Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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Où commence la «Voie de la Vérité» et où finit la «Voie de la Doxa» chez Parménide?
Full text linkAccording to the “orthodox” version of Parmenides’ Poem, version generally accepted as vox dei, the “Way of Truth” begins in fragment 2 of the Poem (because fragment 1 is only a kind of introduction) and ends at verse 50 of fragment 8. The “Way of the Doxa”, on the other hand, begins at verse 51 of fragment 8 and ends at fragment 19. We believe it will not an be exaggeration to say that this text could be signed by most specialists interested in the Parmenidean philosophy, even the most eminent ones. Now, apart from a few words, this passage implicitly supposes a whole series of hypotheses, generally accepted without prior justification, hypotheses which, once analyzed, necessarily lead one to support the non-existence in Parmenides of either a “Way of Truth” or a “Way of Doxa”
Il mito di Elena e il potere controverso della bellezza. Un percorso intertestuale tra Omero, Euripide, Stesicoro, Gorgia, Isocrate e Platone
Full text linkThe myth of Helen runs through the poetic and philosophical tradition of the ancient world. Her defense is a paradox for legal tradition and the opportunity for a triumph of rhetoric. Through her name Greeks discuss the enchantment of beauty and desire as a driving force, which can have a destructive or constructive effect, or even act as a medium for great ideals. With Helen, a controversial power is at issue, which emanates from beauty and which presents itself differently to the gaze of men and women, raising a “gender” question that has clear traces in ancient texts. All this gives reason to appreciate, once again, the usefulness of intertextual comparison to investigate themes transversally present in poetic, rhetorical, legal, historical and philosophical texts. The revisiting of myths is already an elective place for a consciously intertextual practice on the part of tragic poets, in which Plato finds a model for his philosophical theatre. Among the detectable intersections, it still deserves investigation that precisely the “rewriting (palinodia)” of the myth of Helen offers Plato the opportunity to introduce a decisive turning point in the Phaedrus, where his Socrates deals with the power of eros by dueling with rhetoric: here a poetic quotation becomes a philosophical place, in which the threads of a distant comparison, sometimes explicit, sometimes underground, intertwine between the intellectuals active in the first half of the 4th century. The ambiguity of the myth of Helen is the underlying theme of this essay, which aims to identify connections between the texts and implications that are not always declared. The themes examined are the praise or denigration connected to the image of Helen in Homer, the double rewriting of the myth in Euripides (The Trojan women and Helen), the different virtuosities of its defense in Stesichorus, Gorgias and Isocrates, the philosophical metamorphosis of the myth in Plato’s Phaedrus, where for the first time the quality of desire is questioned together with the type of love that derives from it. This essay is intended to be a tribute to Livio Rossetti, who made intertextual study an indispensable exegetical model for understanding what is talked about in the literature of the ancient world
Πλάτων τρόπον τινὰ οὐ κακῶς τὴν σοφιστικὴν περὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔταξεν (Aristot. Metaph. 1026b14)
Full text linkAristotle’s observation that “Plato not wrongly ordered sophistry around non-being” (Metaph. E 2, 1026b14; also in K 8, 1064b29) refers generally to Plato’s Sophist. The admission of non-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν) could be considered as a certain consequence of the Eleatic monism, which gave rise to the Sophistic movement as has been recognized by Plato and Aristotle. In this paper, we try to identify more precisely the context of this setting of non-being of polemical and very particular importance. Plato’s Sophist discusses non-being, but the inspiration came precisely from the audacious argument of an unnamed sophist who dares to challenge Parmenides’ solemn prohibition of non-being. In fact, the Stranger of Elea recounts that even as a boy he knew the prohibition of the great Parmenides (Soph. 237a). Moreover, being younger, he believed he understood exactly this difficulty, that is, when “someone” (τις) spoke of non-being; now he entangles himself in various aporias regarding this issue (Soph. 243b). Thus, it is the unnamed sophist, who “takes refuge in the darkness of non-being and attaches himself to it in its exercise, which is hard to grasp because the place is so dark” (Soph. 254a). The discussion that follows has a twofold purpose: first, against Parmenides’ prohibition, to admit non-being, and secondly, by refuting the sophist’s meontological argument, to propose a better solution. We observe that Plato in his polemic with a “sophist,” although in an allusive form and without ever explicitly naming Gorgias, but in such a way as to allow an implicit identification of him, draws nourishment from his “own demonstration” (ἴδιος ἀπόδειξις), which is based on the formula of identity, i.e., on the assertion that “non-being is non-being” (cf. De MXG, 979a25-33). Thus, the Elean Stranger (Soph. 258b-c), when arguing with the sophistic invention of non-being, has taken up the same tautological “is” that was coined by Gorgias in order to overturn the ontological argument of Parmenides, albeit his understanding in this regard was different from that of the Leontinian. This testifies to a positive qualification of non-being which in this way is not in absolute opposition to being, but is only different from it. This solution also allows Plato to solve the problem of negative predication and the statement of falsehood. Scholars of Plato do not suppose that the author of the Sophist could have had precisely the Sophist Gorgias in mind. But in our opinion, in this way the meaning of this difficult sentence (Soph. 258c) is clarified and it becomes evident which of the sophistic arguments Plato has in mind here. But it was none other than Gorgias who accepted the possibility of identities in expressions and used the refuting method to show that even that which is different is somehow identical and vice versa, and in particular that the identical is the opposite of being and of non-being (cf. Phaedr. 