Filozofia Chrześcijańska
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    174 research outputs found

    Wina jako węzeł moralności

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    The author analyzes the main problems in defining semantic, psychological and social dimensions of conscience. Starting with etymology and with the research of linguistic tradition he distinguishes causative fault and guilt. Internalisation of guilt is treated as the most important issue for morality.  This issue essentially creates a major “knot” of morality, however, it points to the objectified, social sense of guilt. From the perspective of conscience guilt reveals and makes possible genuine morality and the chance to adapt human own guilt in view of their personal development and of preserving dignity. The perspectives of the conscience analysis distinguished in the article require a thorough examination and discussion.The author analyzes the main problems in defining semantic, psychological and social dimensions of conscience. Starting with etymology and with the research of linguistic tradition he distinguishes causative fault and guilt. Internalisation of guilt is treated as the most important issue for morality. This issue essentially creates a major “knot” of morality, however, it points to the objectified, social sense of guilt. From the perspective of conscience guilt reveals and makes possible genuine morality and the chance to adapt human own guilt in view of their personal development and of preserving dignity. The perspectives of the conscience analysis distinguished in the article require a thorough examination and discussion

    Charakterystyka związku między zdaniami opisowymi a zdaniami normatywnymi.

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    he philosophical problem that is the focus of this article was polemically coined by David Hume and expressed in a Latin phrase: ab esse ad obligare non valet illatio. Thanks to George Moore, this statement entered into the history of philosophy as the naturalistic fallacy. Hume ques- tioned the possibility of deriving ethics from natural law. He was convinced that moral obligation has its roots rather in human emotions. Subsequently both Immanuel Kant in his categorical imper- ative, and Max Scheler in his material ethics of values, disputed Hume’s  statement. In the present article we will try to address the issue of the naturalistic fallacy, which denies the possibility of deriving an „ought” from an „is”, first of all in the field of formal logic. After- wards, we will analyze the relationship of descriptive and normative statements philosophically, psychologically and, in the end, neuroscientifically – all this in order to answer the question whether there is any possible link between those two types of statements.The philosophical problem that is the focus of this article was polemically coined by David Hume and expressed in a Latin phrase: ab esse ad obligare non valet illatio. Thanks to George Moore, this statement entered into the history of philosophy as the naturalistic fallacy. Hume ques- tioned the possibility of deriving ethics from natural law. He was convinced that moral obligation has its roots rather in human emotions. Subsequently both Immanuel Kant in his categorical imper- ative, and Max Scheler in his material ethics of values, disputed Hume’s statement. In the present article we will try to address the issue of the naturalistic fallacy, which denies the possibility of deriving an „ought” from an „is”, first of all in the field of formal logic. After- wards, we will analyze the relationship of descriptive and normative statements philosophically, psychologically and, in the end, neuroscientifically – all this in order to answer the question whether there is any possible link between those two types of statements

    Robert Spaemann, Odwieczna pogłoska. Pytanie o Boga i złudzenia nowożytności, tłum. Jarosław Merecki, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 2009, ss. 339.

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    Prace niemieckiego filozofa, Roberta Spaemanna, ucznia Joachima Rittera, ostatnimi laty cieszą się w Polsce pewną popularnością. Obok wydanego w 1996 roku, kluczowego dla myśli Spaemanna, zbioru esejów  Szczęście a życzliwość w następnych latach pojawiły się kolejne polskie tłumaczenia. Ostatnia w tym gronie jest Odwieczna pogłoska, której oryginał powstał w 2007 roku

    Tadeusz Buksiński, Etyka ewangeliczna, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Instytutu Filozofii UAM, Poznań 2011, ss. 245.

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    Autor opiniowanej pozycji świadomie jednak rezygnuje - w przytłaczającej części swego opracowania - z wykorzystania choćby cząstki tego dorobku i pisząc swą książkę, pozostaje niejako sam na sam z tekstem Ewangelii, abstrahując generalnie od kwestii soterycznych, dogmatycznych czy kerygmatycznych, choć dopuszcza je momentami do głosu, szczególnie w końcowych partiach swej książki. Pozwala mu to spojrzeć na ba- dane kwestie niejako świeżym okiem, nieuzbrojonym w kakofoniczny czasem głos  teorii  i  cudzych interpretacji i przefiltrować je wyłącznie poprzez pryzmat własnych przedzałożeń i własnej świadomości nie tylko moralnej, ale i etycznej, filozoficznej czy metodologicznej

    Pavol Dancak, Personalisticky rozmer vo filozofii 20. Storocia, Presovska univerzita v Presove, Grecko-katolicka teologicka fakulta, 2009, ss. 138.

