Biblioteca Digital de Periódicos da UFPR (Universidade Federal do Paraná)
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Seria Heidegger um kantiano? Um diálogo com Vinicius de Figueiredo
Full text linkThe article takes as its starting point the dialogue with Vinicius de Figueiredo concerning my book Nietzsche, perspectivism and democracy, in which I propose a Kantian reading of Nietzsche’s perspectivism. After reviewing the main lines of my argument, both in the book and in the article where I responded to Figueiredo’s objections, I seek to show that, contrary to what I stated at the time, Heidegger’s philosophy in Being and time can also be read in the same vein. To this end, I turn to §23 of Heidegger’s book, where he engages with Kant’s essay What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking? on the possible “subjectivity” of space. Although “being-in-the-world,” like Nietzsche’s “will to power,” represents an attempt to overcome the Kantian opposition between “subject” and “object,” both retain a certain residue of “subjectivity” — which, I argue, safeguards the simultaneously metaphysical and anti-dogmatic vocation of philosophy.O artigo tem como ponto de partida o diálogo com Vinicius de Figueiredo a propósito de meu livro Nietzsche, perspectivismo e democracia, onde proponho uma leitura kantiana do perspectivismo nietzschiano. Depois de repassar as principais linhas de minha argumentação, tanto no livro como no artigo em que reagi às objeções de Figueiredo, procuro mostrar que, ao contrário do que eu afirmava na época, a filosofia de Heidegger em Ser e tempo também pode ser lida na mesma chave. Para tanto, recorro ao § 23 da obra, onde Heidegger dialoga com o texto Como orientar-se no pensamento?, de Kant, acerca da eventual “subjetividade” do espaço. Embora o “ser-no-mundo”, a exemplo da “vontade de poder” nietzschiana, represente uma tentativa de superar a oposição kantiana entre “sujeito” e “objeto”, haveria em ambos certo resquício de “subjetividade” — a garantir, segundo defendo, a vocação ao mesmo tempo metafísica e antidogmática da filosofia
A Retórica de Aristóteles: um guia para estudantes: Traduzido por Luísa Madeira Mariano Leão e Revisado por Wladimir Barreto Lisboa
No full textTradução do texto "A Retórica de Aristóteles: um Guia Para Estudantes", de Arthur E. Walzer, Michael Tiffany, and Alan G. Gross
Para além da (ir)racionalidade: différance, fantasia e uma outra educação
No full textIn this article, we attempt to rethink the issue of social rationality and irrationality through deconstructionist and psychoanalytic frameworks. We begin by defining social rationality as a common project guided by a presumed absolute foundation that predetermines supreme meanings and ends. We then introduce Derrida’s notions of différance, calculation, and responsibility to highlight the impossibility of rationalist projects and to outline ethical-political possibilities (dis)oriented by otherness, singularity, and incalculability. Next, we address the mass adherence to so-called fake news as an example of a phenomenon typically attributed to “social irrationality,” which, when reexamined through our deconstructionist references articulated with the psychoanalytic notion of fantasy, takes on new contours. Finally, we present contemporary educational and curricular theories that, inspired by deconstructionist and psychoanalytic approaches, reframe educational processes around difference, otherness, singularity, and incalculability—thus questioning rationalist educational projects structured around ideals of community and calculability.Tentamos nesse artigo repensar a questão da racionalidade e da irracionalidade sociais a partir de referenciais desconstrucionistas e psicanalíticos. Iniciamos definindo racionalidade social como projeto comum orientado por um fundamento suposto absoluto que pré-determina sentidos e finalidades supremos. Trazemos então as noções de différance, cálculo e responsabilidade de Derrida para apontar a impossibilidade dos projetos racionalistas e encaminhar possibilidades ético-politicas (des)orientadas pela alteridade, pela singularidade e pela incalculabilidade. Em seguida, abordamos a questão da adesão em massa às chamadas fake news como exemplo de fenômeno geralmente atribuído à “irracionalidade social”, mas que, com nossos referenciais desconstrucionistas articulados à noção psicanalítica de fantasia, ganha novas cores. Por fim, trazemos teorias educacionais/curriculares contemporâneas que, inspiradas por referenciais teóricos desconstrucionistas e psicanalíticos ressituam os processos educacionais em torno da diferença, da alteridade, da singularidade e da incalculabilidade – questionando, portanto, os projetos educacionais racionalistas que se estruturam em torno de ideais de comunidade e calculabilidade
Ele/dele The impossibility of blaming token people fairly: The problem of demands
