106,840 research outputs found
Kant on truth-aptness
Many scholars claimed that, according to Immanuel Kant, some judgements lack a truth-value: analytic judgements, judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience, judgements of perception, and non-assertoric judgements. However, no one has undertaken an extensive examination of the textual evidence for those claims.
Based on an analysis of Kant's texts, I argue that:
(1) according to Kant, only judgements of perception are not truth-apt. All other judgements are truth-apt, including analytic judgements and judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience.
(2) Kant sometimes states that truth-apt judgements are actual bearers of truth or falsity only when they are taken to state what is actually the case. Kant calls these judgements assertoric. Other texts ascribe truth and falsity to judgements, regardless of whether they are assertoric.
Kant's views on truth-aptness raise challenges for correspondentist and coherentist interpretations of Kant's theory of truth; they rule out the identification of Kant's crucial notion of objective validity with truth-aptness; and they imply that Kant was not a verificationist about truth or meaning
Kant, Nietzsche, and the moral agent
This thesis examines Kant's and Nietzsche's treatments of the moral agent.
It argues for three broad conclusions. Firstly, it argues that, although Nietzsche's
explicit criticisms of Kant's conception of the moral agent can be understood only
in the context of Nietzsche's broader moral philosophy, neither these criticisms
nor their context are well understood by the prevailing literature. The thesis thus
engages with existing scholarship on the nature of Nietzsche's moral philosophy
and with the scanty literature on the relationship between Kant's and Nietzsche's
moral philosophies. Secondly, the thesis argues that Kant's conception of the
moral agent is not undermined by the criticisms which Nietzsche explicitly levels
at it, or, indeed, by others which are commonly made in Nietzsche's name. In
doing so, the thesis combines original interpretations of Kant with elements of
recent Kant scholarship. Finally, however, the thesis argues that neglected
elements of Nietzsche's own moral philosophy provide for a more sophisticated,
telling, and, indeed, original critical engagement with Kant's conception of the
moral agent is not undermined by the criticisms which Nietzsche explicitly levels
at it, or, indeed, by others which are commonly made in Nietzsche's name. In
doing so, the thesis combines original interpretations of Kant with elements of
recent Kant scholarship. Finally, however, the thesis argues that neglected
elements of Nietzsche's own moral philosophy provide for a more sophisticated,
telling, and, indeed, original critical engagement with Kant's conception of the
moral agent. Thus the thesis defends an original interpretation of Nietzsche's
moral philosophy and its critical relation to Kant's, and demonstrates the
pertinence of a certain neglected critical approach to Kant's conception of the
moral agent. On the basis of these conclusions, the thesis ultimately defends a
conception of the moral agent which, although Kantian, owes something to both
Kant and Nietzsche
Kant's productive ontology : knowledge, nature and the meaning of being
In this thesis I provide an interpretation of Kant's theories of knowledge,
nature, and being in order to argue that Kant's ontology is a productive ontology:
it is a theory of being that includes a notion of production. I aim to show that
Kant's epistemology and philosophy of nature are based on a theory of being as
productivity. The thesis contributes to knowledge in that it considers in detail
Kant's ontology and theory of being, topics which have generally been ignored or
misunderstood.
In arguing for Kant's productive ontology, I argue against Heidegger's
interpretation of Kant, which states that Kant understands being as "produced
permanent presence" or as divinely created materiality. Based on Kant's definition
of being as positing, I argue, by contrast to Heidegger, that Kant understands being
as the original productive relation between subject and object. This can also be
expressed as the relation between formality and materiality, or between epistemic
conditions and existence, that is productive of objects of experience. Being is not
producedness but a relation of productivity, through which both subject and object
are themselves productive. The subject is productive in its spontaneity, and nature,
determined as dynamical interaction, is interpreted as productive. The subject, I
will argue, does not understand nature as produced, but approaches it with a
comportment towards its production as object of experience. Because of its own
subjective productivity - spontaneity or "life" - the subject has a "productive
comportment" towards nature.
Ontology, I claim, concerns the realm of the productive relation of being, the
realm of the relation between epistemic conditions and existence, and therefore the
realm of possible experience. This marks Kant as divergent not only from what
Heidegger calls "the ontology of the extant", but also from the concept-based
ontology of the German rationalists.
