Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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Byzantinism and Rationality: Julien Benda and Constantine Tsatsos
No full textThis article examines the concept of Byzantinism that Julien Benda employed in his book La France Byzantine. In the fin-de-siècle European sensibility, Byzantinism was transferred from political to literary level, but Benda created an epistemological break when he asserted in his book that Byzantinism is literature in its normal function. Furthermore, of Byzantinist character is especially the modern literature (e.g. Valéry or Mallarmé). Thus, labeling modern literati as Byzantinist writers served as a critical tool for Benda, who condemned the degradation of modern intellectuals into clerks. This transformation of literary normality affected also pure thought as is manifested in the ambiguous manner of expressing their ideas by modern thinkers (this being a mixture of idealism and apocryphal thinking, which renders ideas rather abstractions than instruments of rationality). An example of such a Byzantinist use can be found in the manner Emmanuel Levinas exploited Husserl’s phenomenology. Finally, Benda engaged in a discussion with Paulhan’s view that literary philosophy is a form of critical terror. The position of Benda is that of a rationalist, whereas Paulhan is a thinker who focuses on the use of language. For Constantine Tsatsos (1899–1987), on the other hand, a Greek philosopher and author of a philosophical novel entitled Dialogues in a Monastery (1974), the Byzantine moment is a part of great continuity of Greek culture, which is characterized by various structures in its period of long duration. One of these is the synthesis of Hellenism and Christianity that can be seen in Byzantium, where the transposition of the philosophical (Platonic) Eros to the mystical one plays a major role. This development is of paramount importance not only for the whole European culture but also for all questions of beauty and morality. The present paper concludes with a brief discussion of Richard Rorty’s account of pragmatic reason, which makes it possible to show how contemporary philosophy can be placed in the context of the debate about Byzantinism.This article examines the concept of Byzantinism that Julien Benda employed in his book La France Byzantine. In the fin-de-siècle European sensibility, Byzantinism was transferred from political to literary level, but Benda created an epistemological break when he asserted in his book that Byzantinism is literature in its normal function. Furthermore, of Byzantinist character is especially the modern literature (e.g. Valéry or Mallarmé). Thus, labeling modern literati as Byzantinist writers served as a critical tool for Benda, who condemned the degradation of modern intellectuals into clerks. This transformation of literary normality affected also pure thought as is manifested in the ambiguous manner of expressing their ideas by modern thinkers (this being a mixture of idealism and apocryphal thinking, which renders ideas rather abstractions than instruments of rationality). An example of such a Byzantinist use can be found in the manner Emmanuel Levinas exploited Husserl’s phenomenology. Finally, Benda engaged in a discussion with Paulhan’s view that literary philosophy is a form of critical terror. The position of Benda is that of a rationalist, whereas Paulhan is a thinker who focuses on the use of language. For Constantine Tsatsos (1899–1987), on the other hand, a Greek philosopher and author of a philosophical novel entitled Dialogues in a Monastery (1974), the Byzantine moment is a part of great continuity of Greek culture, which is characterized by various structures in its period of long duration. One of these is the synthesis of Hellenism and Christianity that can be seen in Byzantium, where the transposition of the philosophical (Platonic) Eros to the mystical one plays a major role. This development is of paramount importance not only for the whole European culture but also for all questions of beauty and morality. The present paper concludes with a brief discussion of Richard Rorty’s account of pragmatic reason, which makes it possible to show how contemporary philosophy can be placed in the context of the debate about Byzantinism
Ilias und Odyssee: zwei Epen, zwei Welten
Full text linkThe different world views of the authors of the Iliad and the Odyssey are illustrated by selection of verses used by both poets. The role of the gods in the Odyssey precludes the tragic conception of human life that is characteristic of the Iliad
A Reply to John Dudley on Aristotle, Physics 2.5, 196b17–21
