Balcanica Posnaniensia Acta et studia
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Powstanie Abbasydów i jego następstwa w ujęciu Teofanesa Wyznawcy. Część II
Get PDFIn the first part of my article, I described how Theophanes the Confessor refused to legitimize the Abbasids, recognizing the legitimacy of Umayyad rule (according to the chronicler, the Umayyad power came directly from the Prophet Muhammad, which is obviously not entirely true). The chronograph emphasized that the Abbasids used the lower classes to seize power, which allowed them to lead to a state of anarchy. At the same time, he noticed how bad a ruler Marwan the Second was. From this difficult situation, as can be understood, there was no good way out, because both sides of the dispute were tainted with sins that led to injustice or unrighteousness. This was confirmed by supernatural phenomena mentioned by historian in the context of the change of power in the Muslim state. In the second part of my paper, I described how Theophanes tried to suggest that the Abbasid rule had led to religious and class divisions in the country. As a chronicler described the manifestations of anarchy that led to the persecution of Christians in Muslim countries. According to my interpretation, the description of the civil war in the caliphate after the death of Harun ar-Rashid in the work of Theophanes the Confessor is almost a harbinger of the end of the Muslim empire.W pierwszej części mojego artykułu opisałem, jak Teofanes Wyznawca właściwie odmówił prawa do legitymizacji dynastii abbasydzkiej, uznając prawowierność rządów Umajjadów (według kronikarza władza tych ostatnich pochodziła bezpośrednio od Proroka Muhammada, co oczywiście nie jest do końca prawdą). Chronograf podkreślał, że Abbasydzi wykorzystywali niższe warstwy społeczne do przejęcia władzy, co doprowadziło do stanu anarchii. Jednocześnie zauważył, jak złym władcą był Marwan II. Jak można zrozumieć, z tej trudnej sytuacji nie było dobrego wyjścia, ponieważ obie strony sporu zostały obciążone grzechami prowadzącymi do niesprawiedliwości i nieprawowierności. Potwierdzały to niejako zjawiska nadprzyrodzone, o których historyk wspomniał w kontekście zmiany władzy w państwie muzułmańskim. W drugiej części mojego artykułu opisałem, jak Teofanes próbował zasugerować, że rządy Abbasydów doprowadziły do podziałów religijnych i klasowych. Wspomniałem jak kronikarz opisywał przejawy anarchii, która doprowadziła m.in. do prześladowań chrześcijan. Według mojej interpretacji, opis wojny domowej w kalifacie po śmierci Haruna ar-Raszida jest niemal zwiastunem końca imperium muzułmańskiego
Ne davimo Beograd (Serbia) jako przykład miejskiego ruchu społecznego nowej fali
Get PDFThe Serbian socio-political initiative Ne da(vi)mo Beograd (We will not give/flood Belgrade) is defined as a local political movement initiated by the citizens of Belgrade. This movement is one of the new urban social movements emerging from the so-called new social movements of the second generation and indicate the dynamic development of grassroots civic initiatives that want to change the local reality in the face of lack of trust in politicians from the central government, as people not interested in changing the situation of the average citizen. Urban movements, in turn, are characterized by initiatives aimed at improving the lives of the inhabitants of a given town. The article aims to analyze the activities of this movement as an element of a wider activity, known in Serbia as the Civic Front, which brings together local political organizations that are active in individual towns. It also aims to try to answer the question where the border of a social movement ends and the activity of a political organization begins. Ne da(vi)mo Beograd seems to be an initiative that goes beyond unambiguous definitions and may be an example of new, new civic activities that need a new definition, while setting a new framework for activity.Serbska stołeczna inicjatywa Ne da(vi)mo Beograd (Nie damy/zatopimy Belgradu) definiuje się jako lokalny ruch polityczny, powstały z inicjatywy mieszkańców Belgradu. Ruch ten należy do