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Essays on the economic analysis of negotiations
No full textDans le cadre des actions en responsabilité civile, la proportion de conflits résolus par le biais d’un accord à l’amiable entre les parties reste très hétérogène à travers les différents pays. L’échec des négociations entre les parties sont sources de procès dont le coût est élevé, à la fois pour l’état mais également pour les parties impliquées dans le litige. Dans cette thèse, nous utilisons unelarge panoplie de méthodes empiriques afin d’étudier les variables susceptibles d’influencer la probabilité de conciliation entre deux parties engagées dans une action en justice. Les travaux réalisés se divisent en quatre grands thèmes. Dans un premier temps, nous réalisons une méta-analyse afin d’étudier la rationalité des individus dans l’un des jeux de négociations les plus simples : lejeu de l’ultimatum. Les résultats de notre analyse montrent que les proposants agissent de manière rationnelle et anticipent correctement le comportement des répondants qui leur font face, de manière à maximiser leur profit. Consécutivementà cela, nous réalisons une méta analyse comparative des jeux de l’ultimatum et du dictateur afin d’analyser l’hypothèse d’équité selon laquelle les offres formulées dans ces deux jeux ne sont pas significativement différentes. Notre étude permet d’établir une corrélation positive entre le niveau de développement des pays et la probabilité de rejet de cette hypothèse. Dans un troisième temps, nous nous intéressons aux variables susceptibles d’influencer la probabilité de conciliation entre deux parties impliquées dans un litige prud’homal en France. La présence d’un avocat pour le demandeur lors de la phase de conciliation ainsi que l’importance de la somme en jeu dans le litige semblent exercer une influence négative sur la probabilité de conciliation. Enfin, nous réalisons une expérience en laboratoire afin d’analyser le comportement des individus qui ne souhaitent pas négocier mais y sont tout de même contraints. Les résultats de notre expérience montrent que les sujets sont plus agressifs lorsqu’ils sont contraints à négocier. Cette agressivité se traduit par des offres moins généreuses ainsi qu’un taux de rejet plus élevé.In civil liability actions, the proportion of cases that are settled through conciliation remains very low in some countries. Negotiation failures lead to trials, the cost of which is high for both the state and the parties involved in litigation. in this thesis, we use a wide range of empirical tools to investigate the determinants that contribute to the success or failure of settlement between two parties involved in a legal action. We contribute to this topic through four original studies. We first investigate the rationality of players in one of the most simple bargaining games : the ultimatum game. For that purpose, we perform a metaanalysis of the three last decades of experimental research. Proposers’ choices, that do no match the theoretical equilibrium of the game, are found to be rationalegiven the observed behavior of responders. Subsequently, we perform a comparative meta-analysis of the ultimatum and the dictator game to investigate the “fairness hypothesis” according to which off ers in these two games are not significantly different. We find that the more developed a country, the more likely the “fairness hypothesis” is to be rejected. In a third place, we aim to identify the forces that shape decision-making in the pretrial conciliation phase of French labor courts. The results are twofold. First, conciliation is less likely when plaintiff s are assisted by a lawyer. Second, we find that the likelihood of settlement decreases as the amount at stake increases. Finally, through an original experiment, we empirically investigate the behavior of individuals who do not want to bargain, but are forced to do so. We show that individuals who are forced to bargain make less generous offers and are less likely to conciliate
Online Dispute Resolution and Bargaining
No full textWorking Paper du GATE 2003-04Automated negotiation process seems to be a powerful mechanism to resolve disputes arising from Internet-based transactions. Automated negotiation is an online blind-bidding process in which an automated algorithm evaluates bids from the parties and settles the case if the offers are within a prescribed range.\ Following the arguments of the dispute resolution professionals, the main advantage of this procedure is to promote ''natural'' agreements by restoring the parties' right to negotiate on their own, without the presence of a third party in the shadow of negotiations. Our purpose is to investigate this issue by modelling the automated negotiation process as a two-person bargaining game under incomplete information. A first result states that, given incomplete information, not all mutually beneficial agreements can be attained via the procedure. Furthermore, the settlement rule has a drastic effect on the players' strategies, which induce that the automated negotiation process does not significantly increase the likelihood of a settlement. The ability of the procedure to generate efficiency is only due to the costs imposed on parties if a disagreement occurs, that is the combination of players' risk aversion and uncertainty.La procédure de négociation automatisée semble être une solution adéquate aux litiges issus du commerce électronique. Cette procédure consiste en un programme informatique de résolution des conflits, accessible en ligne, qui analyse les propositions d'accord émises par les parties et résout le conflit si ces offres appartiennent à un intervalle prédéterminé. Selon la profession juridique, le principal avantage de ce mécanisme réside dans sa capacité à rétablir le droit inhérent des individus à négocier par eux-mêmes, facilitant ainsi l'obtention d'un accord librement consenti, sans l'intervention d'une tierce partie
Online Dispute Resolution and Bargaining
