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Social Engagement, Political Emotions, and Social Change
No full textThe main aim of the text is to address the formation of collective affective experiences in the time of
crisis, which may or may not lead to social change. I would argue that during social crises there is
the potential for the formation of (ephemeral) political communities with a strong emotional
overall outlook and ethos, which, however, have weak cognitive articulation of the content of their
joint commitment (shared believes and goals), albeit present in a negative form (awareness that
system is failing). It might seem that these communities represent groups in a weak sense. On the
other hand, the strong import of those communities to the individuals, as well as the situation of
crisis, accompanied with intense shared emotions and sense of belonging, advocate for the
opposite.
My main argument is that social engagement between actors is the condition of possibility of such
political communities, considering the initial absence of articulated cognitive and normative rules
which would institutionalize a group. Social engagement here might be understood as a process in
which collective attention to the norms and rules of social action emerges through interaction,
resulting in attempts to modify or reinforce them. Socially engaged acts as the interactions through
which first-person singular shifts to first-person plural.Workshop: Intersubjectivity of Affects and Social Change, Belgrade, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, May 27-28. 2024
Media Formats: Spectacularization of Violence, And The Violence of The Spectacle
No full textTema reprezentacija nasilja i tragičnih nesreća u medijima obrađuje se u članku kroz prizmu fenomena kakvi su kultura spektakla, senzacionalizam, kult poznatih i slavnih ljudi. Želi se preispitati kako, na koje načine, nasilni događaji, tragedije i protagonisti takvih priča nalaze svoje mjesto u medijskoj konstrukciji društvene zbilje, pri čemu je matrica spektakla središnji vrijednosni filter za takvu produkciju. Teorijsko-istraživački naglasak stavljen je na televizijsku medijsku proizvodnju, njenu logiku i pripadajuće joj formate. Stoga se i spektakl tretira kao jedan tip medijskog formata. Središnja je teza rada da nije problematično tek posredovanje reprezentacija slika nasilja, kriminala i tragedija u medijima, nasilni su i oblici formatiranja takvih sadržaja u spektakularne selebrističke medijske proizvode koji su kao takvi plasirani i ponuđeni publikama. Izvedeni su prikazi i analiza dva ilustrativna primjera iz tzv. regije.Representations of violence and tragic accidents in the media are discussed in the article through the prism of phenomena such as the culture of spectacle, sensa-tionalism, and the cult of the famous people. We want to reconsider how, in what ways, violent events, tragedies and the protagonists of such stories find their place in the media construction of social reality, while the matrix of spectacle is the central value filter for such production. Theoretical and research emphasis is placed on television media production, its logic and related formats. Therefore, the spec-tacle is treated as one type of media format. It is not only the representation of images of violence, crime and tragedies in the media that is problematic, the forms of formatting such content into spectacular celebrity media products that are marketed and offered to audiences as such, are problematic too. The paper features presentations and analysis of two illustrative cases from the so-called regions
Contribution To Freud’s of Notion of Culture: Concept and Criticism
No full textČlanak se zasniva na predstavljanju i kritičkom čitanju Frojdovog psihoanalitičkog razumevanja kulture. Sagledava se i preispituje značaj Frojdovih antropoloških poduhvata iznetih u delu Totem i tabu (1913) i njegovih opštih opservacija o kulturi u delu Nelagodnost u kulturi (1930). Utvrđeno je da Frojdova teorija nastanka kulture, u skladu sa antropološkim gledištima svog vremena, naglašava da primitivno društvo predstavlja prvi stepen razvoja kulture u vidu formiranja društvenih i religijskih institucija. Ipak, sa stanovišta društvene nauke, problematične su teze o prvobitnom oceubistvu, te nejasno izvedene pojmovne razlike između prirodnog stanja i društva. Zaključuje se da je njegova misao o kulturi, uprkos brojnim nedostacima, danas svakako dobrodošla pri zasnivanju jedne sveobuhvatne teorije kulture.The article is based on the presentation and critical reading of Freud’s psychoanalytic
