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Prolongation du règlement d’exemption des consortiums : un trompe-l’œil à l’heure de l’intégration et de la digitalisation du transport maritime
No full textInternational audienc
Unpacking the notion of prototype archetypes in the early phase of an innovation process
No full textInternational audienceThe literature on new product development examines a variety of roles that prototypes can play based on the phase of the design process when they are used, but the characteristics of these prototypes that correspond to the expected outcomes, especially in the early phase of the design process, are understudied. We address this gap by studying the characteristics of the prototypes used in the design process (especially during the early phase) that correspond to their roles. Based on an analysis of six cases of prototypes that are used early on in the design process, we characterize three different archetypes of artefacts: stimulators, demonstrators, and validators, and we emphasize the coherence between the role they play in the design process and the characteristics that enable these roles. Specifying the roles of these artefacts should contribute to addressing the two flaws that are generally encountered during prototyping: overdesigning and overtrusting the prototypes
Equilibrium Data Mining and Data Abundance
No full textWe analyze how computing power and data abundance affect speculators' search for predictors. In our model, speculators search for predictors through trials and optimally stop searching when they find a predictor with a signal-to-noise ratio larger than an endogenous threshold. Greater computing power raises this threshold, and therefore price informativeness, by reducing search costs. In contrast, data abundance can reduce this threshold because it intensifies competition among speculators and it increases the average number of trials to find a predictor. In the former (latter) case, price informativeness increases (decreases) with data abundance. We derive implications of these effects for the distribution of asset managers' skills and trading profits
Impact Investing and the Fostering of Entrepreneurship in Disadvantaged Urban Areas: Evidence from Microdata in French Banlieues
No full textWe examine whether impact investing is more effective in fostering business venture success and social impact when directed toward ventures located in vs. outside disadvantaged urban areas (i.e., areas with high crime, unemployment, and poverty). We explore this question in the context of loans made to business ventures located in French “banlieues” vs. “non-banlieues”. We find that loans issued to banlieue ventures, compared to non-banlieue ventures, yield greater improvements in financial performance, as well as greater social impact in terms of the creation of local employment opportunities, quality jobs, and jobs for minorities — all of which contribute to the social inclusion of marginalized communities and the development of sustainable cities
Does Big Data Improve Financial Forecasting? The Horizon Effect
No full textWe study how data abundance affects the informativeness of financial analysts' forecasts at various horizons. Analysts produce forecasts of short-term and long-term earnings and choose how much information to collect about each horizon to minimize their expected forecasting error, net of information acquisition costs. When the cost of obtaining short-term information drops (i.e., more data becomes available), analysts change their information collection strategy in a way that renders their short-term forecasts more informative but that possibly reduces the informativeness of their long-term forecasts. Using a large sample of analysts' forecasts at various horizons and novel measures of their exposure to abundant data (e.g., social media data), we provide empirical support for this prediction, which implies that data abundance can impair the quality of long-term forecasts
Strategic Communication with Side Information at the Decoder
No full textWe investigate the problem of strategic point-to-point communication with side information at the decoder, in which the encoder and the decoder have mismatched distortion functions. The decoding process is not supervised, it returns the output sequence that minimizes the decoder's distortion function. The encoding process is designed beforehand and takes into account the decoder's distortion mismatch. When the communication channel is perfect and no side information is available at the decoder, this problem is referred to as the Bayesian persuasion game of Kamenica-Gentzkow in the Economics literature. We formulate the strategic communication scenario as a joint source-channel coding problem with side information at the decoder. The informational content of the source influences the design of the encoding since it impacts differently the two distinct distortion functions. The side information complexifies the analysis since the encoder is uncertain about the decoder's belief on the source statistics. We characterize the single-letter optimal solution by controlling the posterior beliefs induced by the Wyner-Ziv's source encoding scheme. This confirms the benefit of sending encoded data bits even if the decoding process is not supervised
Nudge and the European Union
