1,721,003 research outputs found
On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria
Get PDFThe paper studies the model of multilateral bargaining over the alternatives representedby points in the mâdimensional Euclidean space. Proposers are chosen randomly and the acceptance of a proposal requires the unanimous approval of it by all the players. The focus of the paper is on the asymptotic behavior of subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies (called bargaining equilibria) as the breakdown probability tends to zero. Bargaining equilibria are said to be asymptotically unique if the limit of a sequence of bargaining equilibria as the breakdown probability tends to zero is independent of the choice of the sequence and is uniquely determined by the primitives of the model. We show that the limit of any sequence of bargaining equilibria is a zero point of the soâcalled linearization correspondence. The asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria is then deduced in each of the following cases: (1) m = n−1, where n is the number of players, (2) m = 1, and (3) in the case where the utility functions are quadratic, for each 1 ≤ m ≤ n−1. In each case the linearization correspondence is shown to have a unique zero. Result 1 hasbeen established earlier in Miyakawa and Laruelle and Valenciano. Result 2 is subsumed by the result in Predtetchinski. Result 3 is new.microeconomics ;
On the Asymptotic Uniqueness of Bargaining Equilibria
Get PDFThis note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the equilibria of strategic bargaining games. Several papers in the literature obtain the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as the unique limit of subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies when the breakdown probability approaches zero. This note illustrates by means of two examples that this result depends crucially on the differentiability of the boundary of the set of feasible payoffs. In the first example the game has a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium that fails to converge to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. In the second example the game has two stationary subgame perfect equilibria that converge to two distinct limits as the breakdown probability vanishes. This example demonstrates that without differentiability of the set of feasible payoffs there is not even asymptotic uniqueness of stationary equilibria in the bargaining model.microeconomics ;
Preference Intensity in Positional Voting
No full textWe report a laboratory experiment on strategic manipulation in positional rules, by which individuals are asked to elicit a complete ranking over 3 alternatives. The prominent rule in this set is the so-called Borda Count, but our experiment also considers other rules in which we increase the score associated to the second-best candidate and vary the monetary prizes in case of a victory of the latter (“preference intensity”). Our results suggest that, as standard game-theoretic logic would suggest, when the intermediate scores and prizes increase, strategic manipulation is reduced. We also see that group size affects the likelihood of strategic manipulation in a non-linear fashion, and mostly depends on how the intermediate score is manipulated. Furthermore, rule efficiency increases with group size (i.e., as the probability of being pivotal decreases) and with both the intermediate scores and prizes.Financial support from the Spanish Ministries of Education and Science and Economics and Competitiveness (SEJ 2007-62656 and ECO2012-34928, ECO2011-29355, and ECO2011-29230), MIUR (PRIN 20103S5RN3\_002), Generalitat Valenciana (Research Projects Gruposo3/086 and PROMETEO/2013/037), Junta de Andalucía (SEJ5980 and SEJ4941), and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciónes Económicas (IVIE) is gratefully acknowledged
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Get PDF“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
Get PDFWe provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
Dispelling the Myths Behind First-author Citation Counts
Get PDFWe conducted a full-scale evaluative citation analysis study of scholars in the XML research field to explore just how different from each other author rankings resulting from different citation counting methods actually are, and to demonstrate the capability of emerging data and tools on the Web in supporting more realistic citation counting methods. Our results contest some common arguments for the continued
use of first-author citation counts in the evaluation of scholars, such as high correlations between author rankings by first-author citation counts and other citation
counting methods, and high costs of using more realistic citation counting methods that are not well-supported by the ISI databases. It is argued that increasingly available digital full text research papers make it possible for citation analysis studies to go beyond what the ISI databases have directly supported and to employ more
sophisticated methods
- ON THE CHOICE OF A POWER INDEX
Get PDFIn this paper, we review and compare the main power indices to be found in the literature, that is to say, the Shapley-Shubik index, the Banzhaf index, the Johnston index, the Deegan-Packel index, and the Holler-Packel index. Three diferent approaches are used. First, the power indices are compared on the basis of a priori properties that they should satisfy. Second, a players power indices are compared on the basis of a priori properties that they shoud satisfy. Second, a players power is interpreted as the probability of her or his vote being necessary to pass a proposal. We present two models consistent with this approach: a model in which this probability arises from the assumptions made on the coalition formation and model, in which it arises from the assumptions made on the players voting behavior. Third, a players power is dened as her or his probability of playing a crucial role. Some power indices are derived from diferent assessments concerning the probability of playing such a role. Illustrations of the choice of an index are given for actual decision-making processes.Collective Decision Making, Power Indices
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