267a-b with reference to Gorgias). Plato, however, stopped only at the formulation of the meontological argument, unlike the sophist Gorgias, who proceeded further in the direction of ontological nihilism, consequently nullifying the possibility of λόγος, which is discussed in the next part of the Sophist (259d-260b), where the sophist Gorgias is criticized, though not named. The author of this paper has already presented the above theses in several Polish and Italian articles, but so far has not found a critical response in the literature on the subject
Il doppio ruolo di Parmenide nel Parmenide di Platone: obiettare alla teoria delle idee e portarvi aiuto come un nuovo Zenone
Full text linkTwo of the greatest interpreters of Parmenides, Giovanni Casertano and Franco Ferrari, have given opposite interpretations of the role of the character of Parmenides. For Ferrari, Parmenides would only be a critic of ideas, as he equates them with their sensitive participants (thus, he could not be considered one of the prosopa of Plato). For Casertano, on the other hand, Parmenides expresses the ‘metaphysical’ aspects of ideas in accordance with the young Socrates’ discourse on the “prodigy” in the initial part of the dialogue. Neither of the two interpretations presents a Parmenides that represents the figure of Plato adequate for the “dramatic” development of the dialogue. If, on the other hand, we regard them both as integral parts, the image and role of Parmenides could be more appropriate to the bipolar structure of the dialogue and of Plato himself. To this end, I have assumed that Plato unifies in Parmenides his dialectical-deductive method with that of Zeno: the aporetic-paradoxical one that is more open than his to finding ways of escape from any paradoxical arguments. It would be for this reason that Parmenides encourages the young and inexperienced Socrates to follow Zeno’s tropos when defining virtue, also because it was Socrates himself, in the final part of his discourse on the “prodigy,” who praised Zeno for the double courage shown first in criticizing the common sense and the principles of current physics and then in overcoming the contrast between these principles and the more specific mathematizing logic. I identify in this praise of Socrates an assumption, on the part of Parmenides, that the burden of bringing back into ideas the courageous behaviour that Zeno showed in the world of the sensible. I agree with Vlastos in considering Parmenides to be “the manifesto of Plato’s self-criticism,” and in viewing this Parmenides as the prosopon of a Plato that is willing both to level self-criticism at his own stance and to give voice to those who do not think like him and even to those who reject his position
To Begin so Early and to Persevere over a Long Period of Time. Reflections on Time on the Horizon of Human Experience in the Anonymus Iamblichi
Full text linkThe interest of scholars in the Anonymous of Iamblichus has been oriented in two main ways: it focuses either on the problem of its dating and authorship, or on one or other of the many themes which seem to have been on the agenda of the investigation of its author. My interest is in this second way and I propose to examine the author’s conception of time on the horizon of human nature. What makes man truly man (ἀνὴρ ἀληθῶς ἀγαθός – DK 89, 4)? I intend to point the importance of the notion of time in the context of the human experience for who aspires to be an agathos, an enkratestaton. First, I will examine the lexical and semantic field of time employed to characterize the human condition and justify the prerogatives of author regarding human behaviour and action. Second, I will discuss the different aspects and contexts considered by the author to develop his argument. Among these aspects we have: (i) the distinction between what is innate in us (φῦναι), and what must be acquired through effort (φιλοπονία) and perseverance over time (πολὺν χρόνον); (ii) the opinion that anyone who wants to guide theirlife in view of what is beautiful and good (καλόν καὶ ἀγαθόν) must to be initiated very early (πρωιαίτατα), or should start “immediately and increasing to the end” (αὐτίκα τε ἀρξάμενον καὶ συναυξηθὲν είς τέλος); (iii) the need for him to use his own resources “always and not occasionally” (DK 89, 1–2). We will examine in our paper the passages in which a concept of time appears, in order to show that this is one of the centrepieces of the author’s argument and the way par excellence to understand the underlying concept of human nature at the thought of its author
Aristotle’s Zeno. How the History of Philosophy is Intertwined with Contemporary Philosophy
Full text linkHermeneutical scholars doubt whether many past authors really existed. They are only a sort of construction built with the passing of time. Indeed, Zeno of Elea, for instance, was real, and historians attempted to establish what he wrote and intended to say. Our most important source for Zeno is Aristotle. Zeno’s paradoxes deeply influenced the latter’s Physics. Is Aristotle’s physics relevant to us? Yes, because philosophical problems are too complex not to be considered in their historical development as well. In reading Zeno and Aristotle, we can see physical problems from a completely different perspective and learn a lot. In other terms, the historical Zeno is disorienting for us. On the other hand, Zeno’s historical legacy is extremely interesting for us. Indeed, we will see how Zeno’s and Aristotle’s reflections on continuum, extension, and movement could contribute to a better understanding of these notions in the contemporary debate. 
