1,721,333 research outputs found

    Edward Nelson cloth purchases, Kendal

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    Edward Nelson "bot of the estate of C Rotch sattinett, fine cloth and 2 yds Battle green broad" $33.06 "against B.F. Hopkins." context unclear. 7.7" X 3

    Edward Nelson bill for services rendered

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    Between July 25, 1823 and November 27th 1825, Edward Nelson made vats and cider barrels for the Rotch estate for $9.01 paid on December 11th, 1823 by Arvine Wales after the death of Rotch in August, 1823. 6.25" x 3.75

    William Edward Nelson (1883-1953)

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    William Edward Nelson was the General Conference treasurer and the Washington Sanitarium board chair at the time of the 1946 General Conference session. This image may have been taken during his tenure as president of Pacific Union College during the 1920\u27s.https://scholarsrepository.llu.edu/general-conference-1946-gallery/1016/thumbnail.jp

    Targeting vs. Instrument Rules for Monetary Policy

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    Svensson (JEL, 2003) argues strongly that specific targeting rules first order optimality conditions for a specific objective function and model are normatively superior to instrument rules for the conduct of monetary policy. That argument is based largely upon four main objections to the latter plus a claim concerning the relative interest-instrument variability entailed by the two approaches. The present paper considers the four objections in turn, and advances arguments that contradict all of them. Then in the paper's analytical sections, it is demonstrated that the variability claim is incorrect, for a neo-canonical model and also for a variant with one-period-ahead plans used by Svensson, providing that the same decision-making errors are relevant under the two alternative approaches. Arguments relating to general targeting rules and actual central bank practice are also included.

    Targeting vs. instrument rules for monetary policy

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    Svensson (2003) argues strongly that specific targeting rules*first order optimality conditions for a specific objective function and model*are normatively superior to instrument rules for the conduct of monetary policy. That argument is based largely upon four main objections to the latter plus a claim concerning the relative interest-instrument variability entailed by the two approaches. The present paper considers the four objections in turn, and advances arguments that contradict all of them. Then in the paper*s analytical sections, it is demonstrated that the variability claim is incorrect, for a neo-canonical model and also for a variant with one-period-ahead plans used by Svensson, providing that the same decision-making errors are relevant under the two alternative approaches. Arguments relating to general targeting rules and actual central bank practice are also included.Monetary policy ; Banks and banking, Central

    Review of Edward Nelson, Milton Friedman and Economic Debate in the United States, 1932-1972 (volumes 1 and 2)

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    Edward Nelson, Milton Friedman and Economic Debate in the United States, 1932-1972 (volumes 1 and 2), Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 202

    Targeting versus instrument rules for monetary policy

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    Monetary policy ; Econometric models

    Edward Nelson, Milton Friedman & Economic Debate in the United States: 1932-1972, Volume 1

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    Abstract. Edward Nelson writes an intellectual history of Milton Friedman, who was a thought leader at the University of Chicago.  Friedman is mostly known for his work in macroeconomics and policy, but he also did important work in microeconomics and statistics.  His macroeconomic demand and supply framework extend into policy, where his work continues to influence economic debate.Keywords. Monetary policy, Milton Friedman, Economic debate.JEL. B21, D00, D20, D40

    Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis

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    The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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