No full textIn this article, I restate the interpretation of Aristotle’s Ph. 2.5, 196b17–21, which I presented for the first time in my book I fondamenti della causalità naturale (2006). According to my reading, both the things that are due to deliberation and those that are not (Arist. Ph. 196b17–18) fall within the group of beings which come to be not for the sake of anything (Arist. Ph. 196b17). In his recent book, Aristotle’s Concept of Chance (Albany 2012), John Dudley found my interpretation laudable and original but rejected it, opting for the traditional interpretation. As he did not provide sufficient reasons for this, I deem it appropriate to discuss more broadly and in greater detail my interpretation in order to demonstrate that it is correct theoretically, linguistically and grammatically. I also discuss a reading of Neoplatonic commentators which seems to me very useful: when commenting on Aristotle, they start with a very prejudicial interpretation which comes from Alexander and which probably determined all later interpretations of the passage. According to this interpretation, beings which come to be not for the sake of anything (Arist. Ph. 196b17) are beings that have no teleology of any kind. Yet this exegetic position faces a series of difficulties which can easily be solved if one assumes, as I do, that these beings have a certain end albeit not an intrinsic one.In this article, I restate the interpretation of Aristotle’s Ph. 2.5, 196b17– 21, which I presented for the first time in my book I fondamenti della causalità naturale (2006). According to my reading, both the things that are due to deliberation and those that are not (Arist. Ph. 196b17–18) fall within the group of beings which come to be not for the sake of anything (Arist. Ph. 196b17). In his recent book, Aristotle’s Concept of Chance (Albany 2012), John Dudley found my interpretation laudable and original but rejected it, opting for the traditional interpretation. As he did not provide sufficient reasons for this, I deem it appropriate to discuss more broadly and in greater detail my interpretation in order to demonstrate that it is correct theoretically, linguistically and grammatically. I also discuss a reading of Neoplatonic commentators which seems to me very useful: when commenting on Aristotle, they start with a very prejudicial interpretation which comes from Alexander and which probably determined all later interpretations of the passage. According to this interpretation, beings which come to be not for the sake of anything (Arist. Ph. 196b17) are beings that have no teleology of any kind. Yet this exegetic position faces a series of difficulties which can easily be solved if one assumes, as I do, that these beings have a certain end albeit not an intrinsic one
The Practical-Technical Reason in the Aristotelian Concept of the Faculties of the Soul
No full textWhen analyzing the structure of the soul, Aristotle distinguished three faculties: the theoretical, the practical and the technical one. The latter two are the focus of this paper. The division could be perceived as an abstract description of diverse functions and purposes of the faculties, but it does not imply factual dissociation between them if we take under consideration their functioning. On the contrary, Aristotle suggested that it would be impossible to detach the practical reasoning from the operational one, for the former stipulated the goal, whereas the latter provided the means for its fulfillment. The genuine intellectual disposition, which supplements the practical reason with the proper means was referred to as ‘cleverness’ (δεινότης). Cleverness has usually been associated with the technical faculty but it also seems to be, first and foremost, the disposition to inventiveness in a broader sense. Although Aristotle did not formulate this directly, it is plausible to view the practical and technical faculty as depending on each other, as far as their products and works are useful to pursue the practical goals and the practical reasoning determines the extent of the possibilities and limitations of their utility in the field of politics. The disposition to cleverness made the cooperation of those faculties possible.When analyzing the structure of the soul, Aristotle distinguished three faculties: the theoretical, the practical and the technical one. The latter two are the focus of this paper. The division could be perceived as an abstract description of diverse functions and purposes of the faculties, but it does not imply factual dissociation between them if we take under consideration their functioning. On the contrary, Aristotle suggested that it would be impossible to detach the practical reasoning from the operational one, for the former stipulated the goal, whereas the latter provided the means for its fulfillment. The genuine intellectual disposition, which supplements the practical reason with the proper means was referred to as ‘cleverness’ (δεινότης). Cleverness has usually been associated with the technical faculty but it also seems to be, first and foremost, the disposition to inventiveness in a broader sense. Although Aristotle did not formulate this directly, it is plausible to view the practical and technical faculty as depending on each other, as far as their products and works are useful to pursue the practical goals and the practical reasoning determines the extent of the possibilities and limitations of their utility in the field of politics. The disposition to cleverness made the cooperation of those faculties possible
