creation of the eternal truths
No full textDescartes' philosophy concerning the relationship between God and the eternal
truths has been an unresolved and problematic issue since he first declared it. For
Descartes, God's power is limitless and nothing can exist independently of Him. The
problem is that if that is true, things such as "God knows that he does not exist" are
possible because the truth of that proposition rests on God's power. In fact, the existence
of any eternal truth depends on God��������s power. Examples of such truths are: "the interior
angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles," "3+4=7," and "two contraries cannot
exist together." Descartes built his entire metaphysics around a certain conception of
God, a conception that includes His not being a deceiver. But if it turns out that God is as
limitless as Descartes thinks He is, Descartes' philosophy does not rest on as firm a
foundation as he believes. In fact, it is inconsistent: we know what we clearly and
distinctly perceive because God would not deceive us and his power is unlimited. But
since His power is absolutely unlimited, it might be the case that God is not a deceiver
and everything we know is true, but at the same time we have been misled by God and
there is an actual reality we are not, and will never be, privy to.
There have been a number of attempts to make Descartes�������� view consistent. I
consider two of the most recent and promising lines of interpretation. The first, Universal
Possibilism, holds that God��������s power is utterly limitless and He can make any proposition true, including problematic ones such as ��������I think, but I am not.�������� This theory argues that
what we can and cannot conceive are merely epistemic limits rather than indicators of
truth. The second, Limited Possibilism, maintains that God has power over the
possibility of any proposition. Any proposition, under this view, is possibly possible; this
preserves the integrity of the connection between what we conceive as true and what is
actually true. The major drawback to this line of thought is that it puts an unintuitive
limit on God: He can make something possible, but he can��������t then do the seemingly simple
task of making that thing true. I argue that a proper understanding of Descartes'
conception of the meanings of "possible," "impossible," "contingent,". "necessary" and
God's nature renders his position consistent. Descartes holds that God necessarily exists,
and his nature is immutable and the existence of anything else is contingent. If one
interprets Descartes' God to hold limitless power over contingent propositions, but not
over his nature or existence, Descartes' position is no longer inconsistent
DESCARTES and the brain
No full textRené Descartes (1596-1650), was a French mathematician, physicist, and philosopher, author of numerous texts, among which was the ‘Treatise on Man’ (L’Homme). There, he described the brain, after consulting authoritative anatomic texts, watching the work of butchers, and personally dissecting animals, and human material. His text, finished in 1633, and revised in 1640, was not published for religious reasons. A Latin translation was published posthumously (1662), and a French one two years later (1664)1,2. The brain, according to his hypothetical description, comprises a solid part constituted by “a tissue composed in a certain particular way” [nervous tissue]. He identified there two regions, a deep or internal one in direct contact with the cavities [ventricles] (EE), formed of a meshwork of filaments or ‘small tubules’ (AA), from which originate many delicate filaments, many occupy an external region, with intervals or ‘pores’ between them (BB), others course to the surface (CC), and longer ones converge caudally to form a stalk-like structure (D). In the middle of the brain is placed the gland H [pineal gland] (place of the ‘rational soul’). The whole structure is enveloped by a double membrane [meninges]3 (Figure). The ‘animal spirits’ (esprits animaux) are filtered by the pineal gland, and fill the cavities, being directed by the gland to the proper tubules, and pores, and from there by means of the stalk, to the rest of the body, constituting the basic mechanism underpinning the presumptive functions of this brain3.Thus, Descartes proposed, for the first time, a minute structure for this solid matter of the brain, although hypothetical, and based on it, a presumptive function
Le Vrai Descartes d'après M. Leroy
No full textCohen Gustave. Le Vrai Descartes d'après M. Leroy. In: Revue d'histoire moderne, tome 8 N°6,1933. pp. 56-58
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