University of Arts in Belgrade
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Nepristrasnost drugog reda i javna sfera
No full textIn the first part of the text the distinction between first- and second-order impartiality, along with Brian Barry’s thorough elaboration of their characteristics and the differences between them, is examined. While the former impartiality is related to non-favoring fellow-persons in everyday occasions, the latter is manifested in the institutional structure of society and its political and public morality. In the second part of the article, the concept of public impartiality is introduced through analysis of two examples. In the first example, a Caledonian Club with its exclusive membership is considered as a form of association which is partial, but nevertheless morally acceptable. In the second example, the so-called Heinz dilemma has been reconsidered and the author points to some flaws in Barry’s interpretation, arguing that Heinz’s right of giving advantage to his wife’s life over property rights can be recognized through mitigating circumstances,and this partiality can be appreciated in the public sphere. Thus, public impartiality imposes limits to the restrictiveness and rigidity of political impartiality implied in second-order morality.Prvi deo teksta razmatra distinkciju između nepristrasnosti prvog i drugog reda, zajedno sa Berijevom (Brian Barry) temeljnom elaboracijom karakteristika i razlika ovih nepristrasnosti. Dok se nepristrasnost prvog reda odnosi na nefavorizovanje bliskih osoba u svakodnevnim odnosima, nepristrasnost drugog reda se ispoljava u institucionalnoj strukturi društva i njenom javnom i političkom moralitetu. U drugom delu članka uvodi se pojam javne nepristrasnosti kroz analizu dva primera. Prvi primer jeste Kaledonijski klub sa svojim ekskluzivitetom članstva i razmatra se kao oblik udruženja koje je pristrasno, ali je ipak moralno prihvatljivo. Drugi primer predstavlja takozvana Hajncova dilema, pri čemu autor daje svoju reinterpretaciju slučaja i ukazuje na pojedine slabe tačke Berijevog tumačenja, smatrajući da se kroz postojanje olakšavajućih okolnosti može prihvatiti Hajncovo pravo da daje prednost svojoj supruzi u odnosu na prava vlasništva i da ova pristrasnost može biti prihvaćena u javnoj sferi. Na taj način javna nepristrasnost određuje granice restriktivnosti i rigidnosti političke nepristrasnosti koja je implicirana u nepristrasnosti prvog reda
Avant-Garde, Kitsch and Leftist Ideas
No full textПредмет текста је однос уметности и политике какав је практикован у време успона европске политичке левице, у првом реду оне на просторима предратног и постратног СССР-а. Теза која се у тексту брани је да сви тоталитарни друштвенополитички системи формирају принципијелно истозначан став према уметности као моћном потенцијалном медију за промоцију и трансмисију идеолошких и политичких порука, што њена остварења углавном доводи на границу кича, ако већ не и у његово само средиште. У другом делу рада разматрају се збивања на eкс-југословенској послератној политичкој и уметничкој сцени и указује на њене специфичности, превасходно ону садржану у чињеници да је кич на њој био присутнији као (анти)стил политичког живота, у првом реду језика тада актуалне политике, него као неуметност.The subject of this text is the relation between art and politics as it was practiced at the time of the rise of the European political Left, above all in the regions of the pre-war and post-war USSR. The thesis defended
in the text is that all the totalitarian social-political systems form, in principle, a uniform attitude to arts as a powerful potential media for the promotion and transmission of their ideological and political messages, which mostly brings artistic creations to the verge of kitsch if not to its very centre. The other part of the thesis deals with events on the ex-Yugoslav post-war political and art scene, highlighting its specific features, especially those contained in the fact that kitsch was present on that scene rather as an (anti)-style of political life – above all of the language of the ruling politics of the time – than as a non-art
The methodology of philosophical practice: Eclecticism and/or integrativeness?