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    Tytuł książki odpowiada zawartym w niej treściom i trafnie wskazuje na personalistyczny wymiar („rozmer”) przenikający filozofię uprawianą w XX wieku

    Potrzeba przełomu. Dialogiczne spojrzenie z Ferdynandem Ebnerem na rozwój sytuacji duchowej we współczesnych społeczeństwach Europy.

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    The „Tischner-Days” Symposium of 2010 examined the topic: „The World and Faith in a Time of Breakthrough”. The newly published conference papers try to define the situation of culture and faith in western civilisation today. The Symposium participants concentrated their efforts mostly on such terms as „individualisation”, „secularisation” and the „holy”. In this article we try to re- read these terms as the description of ongoing changes in the context of Ferdinand Ebners’ dialogical view of the person. Our attempt is therefore to evaluate whether the processes result   in a more personal (inter-personal) world or, rather, in a new ideology, experienced in „I-aloneness” (Ebner). Individualisation – the key term of our analysis – could signify a positive process (as for example K. Popper suggests), when it truly leads from collectivism with its ideology to individualism understood as a (dialogical) person (as in Ebner, Guardini or Mounier). Currently secularisation (Ch. Taylor, K. Gabriel) stands in opposition to Max Webers’ old „secularisation thesis” of pluralisation according to the individual situation of the person, rather than the disappearance of faith. The changes in the sphere of the „holy” could be positive if seen as focusing on the „I-Thou” relation. However, when the ongoing individualisation is not grounded in a dialogical view of the person, it can end up merely as a shift from one ideology to another; secularisation could end up merely as the dissipation of consciousness in a superficial and impersonal „vision”, and the experience of God could become impersonal as mere energy or radiation. When the real life of the person must be seen in terms of his real „spirit”, we are, instead, dealing here with a „dream of the spirit” – as Ebner  says.What then is to be done? To make our times more human (so the humanity of the person will subsist in the dialogical dimension), the „need for a breakthrough” becomes urgent. We should not only foster the interpersonal dialogue, but also fight against „structural loneliness”, i.e. to convert abstract (inhumane) notions into human (dialogical) notions (for example as D. Graebers’ attempts with „debt”). The „Tischner-Days” Symposium of 2010 examined the topic: „The World and Faith in a Time of Breakthrough”. The newly published conference papers try to define the situation of culture and faith in western civilisation today. The Symposium participants concentrated their efforts mostly on such terms as „individualisation”, „secularisation” and the „holy”. In this article we try to re- read these terms as the description of ongoing changes in the context of Ferdinand Ebners’ dialogical view of the person. Our attempt is therefore to evaluate whether the processes result   in a more personal (inter-personal) world or, rather, in a new ideology, experienced in „I-aloneness” (Ebner). Individualisation – the key term of our analysis – could signify a positive process (as for example K. Popper suggests), when it truly leads from collectivism with its ideology to individualism understood as a (dialogical) person (as in Ebner, Guardini or Mounier). Currently secularisation (Ch. Taylor, K. Gabriel) stands in opposition to Max Webers’ old „secularisation thesis” of pluralisation according to the individual situation of the person, rather than the disappearance of faith. The changes in the sphere of the „holy” could be positive if seen as focusing on the „I-Thou” relation. However, when the ongoing individualisation is not grounded in a dialogical view of the person, it can end up merely as a shift from one ideology to another; secularisation could end up merely as the dissipation of consciousness in a superficial and impersonal „vision”, and the experience of God could become impersonal as mere energy or radiation. When the real life of the person must be seen in terms of his real „spirit”, we are, instead, dealing here with a „dream of the spirit” – as Ebner  says.What then is to be done? To make our times more human (so the humanity of the person will subsist in the dialogical dimension), the „need for a breakthrough” becomes urgent. We should not only foster the interpersonal dialogue, but also fight against „structural loneliness”, i.e. to convert abstract (inhumane) notions into human (dialogical) notions (for example as D. Graebers’ attempts with „debt”)