The general aims of the thesis are, first, to argue that being for Kant is the
original relation between subject and object, and that ontology concerns this
relation; second, to argue that ontology and being are understood in terms of
production and productivity; and third, to argue that Heidegger is wrong to ascribe
to Kant an understanding of being as "produced pennanent presence". I approach
these aims by examining a number of Kant's texts in detail, focusing particularly
on Kant's theses about existence and being in The One Possible Basis for a
Demonstration of the Existence of God and the Critique of Pure Reason; on
Kant's philosophy of nature and dynamical matter in the Transcendental Analytic
and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science; on Kant's doctrine of
experience and objectivity in the Transcendental Deductions; on ontological
reflection and the productive comportment of "life" in the Critique of Judgment;
and on Kant's final theory of matter, life and production in the Opus Postumum
Kant, Heidegger and spacing
Kant's metaphysics of space
periods is explored via his
in both the pre-critical and critical
relation to Leibniz, the incongruent
counterparts argument, and the distinctive arguments of the
Transcendental Aesthetic. Sequentially, Heidegger's phenomenology of
space from the period of Being and Time is explicated in terms of
concepts like deseverance, directionality, region and equipmentality.
The two analyses are found to overlap on several key points. These
include: the priority of the whole over the parts, openness, and
exteriority and thus non-discursivity.
The points of overlap we call
'spacing' . Through further analyses,
it is discovered that the
concepts of spacing are precisely the concepts required by these two
philosophers even when they treat of subjects not normally considered
essentially spacial. These subjects include the nature of temporal
relations, of selfhood and self-constancy, and of the experience and
significance of art. The importance of spacing for these subjects is
individually discussed, as are possible reasons why the language of
space should be required
Valor e sentimento moral na teoria kantiana
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia.Há muito tempo, os leitores de Kant têm se questionado a respeito do valor que Kant atribuiu à ação por dever, pois parece moralmente repugnante não recomendar ações acompanhadas por algum sentimento ou inclinação para realizar o que se deve realizar. Esse problema já foi abordado por Schiller e atualmente alguns comentadores como Richard Henson, Barbara Herman, Paul Guyer e Marcia Baron tem discutido sobre o valor moral e a sobredeterminação da ação por dever em Kant. Entre os problemas a serem examinados estão: Quais as circunstâncias nas quais podemos dizer que alguém agiu por dever? A presença de incentivos cooperativos como, por exemplo, a simpatia e a compaixão, determinam que essa ação não foi feita por dever? Não deve existir qualquer outro sentimento moral, mas somente o dever na prática da ação moral? Com isso, pretendemos investigar o caráter e a função do valor e do sentimento moral na teoria kantiana, tanto em uma leitura da Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes como na Doutrina das Virtudes e, assim, verificar se é possível a sobredeterminação da ação por dever e se há uma possibilidade de que incentivos como a simpatia possam estar presentes na prática da ação moral, sem invalidar seu valor moral
Reflexões referentes à relação entre alma, ânimo e prazer nos juízos estéticos em Kant
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2013.O objetivo principal desta dissertação é colaborar na discussão referente à disposição de ânimo (ou a forma com que o ânimo articula as faculdades da alma) que possibilita apreciações estéticas. O problema que nos move pode ser expresso da seguinte forma: em Kant, a partir da consideração de que tanto a alma quanto o ânimo não são materiais, e, cientes de que a espécie de prazer inerente à apreciação estética possui relação necessária com a disposição de ânimo, em que perspectivas a teoria kantiana sustenta esta relação específica entre alma e ânimo (não materiais) influenciando e sendo influenciados pelo corpo (material), em especial no que concerne ao prazer na apreciação estética? A partir disso, nos propomos a examinar as considerações de Kant referentes ao ânimo e a alma, para posteriormente discutir a abordagem expressa na primeira parte da Crítica da Faculdade do Juízo referente à espécie de prazer na apreciação estética, priorizando a necessidade de uma disposição de ânimo específica que possibilita a apreciação estética. The general objective of this dissertation is the collaboration in the discussion regarding the mood disposal (or the way the mood articulates the faculties of the soul) that enables aesthetic contemplation. The problem that moves us can be expressed as follows: for Kant, considering that the soul and the mood are not material, and, aware that the kind of pleasure inherent to aesthetic appreciation has a necessary relation to the mood disposal, in which prospects does the Kantian theory hold that specific relation between soul and mood (non-material), influencing and being influenced by the body (material), especially regarding pleasure in aesthetic appreciation? We propose to examine Kant's considerations regarding mood and soul, to further discuss the approach expressed in the first part of Critique of the Power of Judgment concerning the kind of pleasure in aesthetic appreciation, emphasizing the need of a specific mood disposal that enables aesthetic appreciation