No full textThe need for philosophical practice to integrate various methods, both conceptual and those based on the use of emotions, raises the question as to whether its methodology is necessarily eclectic, in terms of the collection of various methodologies used in philosophy, or whether there is a way to move beyond eclecticism. This is the main subject of this paper. In other words, the question is whether there is such a thing as an ‘integrative’ methodology and, if so, what distinguishes such a method from mere eclecticism. In this text, we define the methodological procedure of integrativeness as the process of systematizing perspectives into an orientational answer to the demands of a specific problem. What differentiates such an approach from mere summation is a new contribution that results from a synergistic and systematic meeting of positions and argumentations whose final result differs from its initial elements. Diversity in the form of a multidimensional relationship towards life and the world results in numerous perspectives, which is a value that should be cultivated and integrated into a reflective and actional perception of the world
Nespretni idioti ili zli planeri? Propitivanje hladnoratovskih stereotipa o ženama, seksualnosti i državnom socijalizmu
No full textIn academic writing, facts about the past generally require the citation
of relevant sources unless the fact or idea is considered “common knowledge:”
bits of information or dates upon which there is a wide scholarly consensus. This
brief article reflects on the use of “common knowledge” claims in contemporary
scholarship about women, families, and sexuality as experienced during 20th
century, East European, state socialist regimes. We focus on several key stereotypes
about the communist state and the situation of women that are often
asserted in the scholarly literature, and argue that many of these ideas uncannily
resemble American anti-communist propaganda. When contemporary scholars
make claims about communist intrusions into the private sphere to effect social
engineering or the inefficacy of state socialist mass organizations or communist
efforts to break up the family or indoctrinate the young, they often do so without
citation to previous sources or empirical evidence supporting their claims,
thereby suggesting that such claims are “common knowledge.” We believe that
those wishing to assert such claims should link these assertions to concrete
originating sources, lest it turn out the “common knowledge” derives, in fact,
from western Cold War rhetoric
The Borders of Phenomenality
No full textOvaj tekst se bazira na predavanju koje je Žan-Lik Marion održao gostujući na Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 4. decembra 2015. godine u Beogradu. Tematizujući „granice fenomenalnosti“, Marion analizira ono što prevazilazi kako horizont predmetnosti, tako i okvire subjektivnosti. Oslanjajući se na istaknute filozofe iz istorije (post)metafizike (Aristotel, Dekart, Lajbnic, Kant, Niče, Huserl i Hajdeger), Marion ukazuje na mogućnost alternativnog puta, fenomenologije davanja koja se usredsređuje na zasićene fenomeneThis text is based on the lecture held by Jean-Luc Marion at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory (University of Belgrade), on December 4., 2015. By thematizing the “limits of phenomenality”, Marion analyzes what exceeds the horizon of objectivity and the framework of subjectivity. By relying on some of the most important philosophers of the history of (post)metaphysics (Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Nietzsche, Husserl and Heidegger), Marion offers an alternative way, namely, a phenomenology of givenness that focuses on saturated phenomena
Disappearing knowledge
No full textFollowing the exposition of the basic standpoints of contextualism in relation to invariantistic position, which takes the concept of knowledge in its rigorous and fixed meaning, the text continues to deal with the analysis of the concept of knowledge offered by David Lewis, with a goal to solve common epistemological problems, one of those being the lottery paradox. Accepting fallibilism as the only plausible option regarding the possibility of acquiring knowledge, Lewis claims that, with the postulated rules that allow us to properly eliminate alternative possibilities, it is possible to resolve the previously mentioned paradox. If we want to base knowledge on probability, and not on certainty, and to directly stipulate it with the context in which it is being imposed or expressed, than it is obvious that knowledge will depend on whether the requirements for knowledge are high or low. Thus, in one case it might occur that we have knowledge, and in the other that we do not, even though nothing is changed except the conversational conditions that are already ”in the game”. Such, elusive knowledge, that gets lost, De Rose labels ”now you know it, now you don’t” and considers it to be a direct consequence of Lewis’s analysis. As such, the analysis should not be accepted.Nakon izlaganja osnovnih stavova kontekstualističke pozicije u odnosu na invarijantističku, koja pojam znanja uzima u strogom i nepromjenljivom značenju, tekst se dalje bavi analizom pojma znanja koju nam je ponudio Luis (David Lewis) sa ambicijom da riješi uobičajene epistemološke probleme, pa među njima i lutrijski paradoks. Prihvatajući folibilizam kao jedinu plauzibilnu opciju za mogućnost sticanja znanja, Luis, zajedno sa postuliranjem pravila koja nam omogućavaju ispravno eliminisanje alternativnih mogućnosti, smatra da je moguće prenebregnuti pomenuti paradoks. Ako znanje želimo da utemeljimo na vjerovatnoći, a ne na apsolutnosti, i direktno ga uslovimo sa kontekstom u kom ono biva zasnovano ili izrečeno, onda je očigledno da će ono zavisiti od toga da li su uslovi za znanjem visoki i niski. Stoga, u jednom slučaju se može desiti da imamo znanje, a u drugom da nemamo, iako se ništa nije promijenilo sem konverzacionih faktora koji su u ’igri’. Takvo znanje, znanje koje je nepostojano, koje se gubi, Diroz (DeRose) naziva ’sad ga ima, sad ga nema’ znanje i smatra da je direktna posledica Luisove analize, te kao takvo ne bi trebalo da bude prihvaćeno
