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Mobilisation au travail par les compétences : l’apport de l’étude des groupes activistes
No full textInternational audienceCet article explore la façon dont les compétences sont susceptibles de mobiliser les acteurs au sein d’une organisation. Pour ce faire, il considère les compétences non comme des ressources stratégiques au service de l’entreprise, mais comme des ressources facteurs de mobilisation au travail pour les individus. Le cadre théorique de la mobilisation des ressources, issu de la sociologie des mouvements sociaux, permet de saisir cette dimension des compétences. La partie empirique provient d’un travail ethnographique de 12 mois effectué auprès du groupe activiste féministe « La Barbe ». Elle explore comment une organisation disposant de peu de ressources peut mobiliser des individus en leur apportant des compétences cohérentes avec leurs parcours individuels et répondant à leurs attentes concernant notamment la recherche de l’émancipation personnelle. Les enseignements et les limites pour la mobilisation au travail par les compétences dans les organisations sont ensuite discutés pour conclure notamment sur les apports de l’étude pour la fidélisation des talents
Managerial Rationality in Global Governance: Driving Legal Behaviour through Indicators
No full textManagerial devices are rapidly developing as a means for driving the legal behaviour of organisations, including those of states and corporations. This article explores the managerial rationality underpinning global legal indicators, and the constraints they convey on legal behaviour. In particular, it argues that indicators are better understood as part of a system of management control and distributed governance, which is steadily eroding state-centred forms of authority, including state law. In this context, legitimacy and reactivity are contingent to their cycle of production and implementation, which is fourfold: data-collecting, benchmarking, auditing and allocating incentives. Each process is meant to generate respectively subjectification, self-knowledge by comparison, accountability and stimulus for action. Indicators with higher degrees of legitimacy become entrenched in institutional practices and legal decision-making processes. The article concludes that regulatory spaces where indicators unfold need critical and political scrutiny to expose their pernicious effects, undesirable uses, and inevitable misuses
Regards croisés sur un Centenaire. Un premier bilan des commémorations de la Première Guerre mondiale à Bruxelles
No full textInternational audienc
Resolving the commitment-flexibility dilemma in new technology ventures
No full textInternational audienceIn their attempt to define radically new product–market pairs, according to the literature, new technology ventures (NTV) are confronted with an apparent dilemma. On the one hand, they should delay key commitments to remain flexible in the face of high uncertainty. On the other hand, commitments are necessary to enable learning and progress. Based on the longitudinal study of four NTVs, we find that the entrepreneurs resolve this dilemma by (i) defining their product and market progressively through iteration and learning, and by (ii) basing this progressive definition on stakeholders’ commitments. We analyse this approach and label it “commit and learn”. Following an inductive methodology, we suggest a conceptual framework to enhance the understanding of commitment as a multi-dimensional concept for new ventures.<br/
Intergenerational Risk Sharing in Life Insurance: Evidence from France
No full textWe study intergenerational risk sharing taking place in one of the most common retail investment products in Europe---life insurance savings contracts---focusing on the 1.4 trillion euro French market. Using regulatory and survey data, we show that contract returns are an order of magnitude less volatile than the returns of assets backing the contracts. Contract return smoothing is achieved using reserves that absorb fluctuations in asset returns and that generate intertemporal transfers across generations of investors. We estimate the average annual amount of intergenerational transfer at 1.4% of contract value, i.e., 17 billion euros per year or 0.8% of GDP. While theory asserts that intergenerational risk sharing cannot take place in competitive markets because it relies on non-exploited return predictability, we show that: (a)~contracts returns are indeed predictable; (b)~investor flows barely react to predictable returns; (c)~observed fees offset the estimated gain from exploiting contract return predictability
Gross, Net, and New Job Creation by Entrepreneurs
No full textUsing a dataset with over 24 million observations and the universe of more than 230,000 entries into entrepreneurship we analyze the gross (including the founders), net (excluding the founders), and new (jobs to the former unemployed or those outside the labor force) job creation by entrepreneurs two and six years after start-up. These novel measures of job creation shows that the average entrepreneur does not create any jobs for any other than him/her-self, and typically arrives from having another job. Thus, short term job creation by entrepreneurs involves a reshuffling of jobs from older to new firms rather than creating new jobs
Limits of Arbitrage under the Microscope: Evidence from Detailed Hedge Fund Transaction Data
No full textWe exploit detailed transaction and position data for a sample of long-short equity hedge funds to document new facts about the trading activity of sophisticated investors. We find that the initiation of both long and short positions is associated with significant abnormal returns, suggesting that the hedge funds in our sample possess investment skill. In contrast, the closing of long and short positions is followed by return continuation, implying that hedge funds close their positions too early and “leave money on the table.” As we demonstrate with a simple model, this behaviour can be explained by hedge funds being (risk) capital constrained and facing position monitoring costs. Consistent with our model, we document that the return continuation following closing orders is more pronounced when these constraints become more binding (e.g., after negative fund returns or increases in volatility)
Asset Purchase Bailouts and Implicit Guarantees
No full textThis paper shows that bailouts of private agents can optimally take the form of asset purchases, even if this also means paying off external asset holders, in the presence of borrowing constraints and asymmetric information on liquidity needs. The combination of these two ingredients make direct compensation through loans and/or net transfers imperfect. Thus, when more constrained agents are also more exposed to the asset, the compensation through asset purchases becomes desirable. Anticipating these purchases, private agents engage in a collective bet on the defaulting asset, leading to an equilibrium implicit guarantee, where even an intrinsically worthless asset can be traded at a positive price
A Non-Bayesian Theory of State-Dependent Utility
No full textMany decision situations involve two or more of the following divergences from subjective expected utility: imprecision of beliefs (or ambiguity), imprecision of tastes (or multi-utility), and state dependence of utility. Examples include multi-attribute decisions under uncertainty, such as some climate decisions, where trade-offs across attributes may be state dependent. This paper proposes and characterises a model of uncertainty averse preferences that can simultaneously incorporate all three phenomena. The representation supports a principled separation of (imprecise) beliefs and (potentially state-dependent, imprecise) tastes, and we pinpoint the axiom that ensures such a separation. Moreover, the representation supports comparative statics of both beliefs and tastes, and is modular: it easily delivers special cases involving various combinations of the phenomena, as well as state-dependent multi-utility generalisations of popular ambiguity models
The Price of Admission: Organizational Deference as Strategic Behavior
No full textInternational audienceWhy would market organizations engage in symbolic and material acts conveying appreciation and respect to other organizations that confirm their inferior position in an established hierarchy? Deference, we argue, is the price outsider organizations pay to pass categorical and symbolic boundaries, and gain acceptance in contexts where insiders regard them as impure. Because not all organizations can or are willing to pay the price, deference varies according to positional, dispositional, and interactional characteristics. We examine and find support for the view of organizational deference as strategic behavior using empirical evidence on market finance organizations investing in film production in France over two decades. Our analysis expands research on non-conflictual interactions and symbolic boundaries in market settings