wyodrębniających się z nowych ruchów społecznych miejskich, które zaliczają się do tzw. nowych ruchów społecznych drugiej generacji i wskazują na dynamiczny rozwój oddolnych inicjatyw obywatelskich, chcących zmieniać lokalną rzeczywistość w obliczu braku zaufania do polityków ze szczebla władz centralnych, jako osób niezainteresowanych wpływem na zmianę położenia przeciętnego obywatela. Ruchy miejskie z kolei cechują inicjatywy ukierunkowane na poprawę życia mieszkańców danej miejscowości. Artykuł ma na celu analizę działalności tego ruchu jako elementu szerszej aktywności, znanej w Serbii jako Front Obywatelski, który zrzesza lokalne organizacje polityczne, aktywizujące się w ramach poszczególnych miejscowości. Ma również na celu próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie, gdzie kończy się granica ruchu społecznego a zaczyna aktywność organizacji politycznej. Ne da(vi)mo Beograd wydaje się być inicjatywą wykraczającą poza jednoznaczne definicje i być może stanowi przykład kolejnych, nowych aktywności obywatelskich, które potrzebują nowego zdefiniowania, wyznaczając równocześnie nowe ramy aktywności
O tym jak się „dusza narodu na wzór ojczystych okolic nastraja”. Ideologiczny krajobraz ojczyzny w serbskim dyskursie urbanistycznym okresu międzywojennego
No full textWhen a project for the comprehensive modernization of the Serbian capital Belgrade was conceived in the late 1860s, an altruistic concern for the health of society was a constant element of most discussions devoted to this problem. When the modernization process of the Serbian capital Belgrade was continued in the late 1860s, an altruistic concern for the health of the society was a constant element of most statements devoted to this problem. The health discourse, apart from the aesthetic one, was an element connecting the reflection on the city in Western Europe and Serbia. However, while in the West attempts to heal urban space were supposed to be an antidote to the negative effects of industrialization, in relation to Belgrade these treatments resulted from completely different premises, namely, they were motivated by the legacy of the times of industrial backwardness as a result of Turkish rule. Urban green areas played a special role in the process of modernizing Belgrade. The concern for them in the statements of Serbian architects and town planners of the interwar period, presented as a touchstone of modernity, was in fact included in the mission of strengthening dynastic interests, based on „national forest myth-making”. In the article I present the mechanisms of designing a historical and political filter on nature, which are one of the strategies of including it in the processes of creating and strengthening the ideology of „integral Yugoslavism”, hidden under the slogans of modernizing the capital of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by greening it.Kiedy pod koniec lat sześćdziesiątych XIX wieku powstał projekt kompleksowej modernizacji stolicy Serbii - Belgradu, stałym elementem większości dyskusji poświęconych temu problemowi była altruistyczna troska o zdrowie społeczeństwa. Dyskurs zdrowotny, oprócz estetycznego był elementem łączącym refleksję nad miastem na Zachodzie Europy i w Serbii. Jednak o ile na Zachodzie próby uzdrowienia przestrzeni miejskiej stanowić miały antidotum na negatywne skutki industrializacji, w odniesieniu do Belgradu zabiegi te wynikały z przesłanek zupełnie innych, motywowane były mianowicie spuścizną po czasach przemysłowego zacofania jako pokłosia panowania tureckiego. Szczególna rola w procesie modernizowania Belgradu przypadła terenom zieleni miejskiej. Troska o nie w wypowiedziach serbskich architektów i urbanistów okresu międzywojennego przedstawiana jako probierz nowoczesności włączona została w istocie w misję umacniania interesów dynastycznych, opartą na „leśnym mitotwórstwie narodowym”. W artykule prezentuję mechanizmy projektowania na przyrodę filtru historycznego i politycznego w celu jej włączenia w procesy stwarzania i umacniania ideologii „integralnego jugoslawizmu”
Rebellion on Hvar island (1510–1514). People’s revolt or Venetian manipulation?