Money and Sociality: Measuring the Unmeasurable Money as Justice, Time and Usury
No full textRazmišljanje o novcu kao društvenoj i ekonomskoj realnosti, k tuje Levinas, nipošto nije moguće bez ozbiljne analize empirijskih podataka. Razmišljanje o novcu, s druge strane, uvijek uključuje i nešto drugo, tako da novac nikad nije isključivo ekonomska kategorija. U tom smislu, Levinas predlaže jednu refleksiju o nekoliko „dimenzija“ koje novac posjeduje u zapadnoj tradiciji. Ovaj članak analizira dva teksta, nastala u razmaku od 25 godina, koja Levinas posvećuje promišljanju novca. Nasuprot tradicionalnoj osudi novca, koja uvijek ostaje na snazi – u onoj mjeri u kojoj čovjek i sam rizikuje da postane roba – novac, za Levinasa, nikad nije samo puko postvarenje, nego uključuje i pozitivnu stranu. Daleko od toga da bi bio samo nešto negativno ili samo neutralno što prekriva ljudske odnose, novac je, naprotiv, uslov zajednice. Novac se ovdje pojavljuje kao mjera nemjerljivog, kao neophodan za genezu socijalnog. U toj perspektivi, bez obzira kako to šokantno i skandalozno zvučalo, novac je ujedno i osnova pravde. Novac omogućava zajednicu, otvara budućnost, ljudi novcem sebi daju kredit: kredit kao vrijeme i kao povjerenje. Oko ove centralne ideje mjerljvosti nemjerljivog, pokušaćemo da propitamo i tematiziramo nekoliko problema koje ova teza implicira, posebno problem odnosa vremena novca i kredita. Na kraju, možda se možemo zapitati nije li – nasuprot Levinasu – ovaj kredit, neodvojiv od suštine novca, uvijek već i lihvarenje?Levinas confirms: a reflection about a money as a social and economical reality is not possible without a serious analysis of empirical data. On the other hand, this reflection always involves something else, so a money is never a merely economical category. In that sense, Levinas proposes an intriguing meditation about some “dimensions” of a money in the western tradition.
Contrary to the traditional moral condemnation of a money – which however remains unquestionable because of the fact that a man always carries a risk of becoming a merchandise – Levinas suggests that money never simply means a reification, but always implies some positive dimensions.
Levinas suggests that a money is not something morally bad or simply neutral covering human relationships, but rather a condition of human community. Furthermore, he claims that a money is a fundament of the justice. A money makes possible a community, he explains, because it opens up the dimension of the future, and implies the existence of human beings who give themselves a credit; a credit understood as a time and a confidence. We shall try to address some problems implied by this thesis, particularly the problem of the relationship between time, money and credit. Finally, we are going to ask whether this credit – inseparable from the very essence of the money – is not always already a sort of usury
Demokratske vrednosti, emocije i emotivizam
No full textThe aim of this paper is to explore the relation between democratic values and emotions. The author argues that democratic values and emotional judgments are inter-reducible: political agents use emotional judgments to re- flexively evaluate normative paradigms of political life. In the first part of the paper, the author describes the state of emotions in contemporary political philosophy and identifies Charles Stevenson’s ethical conception of emotivism as the first comprehensive attempt to neutrally conceptualize emotions in mor- al and political thinking. The second part of the paper explores the shortcomings of emotivism and finds an adequate alternative in Martha Nussbaum’s concept of emotional judgment as the one that contains beliefs and values about social objects. In the final part of the paper, the author identifies that moral and polit- ical disagreements emerge in democracies from ranking of the importance of political objects. The evaluation criteria for this type of ranking is derived from democratic values which are reducible to agents’ emotional judgments.Cilj rada je da istraži odnos između demokratskih vrednosti i emocija. Autor tvrdi da su demokratske vrednosti i emocije međusobno svodljivi: politički akteri služe se emocionalnim sudovima kako bi refleksivno ocenili normativne paradigme političkog života. U prvom delu rada, autor opisuje stanje u savremenoj političkoj filozofiji u vezi sa emocijama i identifikuje etičku koncepciju emotivizma Čarlsa Stivensona kao prvi celoviti pokušaj neutralne konceptualizacije emocija u moralnom i političkom mišljenju. Drugi deo rada istražuje nedostatke emotivizma i nalazi adekvatnu alternativu u konceptu emocionalnih sudova Marte Nusbaum, kao one koja uključuje verovanja o društvenim objektima i njihove vrednosti. U zaključnom delu rada, autor tvrdi da su moralni i politički sporovi u demokratijama rezultat rangiranja političkih objekata po važnosti. Kriterijum evaluacije takvog tipa rangiranja je izveden is demokratskih vrednosti koje su svodljive na emocionalne sudove aktera