What’s in a Name? Limits in Parmenides’ Sequentialism
Full text linkIn this paper, the problem of compatibility between the two parts of the poem by Parmenides of Elea is addressed. This is done on the basis of a number of fragments from the poem – B 8, 9, 12, 16 and others – and a study of their ancient testimonia. In this way, the Parmenidean conception of the world and of human perceptive and gnoseological activity within it is reconstructed. Furthermore, starting from textual clues that show a certain need to go beyond this view of the world, an attempt has been made to argue how τὸ ἐόν can be understood as the All, i.e. as the universe, but seen in its unity. In order to do so, a tempative answer was proposed, using the philosophical category of limit, to recent aporias raised by interpreters
ΠΑΙΣ ΠΑΙΖΩΝ. Homer, Iliad XV 362–364, Heraclitus, DK 22 B 52, and F. Nietzsche
Full text linkFriedrich Nietzsche resorted several times to the image of a child playing with sand or pebbles. His purpose in doing so was to evoke a cyclical process of construction and destruction devoid of both responsibility and finality. This essay examines, on the one hand, the relation of the child’s image to its two main hypotexts (Heraclitus DK 22 B 52 and Iliad XV 362-64) and, on the other, the range of Nietzsche’s uses of the simile
Senofane e il “non sapere di sapere”
Full text linkAn examination of Xenophanes’ fragment DK 21 B 34 shows how it to some extent anticipates what is known in contemporary epistemological debate as the “Gettier problem.” According to the argument underlying this problem, it is not enough to have a “justified true belief” in order to be able to say that one has “knowledge.” As Xenophanes’ text has it, even if one were able to say something true, one would not know it yet. This is because, according to Xenophanes, no one is capable of grasping the evident truth of things, since only conjectures about everything are available. But while conjectures cannot rise above the level of pure opinion, they are not all equal: as DK 21 B 18 recognizes, they are perfectible. But what is the basis of this position, which oscillates between scepticism and fallibilism? Since perfectibility never reaches the end (namely the truth), this progress is infinite: the basis of Xenophanes’ epistemology may therefore be his physics of the infinite, which, however, is itself only a conjecture. This entails the risk of self-refutation. To avoid this peril, the doctrine of Parmenides will have to batten down the hatches
Problems of Understanding and Embodiment in Parmenides B 16/D51
Full text linkParmenides B 16/D51 presents an account of human cognition and understanding. It is usually taken to form part of the account of the untrustworthy opinions of mortals. Regardless of its proper location within the poem, it invokes difference, movement, and multiplicity — features that the goddess describes as fundamental to mortals’ opinions and as incompatible with what one must say and conceive on the road of inquiry that she recommends. The tale of the journey and both parts of the goddess’s speech use negation, invoke difference and change and multiplicity, and in general conform in many ways to the conceptual framework the goddess attributes to mortals in B8.53-61/D8.58-66 and B9/D13. Does this reflect confidence in the Light-Night conception as a starting-point for an adequate account of what-is? Or does it produce a paradox, wherein the Light-Night conception undermines itself but we would have to use it in order to deny its adequacy? In sum, what kind of a claim about human understanding might the passage represent? What could B16/D51 say about the epistemological status of its own claims, and about the epistemological status of each part of the poem? Why does the passage mention humans (anthrōpoi) specifically, as opposed to all beings that have awareness? These questions will be the focus of this essay