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TurkStream on the diversifying south-eastern European gas market. OSW Commentary Number 388 8.04.2021.
Full text linkDecember 2020 saw the completion of another part (Bulgaria–Serbia) of the European section of the TurkStream gas pipeline, through which gas has been exported from Russia to south--eastern Europe since January 2020. The capacity of the entire route is not yet being fully used, but it has already reduced Russia’s dependence on transit via Ukraine. In 2020, around 12 bcm of gas was sent via TurkStream instead of Ukrainian pipelines: half to Turkey, and the rest to Bulgaria, Greece and North Macedonia. Ultimately, the pipeline will also transport gas via Serbia to Hungary, Austria and Romania. The rapid implementation of the entire project, in a region where infrastructure investments usually take a long time, represents a success for the Kremlin. Neither the economic challenges linked to the COVID-19 pandemic nor the political opposition of the US to new links between Europe and Russia (which mainly strikes at the Nord Stream 2 pipeline) have got in the way of the project’s completion.
However, TurkStream will not stop the changes happening on the south-eastern European gas market, many of which are unfavourable for Russia. Some of them may paradoxically even be accelerated due to TurkStream’s launch. In recent years, infrastructure has been developed which enables the region’s countries to diversify their gas supply sources and routes, including Azerbaijan or (in the form of LNG) the USA and Qatar. Additionally, the launch of TurkStream has freed up large capacities of trans-Balkan gas pipeline, as well as those running along the Ukraine–Hungary–Serbia route, all of which can be used to deliver gas supplies from outside Russia
A hydrogen alliance? The potential for German-Russian cooperation in hydrogen energy. OSW Commentary Number 383 3.03.2021.
Full text linkJoint hydrogen energy projects are components of the comprehensive Russian-German energy cooperation which has been ongoing for more than five decades. Due to increasing demand for hydrogen resulting from Germany’s energy transition (Energiewende) and to the potential of the hydrogen sector in Russia and its focus on export, the fundamental interests of the two states are well aligned. In 2020, Moscow and Berlin stepped up their political dialogue in this field, and companies from Germany and Russia went on to conclude their first agreements. The new aspect of this cooperation with Berlin is also important to Moscow in political terms
Tightening the screws. Putin’s repressive laws. OSW Commentary Number 380 18.02.2021.
Full text linkIn December 2020, President Vladimir Putin signed a package of laws tightening regulations on non-governmental organisations, public gatherings and media censorship. It is one of the elements marking a new quality in the Kremlin’s domestic policy: Russian authoritarianism has de facto abandoned the pretence of democratic procedures in favour of increased control and repression.
The laws reflect the unease of those in power, engendered by the pandemic, the economic crisis, growing public discontent and the waning influence of state propaganda on citizens. The authorities are primarily concerned about the course of parliamentary elections scheduled for September 2021. This fear has been fuelled by mass protests in Belarus, until recently considered a stable authoritarian regime. In addition to legal measures, the crackdown on political opponents has been reinforced by the neo-Soviet “besieged fortress” rhetoric, including warnings about alleged foreign interference in the elections. However, the strategy adopted by the Kremlin is likely to prove counterproductive and merely inflame the electorate further
Sweden’s security: The long way towards total defence. OSW Point of View Number 81 Warsaw January 2021.
Full text linkSince 2008, Swedish security policy has drawn keen interest from the countries of the Nordic and Baltic states, NATO, as well as the US and Russia. The allied member states have hoped to see Sweden join NATO, while Russia has sought to convince the Swedish government and public that it would be better to abandon integration with the trans-Atlantic security structures. Sweden, confronted with the increasingly aggressive policy of the Kremlin, has faced a major challenge in the last decade: how to pursue the security and defence policy of a non-aligned country with limited military capabilities? For a country that is part of the West, but not NATO, would the option of returning to its Cold War neutrality be viable? Or would it be possible for Sweden to become a member of the Alliance?