Get PDFIn the extensive work of the Dubrovnik-born Benedictine Lodovico Tuberon de Crieva, „Commentaria de temporibus suis” describing the events in the Mediterranean in the years 1490–1522, there is a small passage about the events on the island of Hvar (ital. Lesina). The island was then, together with most of the Dalmatian coast, under the rule of the Venetian Republic. On Hvar in 1510, a popular uprising against the local nobles broke out, which lasted with varying intensity until 1514. The Venetian authorities then sent considerable armed forces, which, after defeating the rebels at sea and on land, suppressed the rebellion. It is surprising, however, that Tuberon suggests in the above-mentioned passage that the outbreak of the revolt could have been provoked by the Venetians themselves, who feared the nobility allegedly favoring the King of Hungary. He also mentions the leading role of a clergyman who was supposed to encourage the plebs to act and initiate a revolt. Taking the mentioned text of Tuberon as a starting point, the author analyzes the political and social situation on the island of Hvar as well as the background and course of the events in the years 1510–1514. The author\u27s goal is to establish what the grounds for Tuberon\u27s presumptions were and to what extent they are true.In the extensive work of the Dubrovnik-born Benedictine Lodovico Tuberon de Crieva, „Commentaria de temporibus suis” describing the events in the Mediterranean in the years 1490–1522, there is a small passage about the events on the island of Hvar (ital. Lesina). The island was then, together with most of the Dalmatian coast, under the rule of the Venetian Republic. On Hvar in 1510, a popular uprising against the local nobles broke out, which lasted with varying intensity until 1514. The Venetian authorities then sent considerable armed forces, which, after defeating the rebels at sea and on land, suppressed the rebellion. It is surprising, however, that Tuberon suggests in the above-mentioned passage that the outbreak of the revolt could have been provoked by the Venetians themselves, who feared the nobility allegedly favoring the King of Hungary. He also mentions the leading role of a clergyman who was supposed to encourage the plebs to act and initiate a revolt. Taking the mentioned text of Tuberon as a starting point, the author analyzes the political and social situation on the island of Hvar as well as the background and course of the events in the years 1510–1514. The author\u27s goal is to establish what the grounds for Tuberon\u27s presumptions were and to what extent they are true
Structure of the cavalry group of the Crown Standard-Bearer Mikołaj Hieronim Sieniawski, stationed in Moldavia after the battle of Khotyn (Chocim) in 1673
Get PDFOn 10 and 11 November 1673 Commonwealth’s armies crushed Ottoman forces at the battle of Khotyn. Victory open new theatre of the operations against High Porte: towards river Danube and on the Polish territories lost in 1672 (Podolia with Kamianets-Podilskyi and Right-bank Ukraine). Polish and Lithuanian troops were very weary after the campaign, what’s more death of King Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki led to interregnum. Polish command decided to set up the system of border defence, to protect country until the election of new monarch, which should later lead to the new offensive. As such cavalry detachments were spread out in Podolia and Moldavia, while corps under command of Mikołaj Hieronim Sieniawski, Crown Standard-bearer was sent to occupy the latter country. Previous research mentioned that this group had between 6000 and 8000 soldiers. Thanks to document from National Library in Warsaw, we can now identify much more detailed organisation of Sieniawski’s force. He had 48 pancerni banners and two light horse banners, in total 5206 horses. Despite capturing Iași, capitol of Moldavia, Sieniawski’s troops were forced on 17 January 1674 to retreat to Poland, under pressure from the fresh Tatar attack. Despite of the withdrawal from Moldavia, border defence system was still functional and Commonwealth managed fairly quickly to elect new king.On 10 and 11 November 1673 Commonwealth’s armies crushed Ottoman forces at the battle of Khotyn. Victory open new theatre of the operations against High Porte: towards river Danube and on the Polish