Marian Wesoły’s Greek Philosophy in Byzantium
No full textMarian Wesoły devoted a considerable part of his life and research to studying the philosophical thought of antiquity. He is, therefore, widely known to scientific community as an admirer of Hellas, outstanding scholar and expert on ancient philosophy, which is reflected in his many publications in the field. Importantly, however, Marian Wesoły, has also been a pioneer of research into a much lesser known field of research, namely Greek philosophy in Byzantium. While this neglected and often disdained area of research has been the subject of Marian Wesoły’s numerous publications, this article presents an over view of his most important findings. Marian Wesoły devoted a considerable part of his life and research to studying the philosophical thought of antiquity. He is, therefore, widely known to scientific community as an admirer of Hellas, outstanding scholar and expert on ancient philosophy, which is reflected in his many publications in the field. Importantly, however, Marian Wesoły, has also been a pioneer of research into a much lesser known field of research, namely Greek philosophy in Byzantium. While this neglected and often disdained area of research has been the subject of Marian Wesoły’s numerous publications, this article presents an over view of his most important findings
Evil as Privation in Neoplatonism. Simplicius and Philoponus in Defense of Matter
No full textThe aim of this paper is to highlight the decisive contribution of Simplicius and Philoponus to the resolution of the problem of evil in Neoplatonism. A correct and faithful interpretation of the problem, which also had to agree with Plato’s texts, became particularly needed after Plotinus had identified evil with matter, threatening, thus, the dualistic position, which was absent in Plato. The first rectification was made by Proclus with the notion of parhypostasis, i.e., “parasitic” or “collateral” existence, which de-hypostasized evil, while at the same time challenging the Plotinian theory that turned evil into a principle that was ontologically opposed to good. In light of this, the last Neoplatonic exegetes, Simplicius and Philoponus, definitely clarified the “privative” role of kakon, finally relieving matter from the negative meaning given to it by Plotinus and restoring metaphysical monism. The aim of this paper is to highlight the decisive contribution of Simplicius and Philoponus to the resolution of the problem of evil in Neoplatonism. A correct and faithful interpretation of the problem, which also had to agree with Plato’s texts, became particularly needed after Plotinus had identified evil with matter, threatening, thus, the dualistic position, which was absent in Plato. The first rectification was made by Proclus with the notion of parhypostasis, i.e., “parasitic” or “collateral” existence, which de-hypostasized evil, while at the same time challenging the Plotinian theory that turned evil into a principle that was ontologically opposed to good. In light of this, the last Neoplatonic exegetes, Simplicius and Philoponus, definitely clarified the “privative” role of kakon, finally relieving matter from the negative meaning given to it by Plotinus and restoring metaphysical monism
The Concept of ‘Matter’ in Archaic Greece, 1: Khaos/Aèr in Hesiod’s Theogony
No full textThe essay considers synthetically the passages of Hesiod’s Theogony concerning Khaos, Gaia, Uranòs, and Tàrtaros as describing the cosmic structure at its very beginning and at its present state. The final result of the cosmogenetic process consists of three solid parallel disks of equal size separated from one another by the space of Khaos/Aèr. The whole structure is conceived of as an ideal cylinder (ideal because it has no real lateral walls), whose superior base is Uranòs (the Sky), the inferior one is Tàrtaros (the Hell) and the median section is Gaia (the Earth), dividing the whole cylinder into two high semicylinders full of Khaos/Aèr. From this Khaos/Aèr, the primal Four Elements (earth, water, misty air and fire) derive, as plants do from their roots, from which all other substances of the universe originate in turn. Thus, Khaos is arkhè (the ‘beginning’) not only in the chronological-historical sense, but also in the sense of an eternal generative substance of all things. We may conclude that the Hesiodic word khaos is a lexical ancestor of the later physical and philosophical term