Stockholm has found its own answer to the security dilemmas. It is currently neither neutrality nor accession to NATO. Sweden is weaving an ever tighter network of military cooperation with the Alliance, the US, its Nordic neighbours and others to complement the limitations in defence capabilities of the Swedish Armed Forces, and restoring the ability of its society and economy to function in times of crisis and war. While this is admittedly not an optimal answer, it is nonetheless satisfactory given the domestic political circumstances
Building a circular economy: The role of information transfer. EPC Discussion Paper 17 November 2021.
Full text linkThe circular economy is a crucial component of a climate-neutral future. One of the main obstacles to building a circular economy is the lack of information transfer across supply chains. Without any or inadequate access to data about the origin, make-up and design of products, it is impossible for producers, consumers and recyclers to adopt more circular, sustainable practices. Aligning the ongoing green transition and digital transformation carries the potential to overcome this barrier.
The EU’s policies for enhancing information transfer across value chains is evolving quickly, as are new technologies. Today, online platforms, databases, apps, sensors, connected machines, QR codes, radio-frequency identification (RFID) and blockchain already make it easier to share data about a product's origin, design, repairability and future life cycle. Digital product passports (DPPs), in particular, show much promise. It is in Europe’s interest to build on the related business cases and opportunities now and create a policy and financial framework that enables the use of these and new digital tools for the benefit of establishing a more circular economy
Towards circular e-waste management: How can digitalisation help? EPC Discussion Paper 30/09/2021.
Full text linkE-waste is the fastest growing waste stream in the world. Most of it is mishandled, leading to more pollution, more greenhouse gas emissions and the loss of scarce and critical materials. Digitalisation can go a long way to establishing a circular management of e-waste and, thereby, a circular and sustainable economy.
Digital solutions such as AI, blockchain or robotics can help to better collect and treat our discarded phones, televisions and computers, or to prevent them from becoming waste in the first place, by making information easier to share, improving processes and connecting the relevant actors across the value chain.
However, despite their potential, these new technologies can also present challenges. The uptake of digital solutions by waste operators and producer responsibility organisations (PROs) are often hindered by costs and the EU’s fragmented market for e-waste management. Concerns over data protection can create obstacles to accessing and sharing data of relevance to circular e-waste management. If not steered properly, digital transformation can also lead to negative side effects, such as more e-waste. For e-waste management to become more circular and digital, policy must back it up
The von der Leyen Commission: On trial again. EPC Commentary April 2021.
Full text linkWhen the dust finally starts settling from the COVID-19 crisis, von der Leyen will have to refocus on her original agenda. Will she deliver?
Fast-forward five months, Commission President von der Leyen will deliver her second State of the Union address. In effect, it will be her mid-mandate speech and chance to turn the corner from her disappointing management of the pandemic. New waves of the virus might still hit, but by then, vaccinations levels will likely offer Europeans and EU institutions the long-sought reprieve to focus on recovery and the future.
At its inception, von der Leyen’s Commission formulated bold and inspiring promises: a European Green Deal and climate neutrality by 2050; making the 2020s Europe’s Digital Decade; a stronger, geopolitical Europe. The seven-year Next Generation EU budget and its €672.5 billion Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) increase the means to deliver on these substantially.
These four, highly ambitious priorities stand as a formidable test for the remainder of von der Leyen’s mandate. It is a trial that she – and the EU – cannot afford to fail. By September, she will need to prove that she can transform her Presidency and deliver on these expectations
National Recovery and Resilience Plans: Empowering the green and digital transitions? EPC Discussion Paper April 2021.
Full text linkIf designed well, national Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) could encourage comprehensive reform and the long-term investment needed to make the twin green and digital transitions a success while ensuring social and territorial cohesion across Europe.
The COVID-19 crisis has worsened inequalities between European countries, regions and social groups. The twin transition to a more sustainable and digital society, although necessary to avoid the drastic effects of climate change and simultaneously ensure economic prosperity, will likely have bigger consequences for already vulnerable groups.
For the EU to 'build back better', the national recovery plans have to reflect this reality. They are highly visible in national political debates, indicating strong national political ownership of the content. However, the process often appears untransparent, managed by the government behind closed doors and with limited input from stakeholders.