territories lost in 1672 (Podolia with Kamianets-Podilskyi and Right-bank Ukraine). Polish and Lithuanian troops were very weary after the campaign, what’s more death of King Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki led to interregnum. Polish command decided to set up the system of border defence, to protect country until the election of new monarch, which should later lead to the new offensive. As such cavalry detachments were spread out in Podolia and Moldavia, while corps under command of Mikołaj Hieronim Sieniawski, Crown Standard-bearer was sent to occupy the latter country. Previous research mentioned that this group had between 6000 and 8000 soldiers. Thanks to document from National Library in Warsaw, we can now identify much more detailed organisation of Sieniawski’s force. He had 48 pancerni banners and two light horse banners, in total 5206 horses. Despite capturing Iași, capitol of Moldavia, Sieniawski’s troops were forced on 17 January 1674 to retreat to Poland, under pressure from the fresh Tatar attack. Despite of the withdrawal from Moldavia, border defence system was still functional and Commonwealth managed fairly quickly to elect new king
Osady aromańskie w górach południowego Pirynu. Odtwarzanie dawnego dziedzictwa kulturowego pasterskiej społeczności (II)
No full textThe cultural heritage of the Aromanian (Vlach) shepherds in Bulgaria is still an underresearched topic in the field of contemporary heritology and memory studies. The Aromanians settled there after years of severe persecution perpetrated by the Turks and Albanians at the end of the 18th century. For almost two centuries, Bulgaria was a space where they created their own world, with houses, farms, and places of religious worship They set up a network of herding and trade routes leading to various regions of the Balkans and Europe. The aim of this paper is to explore the remaining traces of the cultural heritage of Aromanian shepherds that can be found in the settlements of southern Pirin in Bulgaria. It presents the main Aromanian mountain villages, former herding routes and preserved cultural heritage. The research is based on the qualitative methodology, including participant observations in the villages of Pirin and interviews with the inhabitants of Bulgarian mountain villages. The research has shown that today’s sparse Aromanian community living in the Bulgarian Pirin Mountains has retained the memory of its roots, as well as a small number of neglected cultural heritage sites. Undoubtedly, places and non-places of this community require description, documentation, and revitalisation.Dziedzictwo kulturowe aromańskich (wołoskich) pasterzy w Bułgarii jest wciąż niedostatecznie zbadanym tematem w dziedzinie współczesnej heritologii i studiów nad pamięcią. Aromani osiedlili się tam po latach dotkliwych prześladowań ze strony Turków i Albańczyków pod koniec XVIII wieku. Przez prawie dwa stulecia Bułgaria była przestrzenią, w której stworzyli swój własny świat, z domami, gospodarstwami i miejscami kultu religijnego. Stworzyli sieć szlaków pasterskich i handlowych prowadzących do różnych regionów Bałkanów i Europy. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest zbadanie pozostałych śladów dziedzictwa kulturowego pasterzy aromańskich, które można znaleźć w osadach południowego Pirinu w Bułgarii. Przedstawiono w nim główne górskie wioski aromańskie, dawne szlaki pasterskie i zachowane dziedzictwo kulturowe. Badania opierają się na metodologii jakościowej, obejmującej obserwacje uczestniczące w wioskach Pirinu i wywiady z mieszkańcami bułgarskich wiosek górskich. Badania wykazały, że dzisiejsza nieliczna społeczność aromańska zamieszkująca bułgarskie góry Pirin zachowała pamięć o swoich korzeniach, a także niewielką liczbę zaniedbanych miejsc dziedzictwa kulturowego. Niewątpliwie miejsca i nie-miejsca tej społeczności wymagają opisu, dokumentacji i rewitalizacji
Ottoman supremacy and the political independence of the Balkan and Central European states