    Wina i sumienie. Komentarz etyczny do epilogu Zbrodni i kary Fiodora Dostojewskiego

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    Dostoyevsky’s famous novel Crime and Punishment can be interpreted as an argument with Nietzsche’s view on the genealogy of conscience. While Nietzsche believes that conscience is a product of a disease and inhibits the will to power, Dostoevsky shows the situation of crossing the border as a source of moral illness and self-destruction of the human person. Crime andPunishment, as well as Dostoevsky’s novel Demons and The Trial of F. Kafka, also criticize modern and postmodern society, in which there is a strong trend, stimulated by psychoanalysis, to liberate people from guilt. With reference to Martin Buber’s views, the author of the article formulatesa thesis on the ontological nature of guilt, treating its confession as a necessary act of self-enlightenment in conscience.Examining the structure of conscience in the context of guilt, a deeper level must be indicated, called synderesis in the scholastic tradition. Considering the elements of experience present in the experience of conscience, the author criticizes the intellectualist interpretation of synderesis. He takes into account the deep level of understanding of conscience in the category of heart made by D. v. Hildebrand and the anamnesis category of J. Ratzinger.Dostoyevsky’s famous novel Crime and Punishment can be interpreted as an argument with Nietzsche’s view on the genealogy of conscience. While Nietzsche believes that conscience is a product of a disease and inhibits the will to power, Dostoevsky shows the situation of crossing the border as a source of moral illness and self-destruction of the human person. Crime and Punishment, as well as Dostoevsky’s novel Demons and The Trial of F. Kafka, also criticize modern and postmodern society, in which there is a strong trend, stimulated by psychoanalysis, to liberate people from guilt. With reference to Martin Buber’s views, the author of the article formulates a thesis on the ontological nature of guilt, treating its confession as a necessary act of self-enlightenment in conscience.Examining the structure of conscience in the context of guilt, a deeper level must be indicated, called synderesis in the scholastic tradition. Considering the elements of experience present in the experience of conscience, the author criticizes the intellectualist interpretation of synderesis. He takes into account the deep level of understanding of conscience in the category of heart made by D. v. Hildebrand and the anamnesis category of J. Ratzinger

    Przyznanie się. Teoretyczne trudności związane z przypisywaniem sobie działań

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    This paper deals with validity conditions of admission to an act. We shall look at admission first as a speech act that has a certain gravity as a legal act. We reconstruct Searle’s success condi- tions for admission and supplement them with particular legal conditions in legal acts of admission and pleas. We focus on the preparatory conditions of admission and we show difficulties involved in fulfilling these conditions.This paper deals with validity conditions of admission to an act. We shall look at admission first as a speech act that has a certain gravity as a legal act. We reconstruct Searle’s success condi- tions for admission and supplement them with particular legal conditions in legal acts of admission and pleas. We focus on the preparatory conditions of admission and we show difficulties involved in fulfilling these conditions

    Problem trafu moralnego i winy według Thomasa Nagela i Norvina Richardsa. Próba uzupełnienia krytyki Richardsa

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    The article discusses the problem of moral luck described by T. Nagel and B. Williams. It also presents the critique of N. Richards. In terms of Nagel moral luck causes a paradox: we judge morally random acts and break the principle of estimating only those acts which are under the con- trol of the perpetrator. Richards criticizes the sole use of the criterion of effects of the act, without intentions. This criticism is extended and includes the objection of too far-reaching generalization of the role of luck made by Nagel.The article discusses the problem of moral luck described by T. Nagel and B. Williams. It also presents the critique of N. Richards. In terms of Nagel moral luck causes a paradox: we judge morally random acts and break the principle of estimating only those acts which are under the con- trol of the perpetrator. Richards criticizes the sole use of the criterion of effects of the act, without intentions. This criticism is extended and includes the objection of too far-reaching generalization of the role of luck made by Nagel

    Oblicza natury ludzkiej. Studia i rozprawy, red. Piotr Duchliński, Grzegorz Hołub, Wyższa Szkoła Filozoficzno-Pedagogiczna „Ignatianum" i Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków 2010, ss. 506.

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    Książka zawiera 25 tekstów zgrupowanych w trzech częściach. Całość poprzedza odredakcyjny wstęp Piotra Duchlińskiego, który syntetycznie i interesująco wprowadza w problematykę książki

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    Filozofia Chrześcijańska
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