1,721,060 research outputs found
La stabilité du secteur bancaire : gérer la négociabilité et la complexité
The Stability of the Banking Sector : Dealing with Marketability and Complexity.
This paper focuses on the proliferation of financial innovations as a decisive force affecting the stability of the financial services industry. A fundamental feature of more recent financial innovations is their focus on augmenting marketability which makes banks and financial markets more intertwined. We argue that the more intertwined nature of banks and financial markets adds complexity and induces opportunistic decision making and herding. In doing so, it has exposed banks to the boom and bust nature of financial markets and has augmented instability. Building on this, the paper discusses whether capital regulation and market discipline might be effective at countering the elevated instability. Wewill argue that market forces might be at odds with financial stability and point at institutional and regulatory changes that might be needed. In particular, structural remedies are advocated in order to reduce the complexity of financial institutions.
Classification JEL : G01, G10 G21, G24, G28.Cet article se concentre sur la prolifération des innovations financières en tant que mécanisme décisif affectant la stabilité de l’industrie des services financiers. L’une des principales caractéristiques des innovations financières récentes est qu’elles visent à augmenter la négociabilité, rendant ainsi la dissociation des banques et des marchés financiers de plus en plus difficile. Nous soutenons que cette nature plus interconnectée des banques et des marchés financiers accentue la complexité, provoque des prises de décisions opportunistes et des comportements moutonniers, exposant ainsi les banques au caractère cyclique (alternance de fortes expansions et de récessions) des marchés financiers et augmentant l’instabilité. En partant de ce constat, l’article tente de déterminer si une réglementation en matière de fonds propres et de discipline de marché pourrait être efficace pour contrer cette instabilité élevée. Nous soutiendrons que les mécanismes du marché peuvent être en contradiction avec la stabilité financière et nous mentionnerons les changements institutionnels et réglementaires qui pourraient s’avérer nécessaires. Plus particulièrement, nous préconiserons des mesures correctives de nature structurelle visant à réduire la complexité des institutions financières.
Classification JEL : G01, G10 G21, G24, G28.Boot Arnoud W. A., Marinc Matej. La stabilité du secteur bancaire : gérer la négociabilité et la complexité. In: Revue d'économie financière, n°106, 2012. Système financier et création de valeur. pp. 171-194
Why Hang on to Losers? Divestitures and Takeovers.
The author studies the divestiture decisions of managers who care about their reputations. Managers' divestiture and investment decisions are publicly observable, but managers privately observe signals with respect to the future payoff distribution of investments they have initiated. He establishes that in equilibrium there is too little divestiture. These inefficiencies create the opportunity for wealth-enhancing divestiture-motivated takeovers. A key result is that only managers of targets with "middle of the road" asset specificity should consider the takeover threat credible. These findings suggest that uniqueness of assets is an important determinant of both agency costs and takeover activity. The author's analysis leads to several empirical predictions. Copyright 1992 by American Finance Association.
Restructuring in the banking industry with implications for Europe
Set against the background of a rapidly consolidating financial sector, this paper explores the main forces that are driving this process. Acknowledging that the search for scale and scope economies is one of them, the paper emphasises that the empirical evidence in support of such economies is mixed, at best; while scale and scope economies exist, in principle, they are difficult to attain in practice. The paper considers strategic positioning in an uncertain and rapidly changing environment a more important factor: by expanding scope (and scale), financial institutions acquire options to venture into new activities. An implication of this strategic-option explanation is that consolidation, scope expansion in particular, will partially unravel as and when uncertainty declines and competition forces financial institutions to discover their true competitive advantages
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Credit ratingbureaus en de stabiliteit van de financiële sector
De kredietcrisis die afgelopen zomer is ontstaan roept de vraag op of credit ratingbureaus hun werk goed doen. In dit artikel wordt ingegaan op de rol die ratingbureaus spelen. De specifieke problematiek van ratingbureaus wordt geplaatst binnen het kader van de fundamentele herinrichting van de financiële sector die gaande is. Als er iets de hedendaagse financiële sector kenmerkt dan is het de toegenomen verwevenheid van financiële instituties en financiële markten. Dit brengt bepaalde risico's met zich mee. Zo laat de kredietcrisis, ook wel sub-prime crisis genoemd, een grote verwevenheid zien in het financiële systeem, met een soort 'olievlekwerking' die tot grote instabiliteit kan leiden. Waren het in het verleden louter grotere banken die er toe deden, nu is het een netwerk van diverse partijen van hedge fondsen, banken, verzekeraars tot pensioenfondsen. En wat hen bindt is de financiële markt waarin ratingbureaus zo'n belangrijke rol spelen. Hoe moet met deze verwevenheid worden omgegaan? Ik zal verschillende oplossingsrichtingen aandragen
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