Get PDFThe article deals with the nature of the political relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states. The various forms of dependency led to varied limitations on the functioning of these states, especially in the field of their international politics. The Ottoman Empire\u27s relations with weaker, allied, vassal and subordinate states were shaped by the following factors: the historical period, the political and legal nature of the mutual relations, religion, the current political and military situation. On the basis of analysis of the sources and scientific literature, it has been shown that the Ottoman Empire was unable to prevent more or less official policy by its subordinate centres, as long as they had any state structures (even if they were only of a self-governing nature). In the 14th century, most of the Balkan states found themselves as allies and tributaries of the Ottoman Empire. The alliance with the Ottomans did not limit political relations with countries uncommitted against the Ottomans. In the 15th century there was a process of more and more clearly political subordination of the Balkan states which added two important elements to earlier financial and military obligations - investment and obedience. In the 16th century, it was extremely important to surrender to the King of Hungary John Zápolya under the authority of Sultan Suleiman. It also resulted in the Ottoman Empire taking over direct political control of the Romanian principalities: Wallachia and Moldavia. The Sultan was not able to fully control them, they often carried out independent political activities, connected with the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Holy Empire, and Transylvania. In the 18th century the process of building the Balkan nation states launched, albeit very slowly. In the 19th century, any independence, even very limited, was conducive to the rapid formation of their own independent statehood.The article deals with the nature of the political relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states. The various forms of dependency led to varied limitations on the functioning of these states, especially in the field of their international politics. The Ottoman Empire\u27s relations with weaker, allied, vassal and subordinate states were shaped by the following factors: the historical period, the political and legal nature of the mutual relations, religion, the current political and military situation. On the basis of analysis of the sources and scientific literature, it has been shown that the Ottoman Empire was unable to prevent more or less official policy by its subordinate centres, as long as they had any state structures (even if they were only of a self-governing nature). In the 14th century, most of the Balkan states found themselves as allies and tributaries of the Ottoman Empire. The alliance with the Ottomans did not limit political relations with countries uncommitted against the Ottomans. In the 15th century there was a process of more and more clearly political subordination of the Balkan states which added two important elements to earlier financial and military obligations - investment and obedience. In the 16th century, it was extremely important to surrender to the King of Hungary John Zápolya under the authority of Sultan Suleiman. It also resulted in the Ottoman Empire taking over direct political control of the Romanian principalities: Wallachia and Moldavia. The Sultan was not able to fully control them, they often carried out independent political activities, connected with the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Holy Empire, and Transylvania. In the 18th century the process of building the Balkan nation states launched, albeit very slowly. In the 19th century, any independence, even very limited, was conducive to the rapid formation of their own independent statehood
Między upamiętnieniem a manipulacją: miejsce obozu koncentracyjnego w Jasenovacu w serbskiej pamięci i przestrzeni publicznej lat 80. i 90. XX wieku
No full textThe article discusses the question of the politics of memory in the public discourse of Serbia in the 1980s with regard to the crimes commited by the Ustasha regime against the Serbian population in Independent State of Croatia (NDH), during World War II. Particular attention is is paid to the case of the largest Ustasha concentration camp Jasenovac. The discussion on this topic was presented on the basis of the press from the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s. The predominant number of publications emphasised that the Serbs suffered huge losses and that the crimes against the Orthodox population in the NDH were never punished. Discussions