A Relação entre ética e direito na filosofia de Immanuel Kant
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. Programa de Pós-graduação em FilosofiaEm 1797, Immanuel Kant publicou A Metafísica dos Costumes, texto que compõe o sistema de sua filosofia prática e subdividi-se em uma doutrina do direito e uma doutrina da virtude. Tal trabalho filosófico gera interpretações distintas por parte de estudiosos, especialmente acerca da relação entre ética e direito no pensamento kantiano. Não obstante, é possível dizer que esta relação precisa ser esclarecida a partir dos conceitos kantianos de Moral, Ética e Direito, para expor o fundamento das leis éticas e das leis jurídicas e a forma de apreendê-las, e também para estabelecer uma diferença entre Ética e Direito, para a qual se recorre ao conceito de legislação. Não apenas a Ética, mas também o Direito tem, numa interpretação específica, de justificar-se por meio da moral envolvendo, portanto, também a concepção de Crítica no sentido de desenvolver o conceito de liberdade. Entendendo que ao estabelecer as relações entre a legislação ética e a legislação jurídica, a partir de uma unidade comum, bem como sua diferenciação, seja possível elaborar os conceitos racionais puros do Direito e da Ética, que constituem o programa de uma metafísica dos costumes, o propósito do presente trabalho é expor a relação entre ética e direito no pensamento de Immanuel Kant, buscando apontar os fundamentos críticos da filosofia prática kantiana bem como sua articulação com a liberdade humana
A análise de Jürgen Habermas sobre a tensão entre direitos humanos e soberania popular na teoria do direito de Immanuel Kant
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2009O presente trabalho tem o objetivo de reconstruir a crítica de Habermas à relação entre os Direitos humanos e a Soberania popular na teoria do direito de Kant. A teoria do discurso de Habermas observa que a teoria do direito de Kant almejou resolver a dialética entre os direitos humanos e a soberania popular por meio da interligação entre o princípio da vontade unida do povo e o princípio do direito em sua subordinação ao princípio moral. Habermas realiza uma reconstrução do sistema jurídico com o objetivo de resolver o aparente conflito entre os direitos humanos e a soberania popular na legitimação do direito. Nesse sentido, a Teoria do discurso defende que por meio da compreensão de uma eqüiprimordialidade [Gleichursprünglichkeit] no surgimento da soberania popular e dos direitos humanos é possível reconstruir de forma correta e legítima o sistema jurídico.The present work aims at reconstructing Habermas' criticism of the relationship between human rights and popular sovereignty in Kant's theory of law. Habermas' discourse theory maintains that Kant's theory of law aims at solving the dialectic between human rights and popular sovereignty by interconnecting the principle of the united will of the people and the principle of law in its subordination to moral principle. Habermas offers a reconstruction of the legal system in order to solve the apparent conflict between human rights and popular sovereignty in the legitimation of law. In this sense, the discourse theory claims that by understanding popular sovereignty and human rights as being equiprimordial [Gleichursprünglichkeit] one can rebuild in a correct and legitimate way the legal system
Kant's dynamic theory of matter in 1755, and its debt to speculative Newtonian experimentalism
This paper explores the scientific sources behind Kant’s early dynamic theory of matter in 1755, with a focus on two main Kant’s writings: Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens and On Fire. The year 1755 has often been portrayed by Kantian scholars as a turning point in the intellectual career of the young Kant, with his much debated conversion to Newton. Via a careful analysis of some salient themes in the two aforementioned works, and a reconstruction of the scientific sources behind them, this paper shows Kant’s debt to an often overlooked scientific tradition, i.e. speculative Newtonian experimentalism. The paper argues that more than the Principia, it was the speculative experimentalism that goes from Newton’s Opticks to Herman Boerhaave’s Elementa chemiae via Stephen Hales’ Vegetable Staticks that played a central role in the elaboration of Kant’s early dynamic theory of matter in 1755
- …
