Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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A Defense of “Author’s Mouthpiece”
Against the assumption that their literary form precludes Plato from expressing views in his dialogues, this paper argues that it is legitimate to read certain utterances of characters also as expressions of Plato’s views or to infer Plato’s views from his characters’ speech. Ancient hermeneutical practice, including the practice of Plato’s characters themselves, shows mimetic literature’s reception as “double speech” on two registers, a story register and a rhetorical register. Although aware of the distinction between character and author, ancient readers attribute ideology in characters’ speeches directly to the author. Plato’s contemporaries did this with his dialogues. This practice creates the presumption that philosophical dialogues began as a genre both mimetic and assertoric. Evidence from Cicero and Plutarch supports this presumption, and modern examples show writers and artists weaving ideology into their works. Distinctions in modern literary theory help posit “mouthpiece” as a formal property of characters, “turned on” in order for the author to convey ideology at places in the work. I argue that the “mouthpiece” assumption does not entail fallacy and that the theoretical gains of the “author’s mouthpiece” construct outweigh its risks. Without vitiating dialogues’ status as fiction, the “mouthpiece” assumption serves the history of philosophy and enriches our engagement with the texts
Arte letteraria e coerenza filosofica: il sole, la linea e la caverna
The approach I propose here to Books VI and VII of Plato’s Republic is to offer some reflections on the organicist and perspectivist readings. Perspectivism seems in some respects to be a variant of organicism. Indeed, both approaches allow for a reassessment not only of the various parts that make up a dialogue, but also, more generally, of the importance of the literary or dramatic form, which is marginalised by the evolutionist reading. The aim of this essay is therefore to try to understand some of the images present in the central books of the Republic, without burdening them with theoretical structures and questionable chronologies, but rather by noting their importance in the overall design of the individual text and their consistence within a broader organism, the entire and unitary Platonic corpus of dialogues. To this end, I will try to highlight the subtle differences between organicism and perspectivism. I will focus on the relationship between literary constructions and theoretical speculations that make the Republic an organically unified text in itself and perfectly consistent with the entire corpus of dialogues. Three images in particular will help me to show how literature and philosophy meet: the sun analogy, the divided line and the allegory of the cave. My aim is not to say what exactly the epistemology of the central books of the Republic consists in, but rather to try to identify the pitfalls in the text when philosophical questions about epistemological issues are separated from literary ones
Livio Rossetti: sulla nascita della filosofia e sui Presocratici
This article aims to dialectically synthesize the main theses of Livio Rossetti concerning the origins of philosophy. It considers Rossetti’s central thesis, which has been prominent in recent years, that philosophy does not begin with Thales but rather with Plato, given that in the works of the Athenian philosopher, the semanteme philosoph* appears with a frequency previously unseen. The article also poses a critical inquiry to Rossetti regarding the definition of philosophia that he, at least implicitly, employs to support his theses
Seneca’s Heraclitus DK 22 B 49a and Parmenides
Several scholarly inquiries have explored the possibility that Parmenides was acquainted with Heraclitus and engaged in polemics against him, in light of the fact that their respective chronologies do not preclude this scenario. However, with few exceptions, the debate remains polarized between two main positions: the first contends that Heraclitus and Parmenides were likely unaware of each other, or at least that no conclusive evidence exists to prove their acquaintance; the second posits that Parmenides was indeed aware of Heraclitus and argued against him. This paper focuses on Heraclitus B 49a DK to offer additional, albeit measured, support for the latter position and to suggest a hypothesis, at least a partial one, concerning the origins of Parmenides’ κρίσις between εἶναι and μὴ εἶναι
The Study of Being in Plato and Aristotle
Usage of the Greek verb ‘to be’ is generally divided into three broad categories — the predicative use, the existential and the veridical—and these usages often inform the way we understand Being in ancient philosophy. This article challenges this approach by arguing that Being is not the product of linguistic reflection in Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle; rather, these thinkers treat Being as the ontological and epistemological primary. Though this may overlap with the linguistic senses, it is not the same thing. The article is divided into three sections: the first one raises several basic issues with the predicative interpretation of Being, the second argues that Being is unified and singular in a significant sense and the third brings out the special pre-immanence of Being
The paschein and pathê of the Earth and Living Beings in Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias (Meteorologica 1.14)