hyle because it conveys the primeval notion of ‘matter’.The essay considers synthetically the passages of Hesiod’s Theogony concerning Khaos, Gaia, Uranòs, and Tàrtaros as describing the cosmic structure at its very beginning and at its present state. The final result of the cosmogenetic process consists of three solid parallel disks of equal size separated from one another by the space of Khaos/Aèr. The whole structure is conceived of as an ideal cylinder (ideal because it has no real lateral walls), whose superior base is Uranòs (the Sky), the inferior one is Tàrtaros (the Hell) and the median section is Gaia (the Earth), dividing the whole cylinder into two high semicylinders full of Khaos/Aèr. From this Khaos/Aèr, the primal Four Elements (earth, water, misty air and fire) derive, as plants do from their roots, from which all other substances of the universe originate in turn. Thus, Khaos is arkhè (the ‘beginning’) not only in the chronological-historical sense, but also in the sense of an eternal generative substance of all things. We may conclude that the Hesiodic word khaos is a lexical ancestor of the later physical and philosophical term hyle because it conveys the primeval notion of ‘matter’
Pragmatic Rhetorical Principles in Isocrates
Full text linkWhile Isocrates regarded rhetoric not as a rigid discipline, but as a creative and pliable art, it is not possible to standardize art. According to his point of view (Against the sophists 13.13), good speech depends on certain principles: opportunity (kairos); suitability (to prepon) and novelty (kainos). The sophists, according to Isocrates, did not pay attention to these principles, and that was their main mistake. The problem was, however, that it was difficult to teach these principles to the disciples, precisely because rhetoric was a flexible art. Still, although it is not possible to provide fixed rules concerning rhetorical principles, the ancient rhetor provided some useful suggestions in his works which make it possible to reconstruct the nature of these principles
Aristotle’s Criticism of the Platonic Idea of the Good in Nicomachean Ethics 1.6
Full text linkIn Nicomachean Ethics 1.6, Aristotle directs his criticism not only against the Platonic Idea of the Good but also against the notion of a universal Good. In this paper, I also examine some of the most interesting aspects of his criticism of the Platonic Good and the universal Good in Eudemian Ethics 1.8. In the EN, after using a series of disputable ontological arguments, Aristotle’s criticism culminates in a strong ethical or rather practical and, simultaneously, epistemological argument, from which a dialectical postulatum emerges. This argument aims to show that we have to discover the dialectical stages or grades which constitute the relation between the ultimate End, i.e., the Good simpliciter or the absolute Good, and the relational goods till the last prakton good in which each specific praxis ends. According to the present reading, Aristotle sets out to establish a kind of Dialectic of the ends (Dialektikē tōn telōn) or Dialectic of the goods (Dialektikē tōn agathōn), which puts emphasis on the descent to the specific good, which is appropriate to and cognate with each individual, be that a person, praxis, science or craft. It is also suggested that this might be relevant to Aristotle’s tendency to establish a separation of phronēsis, i.e., practical wisdom, from sophia, i.e., wisdom, in the Nicomachean Ethics
Melissus, Time and Eternity
No full textThe traditional interpretation of Eleatism has it (1) that Melissus was a disciple of Parmenides (albeit with some divergences) and (2) that Parmenides believed in the timeless eternity of Being. It seems, on the contrary, (3) that Melissus acknowledged the reality of time by conceiving eternity as infinite time. Failing to justify this particular divergence from Parmenides’ approach, certain authors held that it was necessary to reinterpret the Melissan eternity as a form of infinite timelessness. This paper attempts to demonstrate that this reading is groundless and that if the traditional interpretation is questioned then one should reconsider the assumptions (1) and (2) but not (3).The traditional interpretation of Eleatism has it (1) that Melissus was a disciple of Parmenides (albeit with some divergences) and (2) that Parmenides believed in the timeless eternity of Being. It seems, on the contrary, (3) that Melissus acknowledged the reality of time by conceiving eternity as infinite time. Failing to justify this particular divergence from Parmenides’ approach, certain authors held that it was necessary to reinterpret the Melissan eternity as a form of infinite timelessness. This paper attempts to demonstrate that this reading is groundless and that if the traditional interpretation is questioned then one should reconsider the assumptions (1) and (2) but not (3)