Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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The Structure of Plato’s Republic and the Cave Allegory
As Plato’s Phaedrus 246c stipulates, every logos must be structured like a living being, i.e., the relation of all its parts to one another and to the whole must be appropriate. Thus, the present paper argues that Plato’s masterwork has been organized in accord with the ascent/descent movement as presented in the Allegory of the Cave: Book I represents eikasia, Books II–IV.434c exemplify pistis, Book IV.434d–444e illustrates dianoia and Books V–VII express noesis. Having reached the anabasis (with the Sun, the Line and the Cave images) the philosopher turns to the consideration of the deficient or unjust forms of the souls and the corresponding political regimes. Finally, the discussion comes back to eikasia through the renewed criticism of mimesis and the exposition of the Myth of Er. As is typical of Plato, this is not merely a formal matter, since the structure conveys that as the Good makes the Ideas intelligible, so the Sun, the Line and the Cave images also throw light on the whole dialogue
The Self as Image and Suddenness: Some Remarks on Plotinus’ Noetic Life
This article focuses on certain dimensions of Plotinus’ notion of the noetic self, which so far have not received sufficient scholarly attention. The evidence of Enn. V 8 makes clear the assumption about the inexhaustible generativity of the noetic self. This generativity implies an intimate relation with the notions of image and suddenness: the former is intended as a medium of unconditional self-transparency, whereas the latter is understood as pointing to the unlimited newness that is characteristic of the noetic life, which, according to Plotinus, consists in an indissoluble unity of identity and alterity (Enn. VI 7.13). The aforesaid notions make it reasonable to view Plotinus’ concept of noetic self as pointing to a predominantly relational and dynamic ontology, in which essentialism presupposes no staticity whatsoever, but can rather be seen as a perspective that leads to the development of a harmonious and non-narcissistic creativity
Following Sextus: Demonstrative Argument in Gorgias’ Peri tou mē ontos
The two extant versions of Gorgias’ Peri tou mē ontos (PTMO) have been preserved by an anonymous author (MXG) and by Sextus Empiricus (S.E.). Both versions have been differently interpreted by scholars who examine either the doctrine or the rhetorical-communicational dimension (the first option being dominant). When comparing the PTMO with the rest of Gorgias’ works, the present paper aims to demonstrate that S.E. offers a more precise account of Gorgias’ modus argumentandi. Thus, S.E. shows the following, typical features of Gorgias’ demonstrative reasoning: 1) application of demonstrandum and quod erat demonstrandum, 2) continuous employment of reductio ad absurdum and 3) a refined formulation of the principle of non-contradiction (similar to the one in Pal. 25). The MXG, on the other hand, is accurate in the discussion of particular arguments (e.g. the third kephalaion), but presents an interpreter who is more interested in questioning Gorgias rather than doing justice to his thought. Hence, this article concludes that it was S.E., who had the text or at least a relatively accurate summary of the PTMO
Koinon and koinônia: A Particular Case of Participation in John Philoponus
The aim of this study is to discuss an original philosophical contribution made by Philoponus, who in In Cat. 18, 14–22 equates koinon in its most peculiar meaning with the concept of koinônia understood as a particular case of Platonic methexis. First, the paper analyzes the passages where the Neoplatonic commentators of the Categories distinguish four distinct meanings of the Aristotelian concept of koinon. Subsequently, this article emphasizes the differences between Philoponus’ hermeneutical suggestions and those of the other commentators. Philoponus clarifies that while every koinon is methekton, Aristotle’s koinon is characterized by the fact that the participation is ex isou and kata meros. Thus, koinônia, according to Philoponus, is a particular case of methexis, where everyone participating in something participates in it equally and singly. The example cited by Philoponus to explain Aristotle’s koinon is that of men participating equally and singly in human nature. The study concludes with a discussion of the relationship among the concepts of koinon, koinônia and methexis
Gorgias and Isocrates’ Grave
Gorgias, the teacher of Isocrates, is rarely mentioned in Isocrates’ works and never in a flattering way. He is also presented, among other masters and poets, on Isocrates’ grave in a way that appears to be consistent with his pupil’s thought. Thus, the author of the iconographic plan of the grave may have been either Isocrates himself or someone who sufficiently knew his works and properly understood his tempestuous relationship with his master
