Filozofia Chrześcijańska
Not a member yet
174 research outputs found
Sort by
Czy po Heideggerze i Levinasie możliwa jest etyka w tradycyjnym tego słowa znaczeniu?
No full textThe author tries to answer the question whether thinking is possible as a type of knowledge about human behaviour. To this end, he compares two thinkers, who, while differing considerably from one another, are similar in that they reject the traditional philosophy of existence, and use language with multiple meanings. Heidegger considered ethics as something of fundamental importance, but differing from ethics as knowledge, or as normative science. Levinas, on the other hand, believed ethics was the first philosophy, but did not treat it as normative. He argued that ethics was not cultivation of good, nor even a system of values, but a relationship with others. Heidegger criticized traditional ethics and morality, treating them as immature, juvenile even. Nevertheless, there is something in his writings that suggests what he had in mind was the necessity of existence. The ethics criticized by Heidegger or by modern French anti-humanists as well as Levinas reemerges in the form of humanities, as a discipline which puts man in the centre of the universe and defines actions that are appropriate for him. Shouldn’t we, however, following the train of Kant’s thought on the role of judgment, affirm the ontological difference Heidegger talked about? Since Kant accepted valuation of beauty, one can hazard a guess there exists a certain minimum of substantiation; if not of moral truth, then at least of substantiation at the level of meaning. Subjectivity must be shown as the power to create meaning, and thus to take moral action. Ethics after Heidegger still seems to be possible.The author tries to answer the question whether thinking is possible as a type of knowledge about human behaviour. To this end, he compares two thinkers, who, while differing considerably from one another, are similar in that they reject the traditional philosophy of existence, and use language with multiple meanings. Heidegger considered ethics as something of fundamental importance, but differing from ethics as knowledge, or as normative science. Levinas, on the other hand, believed ethics was the first philosophy, but did not treat it as normative. He argued that ethics was not cultivation of good, nor even a system of values, but a relationship with others. Heidegger criticized traditional ethics and morality, treating them as immature, juvenile even. Nevertheless, there is something in his writings that suggests what he had in mind was the necessity of existence. The ethics criticized by Heidegger or by modern French anti-humanists as well as Levinas reemerges in the form of humanities, as a discipline which puts man in the centre of the universe and defines actions that are appropriate for him. Shouldn’t we, however, following the train of Kant’s thought on the role of judgment, affirm the ontological difference Heidegger talked about? Since Kant accepted valuation of beauty, one can hazard a guess there exists a certain minimum of substantiation; if not of moral truth, then at least of substantiation at the level of meaning. Subjectivity must be shown as the power to create meaning, and thus to take moral action. Ethics after Heidegger still seems to be possible.
Michała Hellera koncepcja racjonalności jako wartości moralnej.
No full textM. Heller analyses rationality in philosophy and theology of science. Philosophical reflection upon the scientific method lets perceive rationality in it understood as an effective tool of knowing and understanding the world. This possibility is conditioned by a certain structure of both a knowing subject and an object being known. Moreover, theological reflection concerning the successes of science indicates the source of rational structure of the world, which is God’s creative plan. The postulate of rationality is based on the choice of value. Thus it is a moral decision.M. Heller analyses rationality in philosophy and theology of science. Philosophical reflection upon the scientific method lets perceive rationality in it understood as an effective tool of knowing and understanding the world. This possibility is conditioned by a certain structure of both a knowing subject and an object being known. Moreover, theological reflection concerning the successes of science indicates the source of rational structure of the world, which is God’s creative plan. The postulate of rationality is based on the choice of value. Thus it is a moral decision
Lęk przed ekspresją twarzy: refleksja „w ramach" filozofii Emmanuela Levinasa.
No full textThe main purpose of the article is to supplement the philospohy of Emmanuel Levinas with the conception of fear. The analysis of certain expressions used in the works of Levinas leads the author to the conclusion that the ethical relation to the face of the Other causes irreversable changes in the self. Jaranowski considers two types of reaction to nakedness (Levinas describes the face of the Other as “naked”) and puts emphasis on the negative one – nakedness is something that should not be exposed, it causes anxiety. The question of nakedness casts light on the problem of the call from the Other as a kind of interruption. For one can not predict all the consequences of responding to the call from the face of the Other. Finally author claims that there is a kind of fear that has its subject in moral obligation as such. The main purpose of the article is to supplement the philospohy of Emmanuel Levinas with the conception of fear. The analysis of certain expressions used in the works of Levinas leads the author to the conclusion that the ethical relation to the face of the Other causes irreversable changes in the self. Jaranowski considers two types of reaction to nakedness (Levinas describes the face of the Other as “naked”) and puts emphasis on the negative one – nakedness is something that should not be exposed, it causes anxiety. The question of nakedness casts light on the problem of the call from the Other as a kind of interruption. For one can not predict all the consequences of responding to the call from the face of the Other. Finally author claims that there is a kind of fear that has its subject in moral obligation as such.
Krytyka koncepcji racjonalności bezdowodowego przeświadczenia teistycznego Johna Hicka.
No full textThe main point of this article is John Hick’s conception of rational theistic belief without proof and its critics. By the analogy between sense experience and religious experience Hick build the inference leading to conclusion that the religious experience is like sense experience reliable foundation for rationally of beliefs. So although religious beliefs have non proofs, for instance for existence of God, they are rational. Critics, like C. R. Brakenhielm, T. R. Mathis, R. W. Perrett review this inference and conclusion. Especially are attacking analogy between sense experience and religious experience, by negation of possibility of the private language and possibility of solipsistic alternative for sense experience.The main point of this article is John Hick’s conception of rational theistic belief without proof and its critics. By the analogy between sense experience and religious experience Hick build the inference leading to conclusion that the religious experience is like sense experience reliable foundation for rationally of beliefs. So although religious beliefs have non proofs, for instance for existence of God, they are rational. Critics, like C. R. Brakenhielm, T. R. Mathis, R. W. Perrett review this inference and conclusion. Especially are attacking analogy between sense experience and religious experience, by negation of possibility of the private language and possibility of solipsistic alternative for sense experience.