understanding of culture. The paper reviews and examines the significance of Freud’s
anthropological endeavors presented in the work Totem und Tabu (Totem and Taboo)
(1913) and his general observations in the work Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (Civiliza tion and its Discontents) (1930). It has been established that Freud’s theory of culture
creation, in accordance with the anthropological views of its time, emphasizes that
the primitive society represents the first level of culture creation, in the form of creating social and religious institutions. However, from the social science point of view,
the problematic theses are the ones on originary patricide, as well as unclearly derived
notion differences between the natural state and society itself. It is concluded that
Freud’s thought about culture, despite its numerous shortcomings, is certainly welcome nowadays, when establishing a comprehensive theory of cul
Norm Compliance and International Status: National Human Rights Institutions in Domestic and Global Politics
No full textTraditional literature associates status‐seeking with aggressive behaviour based on state attributes such as military and economic capacities. This article argues that both material and ideational attributes help to confer status. It demonstrates that fundamental values, such as the rule of law and human rights, act as structural incentives for states to adopt prevailing international norms. It does so by analysing the creation of independent national institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights (also known as national human rights institutions [NHRIs]) in line with the Paris Principles adopted by the UN General Assembly. The article reaffirms the power of club membership in international relations, as governments choose to establish NHRIs despite the fact that these institutions serve to expose their human rights deficiencies and wrongdoings. It warns, however, that some governments might attempt to influence how NHRIs exercise their stratified rights as members of the global NHRI club (the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions) by pressuring them to align their views of the state’s human rights record in international forums with those of the government. The article sheds additional light on the importance of domestic political dynamics in status‐seeking and status‐keeping, which is an overlooked subject in the status literature. Finally, the article raises concerns about the pledge to create NHRIs in all UN member states by 2030, as expressed by Sustainable Development Goal 16, citing a genuine risk of individual NHRIs being captured by their governments in the current climate of democratic backsliding. In light of this, the article deepens our understanding of the interplay between global aspirations, status‐seeking, and the integrity of human rights institutions
Smrt naroda
No full textDeath, Derrida suggests in Politics of Friendship, is a question of numbers. Yet, death is also always “mine,” which is why Heidegger can say that “the dying of Others is not something which we experience in a genuine sense; at most we are always just ‘there alongside’.” Between my death and the death of everyone, between the one and the infinitely many, I have found myself wondering about a different measure, a more limited and distinct grammatical — or arithmetic — register, in which is raised the question of our death. The death, not of humanity, nor quite the death of all others, but the death of the people, the death of we who count and count for and on each other (or imagine we do). This is where Derrida’s calculability or incalculability of death intervenes at its most opaque, it seems to me. Somewhere between the one and the very many, the universal many of humanity, between what Heidegger calls “mineness” (which, when it comes to death, remains a possibility) and the death of (all) others, there would be found the death of we, the people.Smrt, kako sugeriše Derida u Politici prijateljstva, predstavlja pitanje brojeva. Ipak, smrt je
