Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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How to Be an Unsuccessful Ancient Philosophy Scholar in Uneasy Times: The Case of S. Lisiecki (1872-1960)
Full text linkThe paper provides a brief outline of the biography and works of Stanisław Lisiecki (1872–1960), a little-known Polish classics scholar, who is remembered only, if at all, as a translator of Plato’s Republic. In his early fifties, having given up his career as a Catholic priest, he started working in the field of classics and managed to publish several minor works on Plato in Polish and Latin. His decision to abandon the clergy was not welcomed by many members of the Polish academia and most of his translations of Plato and Aristotle remained unpublished. His renderings of Plato could not compete with the highly accessible translations made by W. Witwicki, which were becoming increasingly popular at that time. Furthermore, Lisiecki’s translations of Aristotle, despite the pioneering nature of his undertaking, met with strong criticism at various university seminars
Causality at Lower Levels: The Demiurgical Unity of the Second and Third God according to Numenius of Apamea
Full text linkNumenius is an author who straddles the line between Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. In this contribution, I focus on the differences between the second and the third God, which emerge from analyses of the relevant fragments. Numenius emphasizes, on several occasions, how the second God (i.e., the demiurge) has a dual nature. In this paper, I investigate the role of the demiurge in Numenius and examine in what sense the second and third God are “one.” On the one hand, Numenius seems to be stressing the unity of the second and third levels of reality, but on the other hand, he also appears to be differentiating them. The present analyses concentrate on fragments 19F, 24F, 29T and 30T (respectively 11, 16, 21, and 22 in des Places’ edition). My purpose is to demonstrate that, according to Numenius, the second and the third God are one because they both can be regarded as demiurgic. Thus, Numenius conceives a kind of “double demiurgy,” which preserves the distinction between the second and the third God, who are distinguished from an ontological point of view, but who, at the same time, share a demiurgic function. The second God is then the paradigm, whereas the third God is immanent in matter as a ruling principle of the cosmos, which is similar to the World Soul, as he operates on matter in order to make it rationally ordered
André Motte (1936-2021) Belgian Friend of Classical Philologists and Ancient Philosophy Specialists in Poznań
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Why Is Plato’s Good Good?
Full text linkThe form of the Good in Plato’s Phaedo and Republic seems, by our standards, to do too much: it is presented as the metaphysical principle, the epistemological principle and the principle of ethics. Yet this seemingly chimerical object makes good sense in the broader context of Plato’s philosophical project. He sought certain knowledge of necessary truths (in sharp contrast to the contingent truth of modern science). Thus, to be knowable the cosmos must be informed by timeless principles; and this leads to teleology and the Good. The form of the Good, it is argued, is what makes the world knowable insofar as it is knowable. This interpretation plugs a significant gap in the scholarship on the Good and draws attention to a deep connection between Plato’s epistemology and his teleological understanding of the cosmos
Unwritten Doctrine of Pythagoras in Hermias of Alexandria
Full text linkIn Hermias’ commentary on Phaedrus (In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia), it is possible to identify several direct references to the philosophers and pre-Socratic doctrines, including Pythagoras. We point out to three references to Pythagoras in Hermias: (1) Pythagoras is characterized as an unwritten philosopher, (2) there is a special connection with the divinities and Muses, and (3) there is a special connection with the Phaedrus dialogue, revealed by the affinity between Pythagoras and Socrates. We show how the explicit references to Pythagoras in Hermias constitute a certain method of interpreting Platonism: as a philosophy manifested in writing, but which, at the same time, values the unwritten tradition, represented especially by Pythagoras and Socrates. We also demonstrate how the references translated and examined here reveal the image of this Neoplatonic Pythagoras of Hermias, an image which is not necessarily in tune with the oldest doxography, and which permits the reevaluation of Plato’s position as a philosopher who sought to combine unwritten doctrines with his explicit activity as a writer
Filolaos z Krotony, O naturze (Περὶ φύσεως) doksografia i fragmenty
Full text linkThe present article consists of two parts. First, we provide some general information on the life and views of Philolaus. This serves as an introduction to the second part which offers a new Polish translation of the most important ancient testimonies on Philolaus and the preserved fragments from his book On Nature (the latter are quoted along with the Greek original). According to the most recent research, these fragments are authentic and give an important insight into the Pythagorean and early Greek philosophy. The present selection of Philolaus’ testimonies and fragments has been arranged in a novel and accessible manner.The present article consists of two parts. First, we provide some general information on the life and views of Philolaus. This serves as an introduction to the second part which offers a new Polish translation of the most important ancient testimonies on Philolaus and the preserved fragments from his book On Nature (the latter are quoted along with the Greek original). According to the most recent research, these fragments are authentic and give an important insight into the Pythagorean and early Greek philosophy. The present selection of Philolaus’ testimonies and fragments has been arranged in a novel and accessible manner
The (Un)bearable Lightness of Being. The Cyrenaics on Residual Solipsism
Full text linkThe aim of this paper is to assess the evidence on Cyrenaic solipsism and show how and why some views endorsed by the Cyrenaics appear to be committing them to solipsism. After evaluating the fascinating case for Cyrenaic solipsism, the paper shall deal with an (often) underestimated argument on language attributed to the Cyrenaics, whose logic – if I reconstruct it well – implies that after all the Cyrenaics cannot have endorsed a radical solipsism. Yet, by drawing an illuminating parallel with Wittgenstein’s argument on private language and inner sensations, a case is to be made for the Cyrenaics to have subscribed to a sort of ‘residual solipsism’, which in turn helps us to understand the notion of Cyrenaic privacy at a fuller extent
Les deux manières d’expliquer la réalité proposées par Parménide
Full text linkTowards the end of fragment 1 of his Poem, Parmenides puts forward two methods or paths that a priori explain the same object of study: the existence of the fact or state of being. One of the options leads to the core of the truth and is, therefore, pursued. The other is merely a set of contradictory opinions and is, accordingly, abandoned. These two paths are expounded in the rest of the Poem, while fragment 4 shows that even the erroneous conception, which had to be set aside, can still be fruitful. Once the firm foundation of truth has been established, fragments 10 and 11 propose to widen the inquiry to the whole of reality. This interpretation suggests a rejection of the arrangement of the Poem that has become canonical, and a criticism of the doxographic tradition that since Aristotle has “Platonised” the philosophy of Parmenides by assimilating the “opinions” (which are only points of view) to the “appearances” (in the Platonic sense of the term)
Platone, Prm. 133b4- c1 / 134e9- 135b2. Quali logoi nella gumnasia per un tis refrattario alla persuasione e sensibile alle contraddizioni come Antistene?
Full text linkIn this study, I show how Plato in the Parmenides reprises the encounter with the Phaedo’s Antisthenes, whom I elsewhere assumed to be one of the various tis that get examined in the dialogue. Now, with the Parmenides’ tis, a similar situation arises: this Antisthenes embodies such characteristics as being “an expert in many areas”, “not without natural gifts” and “capable of following with critical intelligence” the logoi taken from “distant premises.” In the four logoi of the gumnasia, I highlight how Plato, in developing his exercise, proceeds on his own way without openly arguing with any tis and how, despite his detached attitude, his hodos, while interweaving with that of his colleague Antisthenes, enters into a conflict. I then demonstrate how the two paths, despite having a common aporetic beginning (the objections of Gorgias to Parmenides and the testimony of Proclus against Antisthenes), at times overlap and at times are mutually exclusive. From this, I also argue that whoever wrote the dialogue must have been aware that the path, although apparently linear and rectilinear, was in fact bumpy and tortuous