about the genocide, which was often described in Serbia as „forgotten”, referred to the political climate in the republic at the time. Leading Serbian politicians spoke sharply on the subject, and numerous scientific and quasi-scientific publications were published. The number of victims was manipulated. Moreover, a message about the „awakening of the Ustasha spirits” was developed in relation to Croatian national activities. Anti-Croatian rhetoric intensified with the introduction of the multi-party system in Yugoslavia (1989) and strengthening of secessionist aspirations in Croatia. The discussions concerning Jasenovac were developed in the context of the political crisis of the federation at the time and the aspirations of Serbian elites towards national unification of Serbs around martyrdom messages.W artykule omówiono kwestię polityki pamięci w dyskursie publicznym Serbii w latach 80. XX wieku w odniesieniu do zbrodni ustaszy podczas II wojny światowej, popełnionych przeciwko Serbom w Niezależnym Państwie Chorwackim (NDH). Szczególną uwagę zwrócono na sprawę największego obozu koncentracyjnego ustaszy w Jasenovacu. Dyskusja na ten temat została przedstawiona na podstawie tekstów prasowych z drugiej połowy lat 80. i początku lat 90. W dominującej liczbie publikacji podkreślano, że Serbowie ponieśli ogromne straty, a zbrodnie przeciwko prawosławnym w NDH nigdy nie zostały ukarane. Zwracano uwagę na liczbę ofiar, często zawyżając liczbę zamordowanych w Jasenovacu. Dyskusje o ludobójstwie, które w ówczesnej Serbii często określano mianem „zapomnianego”, odnosiły się do ówczesnego klimatu politycznego w republice. Czołowi politycy serbscy ostro wypowiadali się na ten temat, ukazywały się liczne publikacje o charakterze naukowym i quasi-naukowym. Wielokrotnie manipulowano liczbą ofiar. W odniesieniu do działań narodowych chorwackich rozwijano przekaz o „przebudzeniu duchów ustaszy”. Antychorwacka retoryka nasiliła się wraz z wprowadzeniem systemu wielopartyjnego w Jugosławii (1989) i nasileniem dążeń secesjonistycznych w poszczególnych republikach. Tematy dotyczące Jasenovaca były rozwijane w kontekście ówczesnego kryzysu politycznego w Jugosławii i aspiracji elit serbskich w kierunku narodowego jednoczenia Serbów wokół przekazów martyrologicznych
Dominika Gapska. Women, Church, State. Cults of the Female Saints in the Writings of Serbian Orthodox Church. Wydawnictwo «scriptum». Cracow, 2021. 207 pp.
Get PDFO cesarzowych Cesarstwa Łacińskiego (1204–1261) (4). Berengaria z Léonu
Get PDFThis article is the fourth part of the series „On the Empresses of the Latin Empire (1204–1261)”. Its aim is to present the biography of Berengaria of León (Berenguela in Castilian), the third wife of John of Briene, mainly on the basis of Castilian and Old French sources. Information about her is laconic and scattered through various sources. Berengaria was the daughter of King Alfonso IV of Leon and his second wife, Berengaria of Castile. Born in 1204, in 1224 she married the former king of Jerusalem, John of Brienne. She became the Latin empress in 1231. She had three sons, her daughter Mary, as the wife of Baldwin II, also became the Latin empress, Little is known about Berengaria\u27s education and her language skills during the stay in Constantinople. She died there in April 1237, but was buried in Compostela. She was not politically active and did not play a significant role in the history of the the Latin Empire.Artykuł stanowi czwartą część cyklu „O cesarzowych Cesarstwa Łacińskiego (1204–1261)”. Jego celem jest przedstawienie postaci Berengarii z Leónu (po kastylijsku Berenguela), trzeciej żony Jana z Briene, przede wszystkim w oparciu o źródła kastylijskie i starofrancuskie. Wiadomości na jej temat są lakoniczne i rozproszone. Berengaria była córką króla Leonu Alfonsa IV i jego drugiej małżonki, Berengarii Kastylijskiej. Urodziła się w 1204 roku, w 1224 roku poślubiła ex-króla Jerozolimy Jana z Brienne. W 1231 roku została cesarzową łacińską. Miała trzech synów, a jej córka Maria, jako żona Baldwina II, także została cesarzową łacińską, Niewiele wiadomo o wykształcenia i umiejętnościach językowych Berengarii podczas jej pobytu w Konstantynopolu. Zmarła tam w kwietniu 1237 roku, ale została pochowana w Composteli. Nie była aktywna politycznie i nie odegrała poważnej roli w historii Cesarstwa Łacińskiego