uvek i „moja“, zbog čega Hajdeger može reći da „umiranje Drugih nije nešto što istinski do življavamo; u najboljem slučaju, mi smo uvek samo ‘tu, pored’.“ Između moje smrti i smrti
svih, između jednog i beskrajno mnogih, počeo sam da razmišljam o drugačijoj meri, ograni čenijem i određenijem gramatičkom — ili aritmetičkom — okviru u kojem se postavlja pitanje
naše smrti. Ne smrti čovečanstva, niti baš smrti svih drugih, već smrti naroda, smrti nas koji
brojimo i koji smo bitni jedni drugima (ili to zamišljamo). Čini mi se da je upravo ovde Deri dina računljivost ili neizračunljivost smrti najneprozirnija. Negde između jednog i mnoštva,
univerzalnog mnoštva čovečanstva, između onoga što Hajdeger naziva „mojošću“ (koja, kada
je u pitanju smrt, ostaje mogućnost) i smrti (svih) drugih, mogla bi se pronaći smrt nas,
naroda
Empathy and collective welfare
No full textTekst se bavi fenomenologijom empatije kao specifičnog stava, ali i empatije kao etičkog
principa. U tekstu se pravi razlika između dva ključna razumevanja empatije u novijoj istoriji
filozofije: onog koje empatiju doživljava kao neku frstu “fuzije” ili povezivanja emocija
posmatrača i emocija onoga sa kojim se empatiše, koja se pre svega izvodi iz tradicije škotskog
prosvetiteljstva, a posebno David Hume-a, i onog koje empatiju shvata kao sposobnost za
saosećanje sa drugim, pri čemu se zadržava jasna svest o tome da primarna osećanja drugog sa
kojim se saoseća nisu naša osećanja. Ovo drugo razumevanje empatije značajno je razvijeno u
novijoj filozofskoj istoriji od strane Maxa Schelera, a eksperimentalno ga je potkrepio Martin
Hoffman u svojim istraživanjima uloge empatije u moralnom razvoju. Autori argumentišu da
drugo navedeno razumevanje empatije predstavlja empatiju kao relacionu emociju, odnosno
emociju koja se odnosi na supstantivne emocije drugog, i prave razliku između relacionih
emocija (emocija u vezi sa emocijama drugih) i meta-emocija (emocija koje osećamo u vezi sa
sopstvenim drugim emocijama). Oni dalje zaključuju da su relacione emocije osnova za
sentimentalističku etiku koja je sposobna da podrži princip moralne obaveze ili dužnosti. U
tekstu se dalje pokazuje zašto je pojam organske zajednice, zasnovan na uzoru funkcionalne
grupe čiji odnosi ne moraju biti posredovani institucionalnim procesima, sam po sebi povoljan
1 Autori su posebno zahvalni recenzentima za časopis Filozofska istraživanja, koji su svojim komentarima omogućili
da ovaj rad dobije na jasnoći i kvalitetu izlaganja. Sve slabosti rada su, naravno, isključiva odgovornost autora.
2
kontekst za unapređivanje mentalne dobrobiti, te uspostavljanje menahizama otpornosti koji
karakterišu samu konceptualizaciju mentalnog zdravlja. Autori smatraju da empatija upravo
doprinosi individualnoj i kolektivnoj otpornosti tako što ne negira individualnu ranjivost, nego je
transformiše u predispozicije za liderstvo koje je zasnovano na emocionalnosti i na percepciji,
čak i institucija i korporativnih struktura, kao “malih društava” u kojima ključnu ulogu igraju iste
vrste socijalnog kapitala kao u organskim zajednicama, pre svega moralne emocije poput
poverenja, empatije i solidarnosti.The paper deals with the phenomenology of empathy as a particular attitude, but also as an ethical
principle. The authors draw a distinction between two key conceptualizations of empathy in recent
philosophy. The first is the one that sees empathy as a sort of “fusion” or interpenetration of
emotions of the observer, and those the person who the observer empathizes with. This view of
empathy derives mainly from the legacy of the Scottish Enlightenment and in particular David
Hume. The other understanding of empathy discussed here is that which sees empathy as the ability
to fell for others, whilst maintaining a clear awareness that the primary emotions of the person
empathized with are not our emotions, or the emotions of the observer who empathizes. The latter
view of empathy is perhaps first attributable to Max Scheler, and has recently been experimentally
supported by Martin Hoffman in his research of empathy in overall moral development. The
authors presently argue that the latter concept presents empathy as a relational emotion (emotion
that concernsthe substantive emotions of other people). They make a distinction between relational
emotions and meta-emotions, namely the emotions we feel concerning our other emotions (e.g.