In his 2013 monograph on Structure and Method in Aristotle’s Meteorologica, Malcolm Wilson has shown both that Aristotle conceived of meteorological phenomena as analogous to the bodily processes of animals, and that for the Stagirite the sublunar world should not be seen as a single body, but rather as composed of many different individuals. However, Wilson did not articulate the relationship between these two theories—that is, he did not answer the following question: how is it possible for the Earth to behave like an animal if it is not a single body? This paper argues that the answer to this question lies in the Aristotelian statement about the different paschein of the Earth and animals. In fact, in the chapter of Meteorology dedicated to climatic changes (1.14), Aristotle, after comparing such changes to the maturing and ageing of living organisms, states that ‘only, in the case of the bodies of plants and animals being affected does not occur in each part separately, but it is necessary for the being to mature and decay all at once, whereas in the case of the Earth this occurs in each part separately, due to cooling and warming’ (351a.28-31). In his commentary, Alexander of Aphrodisias reiterates that the difference between the changes of the Earth and those of living organisms concern the way in which these different subjects undergo affections (pathê). The concept of paschein/pathos is thus fundamental to understanding how Aristotle conceives of biological analogies, which play a key role in his meteorology: as the affections of maturing and corruption show, parallels with organic processes can be found in meteorological phenomena, but always at the level of the individual parts of the Earth. Although the sublunary world can be understood in organic terms, this world is not a ‘cosmic animal’, but rather a multiplicity of ‘regional animals’. To corroborate this thesis, this paper addresses several related questions, including: the mechanics ofenvironmental changes according to Aristotle; the differences between the regions of the Earth; the lexicon used in Meteorology to refer to the transformations of the Earth; the personal notes that Alexander adds to Aristotle’s discussion. Finally, the first modern translation of the relevant section of Alexander’s commentary is also provided here
Wykładnia mimesis tragedii w Poetyce (6–19) Arystotelesa
The aim of this article is to present a new Polish translation of Aristotle’s Poetics, namely, those of its central chapters (6–19) that deal with the Stagirite’s explication of the mimesis of tragedy. When interpreting the first five chapters of the treatise, it is important to recognize the mimetic distinctions and forms according to means and objects as well as the question of how poetic creativity takes shape (generally from improvisation through epic to comedy and tragedy). On the basis of these preliminary assumptions, Aristotle proceeds to define tragedy and analyze its components, forms and functions in more detail. Unlike the previous Polish translations of the Poetics, we have attempted here to render Aristotle’s essential technical expressions as faithfully as possible, without distorting them in accord with various concepts of modern aesthetics or literary criticism. We have also sought to preserve the Stagirite’s typical composition and his complex argument. Only in this way can the sense of Aristotle’s leading assumptions and distinctions be properly discerned. For the ease of reading, we also introduce more paragraphs and relevant subject headings into the text
Parmenide e l’Uovo argenteo degli Orfici in Simplicio, Damascio e Proclo
When commenting on Aristotle Ph. 1.3, 187a1, Simplicius in Ph. 1.3, 146, 29–147,2 establishes an equivalence between the shining «silver egg» (ὤεον ἀργύφεον) of Orpheus (fr. 70 Kern) and the Parmenidean being or, rather, one of the determinations with which Parmenides, in the section of his Poem devoted to the so-called Way of Truth, indicates the ἐόν, i.e., «resembling the mass of a well-rounded sphere» (εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκωι – DK 28 B 8.43). The equivalence established here is found in the great digression about Parmenides (in Ph. 142, 28–148, 24), where Simplicius puts forward an interpretation of Parmenides that identifies the Parmenidean being-one (τὸ ἓν ὄν) with the intelligible (τὸ νοητόν), which, in another passages of the same commentary, is also qualified with the metaphysical concept of “unified” (τὸ ἡνωμένον) that is taken from Damascius. The aim of the present paper is to trace back the Neo-Platonic assumptions of this identification. In particular, we will focus on Damascius Pr. 2.55.40, 14–19 and 3.123.160, 1–3 Westerink, since these passages contain insights into the Orphic theology that is referred to as “usual”, “common” or “rhapsodic”, as well as a contextual “translation” of various Orphic concepts (e.g. ὤεον ἀργύφεον) in terms of Neo-Platonic metaphysics. The metaphysical transposition of the mythical image of the silver egg goes back, however, to Proclus (in Ti. 1.428, 8–9), who assumes the identity between Plato’s being (“being in the primary sense”, τὸ πρώτως [...] ὄν) and the Orphic egg (ταὐτὸν τό τε Πλάτωνος ὂν καὶ τὸ Ὀρφικὸν ὠόν). One cannot, at the same time, exclude a priori the possibility that the Orphic motif of the silver egg circulated in the Magna Graecia of Parmenides already from at least the 6th century BC. It is possible, as Colli hypothesised, that already Ibycus (who certainly knew Orpheus, fr. 25 Page) betrays a certain knowledge of it in fr. 4.4–5 Page, where we find the expression ἐν ὠέωι ἀργυρέωι. This article demonstrates that Proclus and Damascius embedded the Orphic concept of ὤεον ἀργύφεον into their Neo-Platonic metaphysics by showing its potential for speculative order
Parmenides’ Structure of the Earth
It is generally accepted that the enigmatic fragment 12 of Parmenides, supplemented by the first part of A.tius II 7.1, represents an unlikely cosmos which comprises alternating spherical crowns of fire and night, surrounding the earth. A comparison of the fragment and A.tius’ text shows that the latter adds nothing substantial to the fragment. Thus, fragment 12 can actually represent the structure of the earth, which consists of a core of fire, is surrounded by the layers of the earth’s crust, into which heat is transmitted from within, and on which the goddess of life dwells