Mixture and Transformation in Aristotle’s De generatione et corruptione
In his works on natural sciences, primarily in the Physics, Aristotle focuses on different forms of metabolē and distinguishes movement in general from substantial change. The On generation and corruption deals with the latter. When reading this treatise, one should pay particular attention to the concept of mixture. Apart from being the subject of a specific chapter (I 10), the problem of mixture permeates the whole work. But what exactly is mixture? Is it a simple combination of small parts? Can a compound of water and wine be called mixture? If so, is this mixture and nothing more? In the course of the discussion, it is argued that the Aristotelian idea of mixis does not correspond to the concept that is usually associated with it. Rather, it is shown that mixis is fundamental for comprehending the physical world and constitutes not only the term per quem the first elements of all material bodies originate, but also plays a fundamental role in all natural sciences, particularly, in biology
Sacral and Anagogical Aspects of the “Marvellous” in Damascius. An Interpretation
In the fragments of Damascius’ Vita Isidori one can observe a significant presence of the “marvellous.” In many cases, the marvellous seems to manifest a sacral and anagogical value in line with the philosophical and religious conceptions of late Neo-Platonism. A similar value of the marvellous can also be found in a passage of De Principiis (I, 14, 1–19), where Damascius hails the totally ineffable Principle as supremely marvellous, upon which he presents it as absolutely unknowable and expressible only in an aporetic way
Providential Disorder in Plato’s Timaeus?
Plato tries to explain the becoming of the cosmos by referring to the concepts of order and disorder. Scholars have usually focused on the relationship between the cosmos and the demiurge that Plato puts forward to explain the reasonable (i.e., well-ordered) development. Along these lines, scholarship has examined the providential role played by both the demiurge and the soul of the world. Yet, an interesting problem still remains open: what exactly is the function of disorder? What is the sense of the concept of a perfectly established order if we do not know the manner in which it is achieved, since we have no understanding of the conditions that make it possible? Pursuing this line of thought, one may point to a providential role of the disorder given the balance of forces that operates in Plato’s cosmic becoming
The Analytical Perspective of Aristotle’s Categorical and Modal Syllogisms
What is meant under the genuine title of Aristotle’s ta Analytika is rarely properly understood. Presumably, his analytics was inspired by the method of geometric analysis. For Aristotle, this was a regressive or heuristic procedure, departing from a proposed conclusion (or problem) and asking which premises could be found in order to syllogize, demonstrate or explain it. The terms that form categorical and modal propositions play a fundamental role in analytics. Aristotle introduces letters in lieu of the triples of terms (major – middle – minor) constituting the propositions and the three syllogistic figures that schematize them. His formulation of the three syllogistic figures refers to a syntactical and predicative order and position of the triples of terms, arranged in some diagrammed schemata, which, regrettably, are missing from the extant text of the Prior Analytics. Considering planar and graphic arrangements, both vertical and horizontal orders as well as the position of the three terms involved, we propose a reconstruction, at least to some extent, of these probable lettered diagrams. In such reconstructed diagrams, we can appropriately capture the definition of syllogism as a predicative connexion of terms, and easier survey a synoptic account of all valid predicative relations and transpositions, and also reduce the imperfect syllogisms into the moods of the first figure. Aristotle’s syllogistic is an analytical calculation of terms, understood as predicates and subjects within the categorical propositions, and more precisely of three terms schematized in three figures in predicative links such that, by means of a middle, follows from necessity a conclusion of the extreme terms. The necessity of the consequence is not based on the implication or inference of the propositions, but on a predictive transitivity through the middle term within the syllogistic figures. Syllogism must draw its conclusion through the way its terms are predicated of one another. Aristotle in his Prior Analytics (I 3, 8–22) developed also a complex account of modal syllogisms within necessity and possibility of belonging (predicating). This account involves also such an analytical reduction to the syllogistic figures. In this analytical perspective, we try to throw some light on his modal syllogisms, although this difficult and nowadays thoroughly discussed topic would require a much wider treatment