1,721,085 research outputs found
Property identities and modal arguments
No full textMany physicalists about the mind are committed to claims about property identities. Following Kripke's well-known discussion, modal arguments have emerged as major threats to such claims. This paper argues that modal arguments can be resisted by adopting a counterpart theoretic account of modal claims, and in particular modal claims involving properties. Thus physicalists have a powerful motive to adopt non-Kripkean accounts of the metaphysics of modality and the semantics of modal expressions.Peer reviewe
Mark Johnston on whether Experience is Predicative
No full textComments on an early version of Johnston's "The Problem with the Content View" (in Berit Brogaard ed. *Does Perception Have Content?*, 2014) delivered at a workshop on perception at NYU in 2010
Assessing Ontologies: The Question of Human Origins and Its Ethical Significance 1
No full textIn their paper “Sixteen Days ” Barry Smith and Berit Brogaard try to answer the question: when does a human being begin to exist? In this paper we will address some methodological issues connected with this exercise in ontology. We shall begin by sketching the argument of “Sixteen Days”. We shall the
Review of Berit Brogaard, Seeing and Saying
No full textBrogaard's book is extremely informative about the grammar of perceptual verbs, and questions that it indicates representationalism (as opposed to naive realism). As useful as this is, I question how much grammar tells us much about perception
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On romantic love simple truths about a complex emotion
No full text"Romantic love presents some of life's most challenging questions. Can we choose who to love? Is romantic love rational? Can we love more than one person at a time? In On Romantic Love, Berit Brogaard attempts to get to the bottom of love's many contradictions."--Back cover
The Brentano-Sellars Puzzle
No full textVarious recent publications on Brentano are focusing on the so-called ‘Brentano-Puzzle,’ i.e., the question why Brentano, whose work was very influential, is discussed less among contemporary philosophers than might be expected. In this paper I argue that Brentano’s ‘invisibility’ can — at least in part — be explained by mechanisms that determine the way we look back on the history of our own discipline. The Brentano-Puzzle is a result of the way we write the recent history of philosophy, and is thus a phenomenon we encounter not only in the context of Brentano’s philosophy, but also with other philosophers. I will elaborate this point by drawing an analogy between Franz Brentano and Wilfrid Sellars. This analogy concentrates exclusively on their place in the history of philosophy and abstracts completely from the content of their philosophical positions. First I discuss this analogy in detail and then draw some conclusions concerning the Geography of Reason and the dynamics of the history of philosophy, using Brentano’s model of the Four Phases of Philosophy
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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