The tight framework imposed by the European Commission has helped create coherence between the national RRPs. But this only applies in broad terms, as details are often lacking or fragmented. Links to other EU programmes or cross-border projects are limited. And although the RRPs recognise the expected impact on social, economic and territorial cohesion, there's little effort going into thorough impact assessments.
Therefore, EU member states and the European Commission should improve the content of the national recovery plans by enhancing cross-references and links between measures, exploiting complementarities with other EU funding sources, and strengthening the reform components.
The Commission, in particular, should strengthen the EU dimension by highlighting potential cross-country synergies between RRPs. A flexible framework for cooperation between European governments can broker the first steps to reduce the complexity and risks linked to cross-border projects. To mainstream support for socio-economic and territorial cohesion, the Commission should impose ex-ante territorial and social impact assessments. These assessments should not only focus on economic growth but also the well-being of citizens.
Finally, when it comes to implementation, the Commission should request member states to provide as many details as possible on the measures suggested in their plans and ask for intermediate and ex-post assessments. In turn, national governments should improve the transparency of the implementation phase of their respective RRP
China’s grand industrial strategy and what it means for Europe. EPC Policy Paper April 2021.
Full text linkIn its 14th Five-Year Plan, China has mapped out a grand economic and industrial strategy that upends many of the assumptions that underpin the EU's approach - how can the Union respond?
With this new plan, the EU can expect tougher competition and greater protectionism in its economic relations with China. A further blurring of the public-private sector distinction in the country's economic model will make it harder to combat unfair Chinese competition. And while China is actively courting foreign investment, it is also signalling greater protectionism to products not made in China, which will lead to European investors' and exporters' interests diverging.
To balance the scales, the EU should adapt its own strategy by:
continuing to develop trade instruments to combat unfair competition at home and abroad;
ensuring that these instruments and institutions can respond to unfair competition from private companies benefiting from state capital investment;
ensuring that the extensive and often opaque government holdings in private firms are reflected in foreign direct investment and export controls;
incorporating China's attempts to reconfigure supply chains into its own assessment of strategic dependencies, identifying areas that could become vulnerable;
prioritising the improvement of access to the Chinese market for goods and services produced in Europe;
developing alternative sources of growth, and boost demand and reduce barriers within the Single Market to offset greater Chinese protectionism; and
ensuring that its industrial policy efforts will enable European industry to match China's developments.
The present moment may mark a turning point in EU–China relations: in a little over three months, an agreement on an investment treaty was followed by sanctions and countersanctions. Geopolitical conflict ratchets up between China and the US. Beijing's new economic course will reshape its global relationships.
China's protectionist turn and growing one-sided dependencies will threaten Europe's long-term strategic autonomy and undercut any attempts to construct a balanced approach to EU–China relations. If the EU's multi-track strategy is to work, a concerted effort is required to preserve economic parity and balance between the two powers
Pushbacks and lack of accountability at the Greek-Turkish borders. CEPS Policy Contribution 12 Feb 2021.
Full text linkAmid escalating geopolitical tension with Turkey, in March 2020 the Greek authorities announced a hardline approach towards asylum seekers attempting to cross its land and sea borders with Turkey. The framing of cross-border movements as a ‘threat’ to the country’s national security served to justify a derogation from the human rights standards and procedural guarantees that are granted to people seeking protection under EU law. Since then, a pattern of systematic pushbacks at the border and informal returns represents the most visible expression of this hardening of border policies at the EU’s south-eastern borders.
This paper analyses the negative impact of this heavily securitised approach on asylum seekers’ fundamental rights, in particular its implications for the right to asylum that underpins the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).
The paper also reflects on the limits and ambiguities that have characterised the EU’s response to the situation at the Greek-Turkish borders, focusing on the role and responsibilities of the Frontex Agency. It underlines the need for the EU to remedy the shortcomings in existing accountability mechanisms, to guarantee effective remedies for victims of fundamental rights violations at the border. Establishing a sustainable human- rights-compliant management of migration in the eastern Mediterranean also requires that the EU move away from its focus on containing and restricting asylum seekers’ mobility – a focus that has characterised cooperation on migration and asylum with Turkey within the framework of the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement