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The ‘Russian street’: The place and significance of immigrants from the former USSR in Israel. OSW Point of View Number 84 June 2021.
The arrival of more than one million immigrants from the former USSR back in the 1990s and post-2000 has resulted in a surge in Israel’s demographic and economic potential, sealed the domination of right-wing parties on the Israeli political scene and in public discourse, left its mark on Israel’s historical policy, and finally, contributed new elements to Israel’s cultural mosaic. Russian-speaking newcomers from the former Soviet republics have retained their language, customs and contacts with their countries of origin, and have adapted to the new reality in their own unique manner, while maintaining many elements of their former identity. Despite the fact that three decades after the break-up of the USSR, the Russian-speaking Israelis continue to be less affluent and underrepresented in many spheres of life, struggle with negative clichés and in some cases are still not fluent in Hebrew, they should be viewed as a group which has largely been well-integrated into society and (as a general rule) manifests ardent patriotism towards their new homeland. This text is an attempt to sum up the process of the Russian-speaking immigrants’ adaptation to Israeli society (and vice versa); to assess this group’s place and importance in the Israeli state’s life; to determine how it has changed the country; and finally, how it has affected Israel’s relations with the newcomers’ countries of origin
Russia's Belarusian army: The practical aspects of Belarus and Russia's military integration. OSW Report 2021-03-03.
In the 2010s, Minsk lost the remnants of its independent defence capabilities and completely ceded the initiative to Moscow in this regard, remaining content with the appearance of sovereignty. The process of Belarusian-Russian military integration is one-sided; its aim is to adjust the military potential of Belarus to the standards and operational needs of the Russian Armed Forces in the western strategic direction. This process is now so advanced that Belarus cannot be perceived as an independent player in the regional security situation, and should now be considered an integral part of the Russian security space, and its army and arms industry as an element of the Russian instrumentation.
The possible use of all or part of Belarus’s military potential will depend on Moscow’s military commitment, the next manifestation of which will be the ‘Zapad-2021’ exercise planned for September this year. From the perspective of Poland, and of NATO more broadly, this means that the actual border of Russia’s military activity is no longer at the Smolensk heights, but just a few dozen kilometres east of Białystok
The Trap of Geopolitics: Rethinking EU Strategic Communication. College of Europe Policy Brief March 2021.
As part of the European Union’s current ‘geopolitical turn’, strategic communication – combining reactive messaging and proactive narrative-building – is a key element of the EU’s response to increasing global contestation.
Through its reactive component, the EU’s strategic communication is very much focussed on Russia, but still largely neglects that many other foreign and domestic actors deploy disinformation techniques, too.
With its proactive component, the EU uses narrative-building and, in so doing, resorts to aggressive ‘othering’ – disregarding the role of ‘listening’ practices in building trust and mutual understanding with third parties.
Instead of focussing on Eurocentric and securitising narratives, the EU should engage with the world on an equal footing in order to communicate even more strategically.
To this end, a more self-reflexive top-level political discourse should be coupled with a holistic and joined-up approach to disinformation and a greater emphasis on ‘listening’ practices
Shaping return to work policy: The role of industrial relations at national and company level - Country report for Belgium. CEPS Project Report 08 Feb 2021.
Belgium faces long-lasting challenges regarding the labour market activation of vulnerable groups, which includes people with health conditions and disabled people. As part of the “Negotiating return to work in the age of demographic change through industrial relations (REWIR)” project, this working paper explores the role played by industrial relations actors in Belgium in designing and implementing return to work policies at national and company level in order to support the labour market reintegration of individuals suffering from chronic diseases
Germany in the EU after Merkel: A view from Italy. EPC Commentary October 2021.
The German elections were expected to be a potentially destabilising factor for the entire EU. This was due both to the certainty of the end of the Merkel era, after 16 years of uninterrupted Chancellorship, and to the uncertainty around the outcome, given the swinging polls in the months preceding the elections. However, Germany’s political system has proved to be resilient. The ongoing negotiations for the formation of a new government promise to leave Berlin in the driver’s seat of European integration. That’s good news for Italy, as long as Germany engages with willing and able member states besides France and raise the bar on foreign policy matters
The debate on the future of Europe has a German problem. EPC Commentary 16/09/2021.
After multiple delays, the Conference on the Future of Europe has finally started. But the endeavour still faces numerous hurdles. First, European citizens – who are meant to play a leading role in the upcoming European Citizens’ Panels, national events and the Conference Plenary – are not aware that the Conference is taking place. Second, the complex process needs to gain speed, given that the Conference is supposed to come up with a Final Report in spring 2022. Third, the list of issues to be covered is extensive, even though experience suggests that exercises in citizen participation are most successful when they focus on particular topics and specific questions.
But all these challenges are overshadowed by the fact that EU institutions and national governments still disagree on the raison d'être of the Conference and its overall level of ambition. The European Parliament is pushing hard to ensure that the Conference puts political pressure on the (European) Council to implement long-overdue (institutional) reforms. But most national capitals remain sceptical or even outright opposed to the process, thereby undermining the prospects that the Conference will deliver any concrete results
Are European listed corporations short-termist? ECMI Commentary No. 71 07 Jan 2021.
A recent study prepared for the EU Commission has found that EU listed companies are increasingly focused on the short-term financial benefits of shareholders rather than long-term interests and sustainable value creation. It argues that the root causes of this behaviour lie within the regulatory framework and market practices (i.e. lack of a strategic perspective on sustainability, short-term focus of board-member mandates, and remuneration), and alleges that this will both undermine the investment capacity of firms and harm cash balances.
In response to this alleged short-termism, the EU Commission is considering a series of measures such as: harmonising directors’ duties and board composition; incentivising long-term shareholding; reducing quarterly reporting; and broadening reporting targets. The study’s conclusions were strongly contested by top academics in both the EU and the US – a challenge that was at first not matched by the relevant European professional associations
EU Education Diplomacy: Embeddedness of Erasmus+ in the EU’s Neighbourhood and Enlargement Policies. College of Europe EU Diplomacy Paper 3/2021.
Erasmus+ is a powerful tool of public diplomacy for the European Union (EU); however, its international dimension remains under-researched. This paper seeks to help bridge
this gap by analysing the degree to which the EU’s engagement through Erasmus+ is embedded in the overarching frameworks of its neighbourhood and enlargement
policies. Drawing in particular on the experience of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU’s engagement in the Eastern Partnership and the Western Balkans is scrutinised under three lenses: the objectives pursued, their implementation, and the domestic receptibility of Erasmus+. The paper finds a low
degree of Erasmus+ embeddedness in the Eastern Partnership framework and a moderate degree of integration in the enlargement framework. In light of this finding,
it argues that the EU should better employ this valuable tool in its external action and diplomacy. The three countries are highly receptive, but domestic constraints must be considered in EU planning. The paper concludes with policy recommendations that seek to better embed Erasmus+ in the EU’s external policies, as well as to capitalise on
the programme’s potential as a tool for the Union’s broader diplomatic strategy
The European Green Deal: How to turn ambition into action. EPC Discussion Paper 04 November 2021.
The pressure is on. The climate and ecological crises are accelerating and there is growing recognition that business as usual is not an option. The EU can and should play a major role in addressing the planetary crisis, in enabling and accelerating the transition to a more sustainable world. It can do this by acting as a rule-maker and enforcer; as an economic powerhouse; as a source of significant funding within the EU and beyond, as well as a mobiliser for private financing; as a convening power; as an innovator and developer of new solutions; as a standard-setter; as a major producer and consumer.
The European Green Deal is crystal clear in its ambition. However, as this ambition and its goals are turned into policies and initiatives, the greatest challenge lies in the ‘how’. How to turn the ambition of the European Green Deal into real action and real results?
This paper argues that to achieve the goals of the European Green Deal and leverage impact beyond EU borders as well, there are five fundamental strands of action for the EU and its member states:
Leadership that communicates the urgency for action. Europe needs leaders - be it politicians, policymakers, media, heads of military or other opinion influencers - that communicate clearly the direction of travel and remind the public of the benefits of action as well as the costs of inaction for the economy, society and people.
Aligning member state action with the agreed goals requires political will, ownership of the needed measures and recognising that urgent action is in every nation’s interest. This calls for using every tool in the kit, including EU policies, investments and collective action, to get on the right track. It requires addressing existing incoherencies in the policy and investment framework as well as better enforcement of existing rules.
Bringing business along: The EU needs to help create the right framework conditions for European businesses – big and small - to succeed in the transition and to become a leader in those solutions that are increasingly demanded in- and outside of the EU.
Bringing people along: Reaching the agreed goals requires communicating and showing the benefits that the measures will bring to people; managing the social impact on the most vulnerable in particular; and providing people with the right tools to engage in the transition.
Global action: The EU should lead by example but also collaborate with other major players in addressing the climate and the wider sustainability crises. When the EU speaks and acts as one, it can be more powerful and impactful globally than the sum of its parts
Recovery and reform in the EU’s most vulnerable regions. EPC Policy Paper June 2021.
Europe’s most vulnerable regions, characterised by persistent low growth and poverty, face a systemic lack of specific EU support. These regions display particularly high levels of vulnerability to the social, economic and territorial impacts of COVID-19, which will affect their recovery trajectories. They risk being left further behind in the EU’s complex pathway towards ‘a green and digital recovery’.
The Union’s lack of focus and action for investing in these most vulnerable regions must be addressed. First and foremost, EU institutions and member states should recognise that some territories will struggle much more than others in their recovery trajectories. Ignoring their plight would have potentially far-reaching consequences. The EU’s ‘convergence machine’ could be damaged irreparably, with long-term – and potentially political – consequences.
Alison Hunter and Marta Pilati continue their extensive research on the Union’s low-growth, poor regions, calling for the founding of a specific EU initiative to support them as well as further targeting by the existing policy architecture. In particular, they recommend:
creating an EU policy space for regions experiencing long-term low growth and poverty, to promote the value and visibility of place-based support;
aligning Cohesion Policy and the Recovery and Resilience Facility for improved policy coherence and greater investment impact; and
tailoring support for growth-enhancing reforms in the EU’s most vulnerable regions.
The EU’s green and digital recovery strategy fails to account for the specific needs of its poor and low-growth regions. Existing disparities and fragmentation challenges across the Union could widen or even become entrenched, casting new doubts on the EU’s ability and commitment to strengthen its convergence agenda and execute a just transition. The fallout could lead to a rise in territorial and political tensions while leaving many vulnerable places behind. Hunter and Pilati outline an agenda for a new EU initiative that champions reform support for these vulnerable territories and improves their prospects for a digital and green recovery