No full textThis essay attempts to do two things. First, to problematise the relation between obligations and demands. Second, to show that the popular principle of Ought Implies Can and a plausible reading of what it is for blaming to be fair are incompatible with some cherished assumptions to the point of being impossible to blame concrete people, those with flesh and bones, fairly. The argument can be summarised as follows: For a person to fairly blame another subject, they need to be justified in believing both that a) the subject was obliged to act in accordance with the demand associated to blame; and b) the subject was capable of acting in this way. Unfortunately, there are reasons to think that b) is never justified, leading to the blaming itself to never be justified. I try to show that this argument is almost entirely independent of positions on free will, making it the only overall sceptical argument (that I know of) that delivers this conclusion about fair blame and, consequently, moral responsibility to an extent, without involving substantial debates on free will. The essay connects some previously unassociated literatures on Ought Implies Can, blame, the nature of normative demands, Objectivism/Subjectivism about moral obligation, and moral psychology. The conclusion of the piece is not to be an endorsement that there is no fair blame, rather, it claims that these arguments should be taken as a reductio ad absurdum.This essay attempts to do two things. First, to problematize the relation between obligations and demands. Second, to show that the popular principle of Ought Implies Can and a plausible reading of what it is for blaming to be fair are incompatible with some cherished assumptions to the point of being impossible to blame concrete people, those with flesh and bones, fairly. The argument can be summarized as follows: For a person to fairly blame another subject, they need to be justified in believing both that a) the subject was obliged to act in accordance with the demand associated to blame; and b) the subject was capable of acting in this way. Unfortunately, there are reasons to think that b) is never justified, leading to the blaming itself to never be justified. I try to show that this argument is almost entirely independent of positions on free will, making it the only overall skeptical argument (that I know of) that delivers this conclusion about fair blame and, consequently, moral responsibility to an extent, without involving substantial debates on free will. The essay connects some previously unassociated literatures on Ought Implies Can, blame, the nature of normative demands, Objectivism/Subjectivism about moral obligation, and moral psychology. The conclusion of the piece is not to be an endorsement that there is no fair blame, rather, it claims that these arguments should be taken as a reductio ad absurdum
Como aliar academia e mercado? O projeto de extensão Mercademia
No full textThe aim of this study is to share with readers the experience gained from the activities carried out within the Mercademia project. The project seeks to bridge the gap between the market and university to develop business strategies and support decision-making within organizations, whether they are for-profit or non-profit. Through business diagnostics conducted in university departments, NGOs, and micro and small enterprises in Curitiba and surrounding metropolitan area, extension events and social media engagement, the Mercademia project has been working to assist companies in making better strategic and marketing decisions, while also contributing to student development by offering opportunities and experiences that enhance learning. The main contributions of the study lie in the presentation of the method adopted by the project, which comprises four stages: diagnostic meeting, internal meeting with the Mercademia team, project delivery meeting, and follow-up and feedback. Furthermore, the study demonstrates how small-scale actions can impact students, organizations, and the market by aligning academic knowledge with corporate challenges, particularly in the context of strategy and communication.O presente estudo tem como objetivo compartilhar com os leitores a experiência adquirida no projeto de extensão Mercademia. O projeto tem como intuito unir o mercado e academia para definir estratégias empresariais e apoiar a tomada de decisão nas organizações, sejam elas com ou sem fins lucrativos. O projeto Mercademia tem atuado na busca de auxiliar as empresas para melhores tomadas de decisões estratégicas e mercadológicas, bem como contribuir para o desenvolvimento dos alunos, oferecendo oportunidades e vivências que favoreçam o aprendizado. Dentre as ações do projeto destacam-se os diagnósticos empresariais em setores da universidade, ONGs e micro e pequenas empresas da cidade de Curitiba e região metropolitana; promoção de eventos de extensão e atuação nas redes sociais. As principais contribuições do estudo são a apresentação do método adotado pelo projeto, que consiste em quatro etapas (reunião de diagnóstico, reunião interna da equipe Mercademia, reunião de entrega do projeto e acompanhamento e feedback). Ademais, mostra-se como pequenas ações podem impactar alunos, organizações e o mercado ao aliar o conhecimento acadêmico e desafios corporativos, sobretudo no contexto de estratégia e comunicação
As ciências de frente ao negacionismo, conspiracionismo e analfabetismo científico
No full textAs reflexões sobre as educações na contemporaneidade atravessam sintomas contemporâneos que representam disputas na configuração do campo simbólico-cultural e de suas linhas de subjetivação para a instauração dos modos de educar e formar sujeitos, dentre eles expressões reacionárias e neofundamentalistas. Dentre tais dinâmicas a disputa que tem sido realizada se dá no que toca o conceito e a significação das ciências. Desta percepção este ensaio objetiva-se em traçar as relações entre pensamento científico e teoria da cultura a partir de tais sintomas sociais contemporâneos, tomando o movimento Escola sem Partido como sintoma representativo. Tal escrita faz-se por uma hermenêutica Crítica e Clínica da cultura, compreendendo como linhas de constituição de tal sintoma o negacionismo, conspiracionismo e o analfabetismo científico
Rawls, temporal discontinuity and disasters
