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Hume, Association, and Causal Belief
No full textThe associationist interpretation of Hume\u27s account of causal belief is criticized. The origin of this mistaken interpretation is explained. The difference between Hume\u27s views in the Treatise of Human Nature and in An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding is examined
The Methodological Character of Symmetry Principles
No full textIn this paper, I argue that symmetry principles in physics (in particular, in quantum mechanics) have a methodological character, rather than an ontological or an epistemological one. First, I provide a framework to address three related issues regarding the notion of symmetry: (i) how the notion can be characterized; (ii) one way of discussing the nature of symmetry principles, and (iii) a tentative account of some types of symmetry in physics. To illustrate how the framework functions, I then consider the case of the early formulation of quantum mechanics, examining the different roles played by symmetry in this context. Finally, I raise difficulties for ontological and purely epistemological interpretations of symmetry principles, and offer a methodological alternative
Gullible Yet Intelligible
No full textIn this paper I describe the imaginary community of Gullible. Gulliblians are led by moral pressures to believe whatever they are told and, in the scenario that I sketch, this leads to them having widespread contradictory beliefs. This community is nevertheless intelligible to us given what we know about their situation and their moral code. Davidson, however, holds there to be what I call a logicist constraint on interpretation: thinkers can only be interpreted if a good proportion of their beliefs are rational and, for Davidson, rationality entails logical consistency. The possibility of Gullible therefore forces us to reject this logicist aspect of Davidson’s account of interpretation and intelligibility
Comportamento Social e Contextos Sociais: Uma Abordagem Nomológica
No full textThis paper aims to argue for a lawful, intentional approach to human behavior. Donald Davidson’s idea that an event is mental according to the way it is described is here accepted. However, his nonlawful conception of psychology, in its turn, is rejected. Rather, based on Howard Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism, a lawful, externalist approach to explaining human behavior is adopted, according to which a bit of behavior is to be interpreted in connection with other ones, within a certain social context. It is argued here also that Rachlin’s perspective amounts to a sort of externalization of intentionality
KG Berlin, Urteil vom 22.01.2021 – 7 U 1081/20: Beendigung einer Parteimitgliedschaft durch Anfechtung wegen arglistiger Täuschung ist weder evident rechtswidrig noch willkürlich.
No full textDas KG Berlin hat in einer Berufung gegen die den Antrag auf einstweiligen Rechtsschutz ebenfalls ablehnende Entscheidung der Vorinstanz (LG Berlin, Urteil vom 21.08.2020 – 43 O 223/20) entschieden, dass die Beendigung einer Parteimitgliedschaft durch Anfechtung wegen arglistiger Täuschung weder evident rechtswidrig noch willkürlich ist
What is Logical about the Logical Interpretation of Probability?
No full textMy goal, in this paper, is to critically assess the categorization of “interpretations of probability” as it appears in the literature. In some sources only Carnap’s treatment of probability is understood to be the best example of “logical” probability. This is surprisingly narrow and I will here suggest otherwise. In fact, I believe that certain forms of Baysianism should also be included in the logical camp
On Normative Practical Reasoning
No full textThis article offers an analysis of normative practical reasoning. Reasoning of this type includes at least one normative belief and it has a practical conclusion (roughly, a conclusion about what to do). The principal question I am interested in is whether this type of practical reasoning can be logically conclusive. This issue has received remarkably little philosophical discussion despite the central role this reasoning plays in our everyday discourse about action and in the resolution of ethical problems. I distinguish three kinds of normative reasons. Quasi-normative reasoning, I maintain in Section 1, can only be valid if it is in fact theoretical reasoning, despite appearance to the contrary. In Section 2, I argue that there are two kinds of genuine normative reasoning (purely normative reasoning and hybrid reasoning) that can be logically conclusive. This article also shows that practical arguments are non-trivially ambiguous (which has been largely ignored in the literature) because they can at the same time express different pieces of practical reasoning that have a different logical status
Silogísticas Keynesianas: As Inferências Imediatas
No full textJohn Neville Keynes uses a diagrammatic method, adapted of Euler’s diagrammatic method, in which the semantic content of a categorical judgment is associated to a proper subset of a set of basic diagrams. Different syllogistics are characterized by different sets of basic diagrams. We compare, by Keynesian diagrammatic method, three syllogistics (all of them with existential presupposition and with “non universal” presupposition of terms) as to validity of immediate inferences: the syllogistic without negative terms, the syllogistic with negative terms in which a term and its corresponding negative term complement each other in relation to the universe of discourse, and the syllogistic with negative terms in which a term and its corresponding negative term does not necessarily complement each other in relation to the universe of discourse