No full textWorking Paper du GATE 2003-04Automated negotiation process seems to be a powerful mechanism to resolve disputes arising from Internet-based transactions. Automated negotiation is an online blind-bidding process in which an automated algorithm evaluates bids from the parties and settles the case if the offers are within a prescribed range.\ Following the arguments of the dispute resolution professionals, the main advantage of this procedure is to promote ''natural'' agreements by restoring the parties' right to negotiate on their own, without the presence of a third party in the shadow of negotiations. Our purpose is to investigate this issue by modelling the automated negotiation process as a two-person bargaining game under incomplete information. A first result states that, given incomplete information, not all mutually beneficial agreements can be attained via the procedure. Furthermore, the settlement rule has a drastic effect on the players' strategies, which induce that the automated negotiation process does not significantly increase the likelihood of a settlement. The ability of the procedure to generate efficiency is only due to the costs imposed on parties if a disagreement occurs, that is the combination of players' risk aversion and uncertainty.La procédure de négociation automatisée semble être une solution adéquate aux litiges issus du commerce électronique. Cette procédure consiste en un programme informatique de résolution des conflits, accessible en ligne, qui analyse les propositions d'accord émises par les parties et résout le conflit si ces offres appartiennent à un intervalle prédéterminé. Selon la profession juridique, le principal avantage de ce mécanisme réside dans sa capacité à rétablir le droit inhérent des individus à négocier par eux-mêmes, facilitant ainsi l'obtention d'un accord librement consenti, sans l'intervention d'une tierce partie
Essays in Economic Psychology of Tax Evasion Behavior
No full textLe premier Chapitre utilise les acquis de la psychologie différentielle et de la psychométrie pour corréler le comportement d’évasion fiscale observé dans le laboratoire aux traits de personnalité individuels, mesuré grâce à des questionnaires psychométriques standardisés. Ces questionnaires de personnalité sont liés aux émotions morales, aux jugements moraux et à la soumission à la norme. Les résultats montrent d’abord que les questionnaires mesurant les émotions morales expliquent mieux les comportements d’évasion que les autres questionnaires. Ensuite, le pouvoir explicatif de ces traits de personnalité reste très modeste. Cette absence de relation forte met donc l’accent sur l’importance du contexte institutionnel dans lequel la soumission fiscale est mesurée. Les deuxième et troisième Chapitres tentent de mieux prendre en compte ce contexte institutionnel, en utilisant la psychologie sociale de l’engagement. Le second Chapitre montre que la modification de l’environnement du contribuable, à travers l’exposition à un serment à dire la vérité, accroît le niveau d’honnêteté des déclarations fiscales qui lui font suite. Le troisième Chapitre tente d’expliquer la cause du phénomène suivant : la démocratie directe, comme présente dans certains cantons en Suisse, serait la source d’une plus grande soumission fiscale. D’après la littérature existante, sa cause pourrait être soit une coordination sociale entre les agents, soit un effet d’engagement du vote en lui-même. Les résultats montrent que la coordination sociale entre les contribuables ne permet pas d’expliquer ce phénomène, qui reflate plutôt un effet d’engagement de la participation au processus électoral.The first Chapter uses differential psychology and psychometrics to correlate tax evasion behaviour observed in the lab to individual personality traits, measured thanks to standardized psychometric questionnaires. These personality questionnaires are related to moral emotions, moral judgments and norm submission. The results are twofold. First, moral emotions better explain evasion behavior than any other personality questionnaire. However, secondly, the explanatory power of these personality traits remains very modest. This lack of a strong relationship suggests that individual characteristics are of little help to understand and predict tax evasion behavior. It highlights the importance of the institutional context in which compliance is elicited. The second and third Chapters try to better account for this institutional context, using the social psychology of commitment. The second Chapter shows that a modification of the taxpayer’s environment, thanks to the exposition to an oath to tell the truth, increases the level of honesty of subsequent tax reports. Building on these results, the third Chapter investigates the hypothesis that direct democracy, as present in some cantons in Switzerland, could be the source of higher tax compliance. According to the existing literature, its cause could be either social coordination between agents or a commitment effect due to the vote itself. The results show that social coordination between taxpayers does not explain this phenomenon, which rather reflects a commitment effect of participation in the electoral process
Online Dispute Resolution and Bargaining
No full textWorking Paper du GATE 2003-04Automated negotiation process seems to be a powerful mechanism to resolve disputes arising from Internet-based transactions. Automated negotiation is an online blind-bidding process in which an automated algorithm evaluates bids from the parties and settles the case if the offers are within a prescribed range.\ Following the arguments of the dispute resolution professionals, the main advantage of this procedure is to promote ''natural'' agreements by restoring the parties' right to negotiate on their own, without the presence of a third party in the shadow of negotiations. Our purpose is to investigate this issue by modelling the automated negotiation process as a two-person bargaining game under incomplete information. A first result states that, given incomplete information, not all mutually beneficial agreements can be attained via the procedure. Furthermore, the settlement rule has a drastic effect on the players' strategies, which induce that the automated negotiation process does not significantly increase the likelihood of a settlement. The ability of the procedure to generate efficiency is only due to the costs imposed on parties if a disagreement occurs, that is the combination of players' risk aversion and uncertainty.La procédure de négociation automatisée semble être une solution adéquate aux litiges issus du commerce électronique. Cette procédure consiste en un programme informatique de résolution des conflits, accessible en ligne, qui analyse les propositions d'accord émises par les parties et résout le conflit si ces offres appartiennent à un intervalle prédéterminé. Selon la profession juridique, le principal avantage de ce mécanisme réside dans sa capacité à rétablir le droit inhérent des individus à négocier par eux-mêmes, facilitant ainsi l'obtention d'un accord librement consenti, sans l'intervention d'une tierce partie
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Get PDF“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
Get PDFWe provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
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