our fear of our own anger). Further, the authors argue that relational emotions are a foundation for
sentimentalist ethics, which can support the principle of moral obligation or duty. The paper goes
on to show why the concept of an organic community as a community that does not have to be
mediated by institutions, a useful context for enhancing individual and collective mental welfare,
even in h highly institutionalized societies, and how the concept of resilience, one of the
foundational concepts of the modern understanding of mental health and welfare, depends on
empathy as an organic relationship and a relational emotion. In its last section, the paper focuses
on the potential of empathy as a culture and as a skill to contribute to the development of organic
leadership, which has its place even in the most advanced corporate structures, and discusses how
the idea that even corporations prosper when they are perceived as “small societies” based on the same sorts of social capital as organic communities (trust, empathy, solidarity and other relational
emotions) depends on emotional skills that are endowed with moral normativity as well
The Status of the Body in Purist Plasticity
No full textThis paper explores the notion of plasticity within the discourse of Purism, reflecting on how the meaning of corporeality inherent in this notion relates to the movement’s key premises. In the context of neo-classicist tendencies in post-First World War French art, Amédée Ozenfant and Charles-Édouard Jeanneret emphasized the significance of plastic reality as the sole domain enabling the creation of “pure” art. In their view, neglecting the laws of the physical world leads to an “art of allusions,” where the essence of an artwork is derived not from its plastic base, but from secondary, symbolic conventions. However, for Ozenfant and Jeanneret, the perspectivism of plastic experience offers only fragmentary knowledge, because it fails to empirically grasp the
whole of a plastic entity. They emphasize the necessity of reconstructing “total plasticity,” which becomes possible only through the intellectual organization of primary, experiential cognitions. This represents an intelligible detachment from experiential continuity and the immediacy of the body. Such activity of the mind is not aimed at diverging from the physics of plasticity, but rather at expressing its universal laws beyond the mere appearance of plastic objects. The process of purification, understood as the transition from an empirical to a formal approach to plastic reality, will be used to explain the ambiguity of the notion of plasticity in Purist discourse. The movement’s approach to the question of the body will be analyzed by starting with the polysemy of the substantive la plastique used by Jeanneret and Ozenfant, which, in addition to referring to modelling and sculpture, also introduces meanings such as “the form of the body.” In this context, the paper will seek to explain how such an “organic” view of the body relates to the movement’s evolutionary definitions of the purification of corporeal objects
Tri filozofema Holokausta
No full textРад је посвећен начинима на које је филозофско и теолошко
мишљење настојало да без огрешења концептуализује Холокауст.
Издвојила су се три термина или три шифре – радикално зло,
тремендум и Аушвиц – које користе они тумачи који уважавају
да се теорија притом сусреће са догађајем који измиче појмовном
захватању и суспендује безмало све дотадашње дискурзивне
операторе. Упркос томе, они настоје да мисле и немисливост
Холокауста, као и разлоге за то. Сваки од та три филозофема
заслужио је посебан део рада, док се у закључку сугеришу оријен-
тири унутар којих би именовање тог неименљивог и мишљење
тог незамисливог продуктивно могло (и) даље да се одвија.The paper is devoted to the ways in which philosophical and theological thinking tried to
conceptualize the Holocaust without offense. Three terms or three codes have been singled
out – radical evil, tremendum and Auschwitz – which are used by those interpreters who
appreciate that the theory encounters an event that eludes conceptual capture and suspends
almost all previous discursive operators. Despite this, they strive to think about both the
incomprehensibility of the Holocaust and the reasons for it. Each of those three philosophems
deserved a separate part of the article, while the conclusion suggests landmarks
within which the naming of that unnameable and the thinking of that unthinkable could
(further) continue productively
Impact of political instability and wars on mental health of people in European countries: lessons from the war in the Balkans
No full textIn this chapter, we describe the impact of the recent experiences of war and long-lasting political and economic instability on mental health. Relying on the data and insights from the Western Balkans, we first review the data on the frequency of psychiatric symptoms in the region immediately after the war and 20–30 years later. Relying on the social identity approach, we discuss how socio-psychological characteristics of post-conflict societies impact mental health. We focus on post-conflict social identities, the salience of threat, religion and crisis of trust and solidarity that can affect the already deteriorated mental health. Finally, we discuss how the current situation can be employed in building the capacities to overcome the devastating consequences of war and instability
The role of cognitive biases in shaping irrational beliefs: a multi-Study Investigation
No full textIrrational beliefs encompass a broad set of beliefs that lack verifiable empirical evidence and contradict scientific principles, often grouped into conspiratorial, pseudoscientific, and paranormal domains. This paper investigated whether these beliefs are rooted in a set of cognitive biases. Across four studies, low socioeconomic status, right-wing political orientation, and religiousness accounted for a substantial portion of irrational beliefs variance. However, cognitive biases consistently contributed incrementally to their prediction, with naturalness bias, omission bias, commitment bias, and the overconfidence effect emerging as the most robust predictors. Our findings indicate the nuanced nature of these relationships, as the predictive power of cognitive biases was consistently higher for conspiracist and pseudoscientific beliefs in comparison to paranormal ones