No full textEurope has largely been absent from the US-dominated debate surrounding the introduction of nudge-type interventions in policy-making. Yet the European Union and some of its Member States are exploring the possibility of informing their policy action with behavioural insights. While a great deal of academic attention is currently been paid to the philosophical, ethical and other abstract implications of behavioural-informed regulation, such as those concerning autonomy, dignity and moral development, this chapter charts and systematizes the incipient European Nudge discourse.Besides a few isolated initiatives displaying some behavioural considerations (e.g. consumer rights, revised tobacco products directive, sporadic behavioural remedies in competition law), the EU – similarly to its own Member States – has not yet shown a general commitment to systematically integrate behavioural insights into policy-making. Given the potential of this innovative regulatory approach to attain effective, low-cost and choice-preserving policies, such a stance seems surprising, especially when measured against growing citizen mistrust towards EU policy action. At a time in which some EU countries are calling for a repatriation of powers and the European Commission promises to redefine - in the framework of its Better Regulation agenda - the relationships between the Union and its citizens, nudging might provide a promising way forward. In the aftermath of the Brexit vote, this promise has not only been shared by the 27 remaining Member State but also represents one of their major priorities . Yet with promises come challenges too.The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets the scene by discussing the growing appeal of nudging among policymakers within and across Europe. Section 3 introduces the notion of behavioural policymaking and contrasts it with that of nudging. Section 4 describes the early and rather timid attempts at integrating behavioural insights into EU policymaking and identifies some domestic experiences. Section 5 discusses the institutional and methodological efforts undertaken by the EU and some of its member states to embrace behavioural policymaking. In turn, section 6 discusses the major difficulties of integrating behavioural insights into EU policymaking and offers some concluding remarks
Measuring Regulatory Complexity
No full textDespite a heated debate on the perceived increasing complexity of financial regulation, there is no available measure of regulatory complexity other than the mere length of regulatory documents. To fill this gap, we propose to apply simple measures from the computer science literature by treating regulation like an algorithm - a fixed set of rules that determine how an input (e.g., a bank balance sheet) leads to an output (a regulatory decision). We apply our measures to the regulation of a bank in a theoretical model, to an algorithm computing capital requirements based on Basel I, and to actual regulatory texts. Our measures capture dimensions of complexity beyond the mere length of a regulation. In particular, shorter regulations are not necessarily less complex, as they can also use more "high-level" language and concepts. Finally, we propose an experimental protocol to validate measures of regulatory complexity
Digital Privacy
No full textWe study the incentives of a digital business to collect and protect users’ information. The information the business collects improves the service it provides to consumers, but it may also be accessed, at a cost, by third strategic parties in a way that harms users, imposing privacy costs. We characterize how the revenue model of the business shapes the equilibrium data policy. We compare the equilibrium data policy with the social optimum and show that a two-pronged policy, which combines a minimal data protection requirement with a tax proportional to the amount of data collected, restores efficiency
If You Love Your Agents, Set Them Free: Task Discretion in Online Marketplaces
No full textIn manufacturing and service operations, flexibility is beneficial for matching supply with demand, but it comes at a cost. In modern digital workplaces, users/agents possess a spectrum of different skills associated with corresponding and variable task preferences: Some are inclined to give up part of their payment to avoid unfavorable matches or prioritize the preferred ones. The platform manager, in turn, gains extra freedom in allocating tasks by possibly charging servers for a favorable assignment. Innovative marketplaces facilitate task discretion and the development of novel implementations and the analysis of resulting benefits are important parts of the platform design. This naturally leads to the problem of exploring and optimizing the task allocation process. We introduce an innovative mechanism for task assignment in the workplace, and we compare it against the traditional one where task routing is solely the platform's decision. In order to improve all users' welfare, agents are allowed some task discretion in exchange for a fee. We model different working environments and different servers' preferences via different distributions, and we study how the agent's preferences, the task cost, and the flexibility fee, affect the equilibrium assignment. In a single-server system, the platform benefits when the agent's preferences are not aligned with its own. In a multi-server system, a server may request autonomy and choose the costly-to-the-platform option, depending on the behavior of other agents. In this case, it may or may not be beneficial for the platform when the agents' preferences are misaligned to its own. In every case, by pricing and offering flexibility the platform can do at least as well as the no-flexibility scheme. An important conclusion is that pricing discretion in task assignments can often improve the agents' welfare as well as the labor platform's profit