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An Inferentialist Approach to Paraconsistency
No full textThis paper develops and motivates a paraconsistent approach to semantic paradox from within a modest inferentialist framework. I begin from the bilateralist theory developed by Greg Restall, which uses constraints on assertions and denials to motivate a multiple-conclusion sequent calculus for classical logic, and, via which, classical semantics can be determined. I then use the addition of a transparent truth-predicate to motivate an intermediate speech-act. On this approach, a liar-like sentence should be “weakly asserted”, involving a commitment to the sentence and its negation, without rejecting the sentence. From this, I develop a proof-theory, which both determines a typical paraconsistent model theory, and also gives us a nice way to understand classical recapture
Making "Reasons" Explicit: How Normative is Brandom\u27s Inferentialism
No full textThis paper asks whether Brandom (1994) has provided a sufficiently clear account of the basic normative concepts of commitment and entitlement, on which his normative inferentialism seems to rest, and of how they contribute to explain the inferential articulation of conceptual contents. I show that Brandom\u27s claim that these concepts are analogous to the concepts of obligation and permission cannot be right, and argue that the normative character of the concept of commitment is dubious. This leads me to replace Brandom\u27s conception of inferential relations as relations between deontic statuses with one according to which they are to be seen as relations between entitlements and acknowledgements of commitments
Foundational Evidentialism and the Problem of Scatter
No full textThis paper addresses the scatter problem for foundational evidentialism. Reflection on the scatter problem uncovers significant epistemological lessons. The scatter problem is evaluated in connection with Ernest Sosa’s use of the problem as an argument against foundational evidentialism. Sosa’s strategy is to consider a strong intuition in favor of internalism—the new evil demon problem, and then illustrate how a foundational evidentialist account of the new evil demon problem succumbs to the scatter problem. The goal in this paper is to evaluate the force of the scatter problem. The main argument of the paper is that the scatter problem has mixed success. On the one hand, scatter undermines objectual evidentialism, an evidentialist theory that formulates principles of basic perceptual justification in terms of the objects (or properties) ofperceptual states. On the other hand, the problem of scatter does not undermine content evidentialism, an evidentialist view that formulates its epistemic principles in terms of the assertive content of perceptual states. The significance of the scatter problem, especially in concert with the new evil demon problem, is that it provides an argument for content evidentialism
“Seguir Regras” em Wittgenstein
No full textThe article presents the problem of determination of a rule in the later Wittgenstein, and the interdiction by the author of a mentalist solution for the problem, showing that such interdiction is also applied to a communitarist solution, formulated in terms of the confirmation of an independent pattern of concordant behaviour. Firstly, the problem of how to follow rules is introduced, and, next, the heart of Wittgenstein’s objections to mentalism is presented. Afterwards, Kripke’s reading of the problem is exposed, presenting his “sceptical solution” as an example of a communitarist reading. Finally, it is argued that Wittgenstein cannot be defending such solution