No full textThis study aims to apply key concepts from Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness to issues of justice in the context of disasters and catastrophes. Disasters can be understood as a form of temporary discontinuity, whereas catastrophes involve a prolonged disruption of people’s normal lives. Whether an event becomes a disaster, a catastrophe, or neither, depends on the degree of preparedness in place—preparedness that can prevent what Kant, in The Metaphysics of Morals, refers to as cases of necessity. This study argues, based on aspects of Rawls’s justice as fairness, that it is a requirement of justice for the state to adopt measures to mitigate temporal discontinuities and their harmful effects on the rational life plans of individuals understood as free and equal citizens.This study aims to apply key concepts from Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness to issues of justice in the context of disasters and catastrophes. Disasters can be understood as a form of temporary discontinuity, whereas catastrophes involve a prolonged disruption of people’s normal lives. Whether an event becomes a disaster, a catastrophe, or neither depends on the degree of preparedness in place—preparedness that can prevent what Kant, in The Metaphysics of Morals, referred to as cases of necessity. This study argues, based on aspects of Rawls’s justice as fairness, that it is a requirement of justice for the state to adopt measures to mitigate temporal discontinuities and their harmful effects on the rational life plans of individuals understood as free and equal citizens
Toward a Kantian theory of prudential irrationality: between intellectual error and volitional failure
No full textThis article investigates the conditions for a Kantian theory of prudential irrationality. Against Merle (2023), it argues that intellectual errors, such as incorrect beliefs, do not suffice to generate irrational actions. The analysis focuses instead on whether volitional failures can lead to prudentially irrational actions. To examine this, two interpretive models are considered: the negative model, inspired by Timmerman (2022), which denies prudential irrationality, and the positive model, developed by Korsgaard (2008), which affirms it. While Timmerman strips the Hypothetical Imperative of normativity, Korsgaard subordinates it to the Categorical Imperative. Both models face limits: the first excludes the possibility of instrumental irrationality; the second risks expanding the moral domain or weakening the link between freedom and the moral law. The challenge remains to explain how instrumental rationality is possible without reducing it to morality, while preserving its intrinsic tie to freedom.This article investigates the conditions for a Kantian theory of prudential irrationality. Against Merle (2023), it argues that intellectual errors, such as incorrect beliefs, do not suffice to generate irrational actions. The analysis focuses instead on whether volitional failures can lead to prudentially irrational actions. To examine this, two interpretive models are considered: the negative model, inspired by Timmerman (2022), which denies prudential irrationality, and the positive model, developed by Korsgaard (2008), which affirms it. While Timmerman strips the Hypothetical Imperative of normativity, Korsgaard subordinates it to the Categorical Imperative. Both models face limits: the first excludes the possibility of instrumental irrationality; the second risks expanding the moral domain or weakening the link between freedom and the moral law. The challenge remains to explain how instrumental rationality is possible without reducing it to morality, while preserving its intrinsic tie to freedom
O conceito de povos em Rawls frente aos desafios da irracionalidade social
No full textO conceito de povos presente no livro O Direito dos Povos de John Rawls está entre as ideias mais criticadas do terceiro livro que compõe a trilogia rawlsiana. Neste artigo buscarei apresentar uma justificativa desta ideia a partir da análise do conceito por Philip Pettit, demonstrando a coerência do conceito de povos no âmbito da obra em que ele aparece e assinalando o papel que o mesmo ocupa em um perspectiva mais geral na teoria de justiça como equidade. O artigo defende que a ontologia dos povos em Rawls, tal como interpretada por Pettit, fornece critérios para avaliar a ilegitimidade de grupos que agem de modo irracional, oferecendo um recurso conceitual relevante para debates contemporâneos sobre extremismo.The concept of peoples presented in John Rawls' book The Law of Peoples is among the most criticized ideas in the third book of Rawls' trilogy. In this article, I will seek to justify this idea based on Philip Pettit's analysis of the concept, demonstrating the coherence of the concept of peoples within the scope of the work in which it appears and highlighting the role it plays in a more general perspective in the theory of justice as fairness. The article argues that Rawls' ontology of peoples, as interpreted by Pettit, provides criteria for assessing the illegitimacy of groups that act irrationally, offering a relevant conceptual resource for contemporary debates on extremism
Between Control and Trust.: Paradigms of Early Modern and Enlightenment Optimism in the Thought of Kant and Spener and their Continuity in Contemporary Thought
No full textThe article addresses the question of the origins of optimism in the perception of the future and the role that the sense of being in control of reality plays in its formation. This article analyses two models of optimism present in modern and Enlightenment thought: those of Ph.J. Spener and I. Kant. It considers the factors that contribute to optimism, including a sense of control over one’s fate as a result of independence from sub-natural factors (such as God) in shaping the future and a sense of belief that reality is developing in an optimal way.N/AN/AN/AN/AN/