NUPI Research Online (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs)
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Failed International Interventions and the Making of New Social Contracts in Mali
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Deterrence and (Re)assurance in the High North – Finland and Norway Compared
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Local content policies: Knowledge stock and future directions for research and policy making in view of the sustainability agenda
Full text linkLocal content policies (LCPs) aim to create opportunities for employment and economic development, and to shield from the “resource curse” and enclave extractivism. LCPs are of ongoing policy interest in resource-rich countries and, more recently, have attracted attention in countries attempting to develop their renewable energy sources. The sustainable development agenda set by the global and regional initiatives, such as the United Nations’ 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement, call for a fresh look at the targets and priorities set by LCPs, e.g., extend to environmental and/or climate change action targets. This article aims to connect in a meaningful way the scientific knowledge on LCPs and evidence-based policy making with the sustainability agenda imperatives. The target is met with the: i) completion of a systematic state-of-the-art literature review and bibliometric analysis to assess and synthesize the accumulated stock of knowledge on LCPs and ii) SDGs mapping onto the LCPs. Τhe review identifies the core approaches and LCPs' assessment outcomes, indicating the plethora of findings. Results show that the relationship between LCPs and the sustainability agenda has not yet been properly analyzed in the literature, identifying thus a gap between research and contemporary policy making. The research community should be proactive: rather than just assessing LCPs' implementation, it should propose alternatives and updates to LCPs in line with the sustainability agenda. The article contributes to this direction by mapping the SDGs onto the LCPs, suggesting ways to advance research in this field and to support evidence-based policy making.publishedVersio
Extreme Moderates: Understanding Low Levels of Violent Extremism in Bosnia-Herzegovina
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"Må Gud forbanne dine mordere" : Regimeretorikk om protestene for kvinne, liv, frihet
Full text linkMens landsomfattende opprør raste og verden var rystet av overgrepet motJina Amini, dyrket den regimelojale pressen i Iran sine egne offerhistorier."Må Gud forbanne dine mordere" : Regimeretorikk om protestene for kvinne, liv, frihetpublishedVersio
The morphology of Putinism: the arrangement of political concepts into a coherent ideology
Full text linkScholarly analysis has been divided as to whether Putinism is a coherent ideology. With the decision to invade Ukraine, this question requires reexamination. This article interprets the evolution of Putinism in morphological terms, tracing how political concepts developed into a distinctive ‘thin’ ideology. After interpreting the original formation of Putinism (2000–2012), I unpack how interlinked processes of securitization and culturization reshaped the arrangement of core, adjacent and peripheral concepts. This was preceded by discursive closure between the Kremlin and its ideological antagonists over critical junctures in 2012 and 2014. An emphasis on the reactive, events-driven dynamic of Putinism reveals how it functions as an immanent morale that reinforces preexisting power networks and strives to win the loyalty of the population. Preserving culture and security has become synonymous with maintaining the very existence of the Russian Federation. With the launch of the ‘Special Military Operation’ in February 2022, this ideology was not immediately transformed but rather deployed on a new and more dramatic level. The ideological reconfiguration examined in this article must be understood as a crucial precursor to the decision to escalate the war in Ukraine, which ris reshaping Russia’s political trajectory in dramatic and unpredictable ways.The morphology of Putinism: the arrangement of political concepts into a coherent ideologypublishedVersio
When do petrostates diversify their exports? Urgency, interests, and policy design in Egypt, Kazakhstan, and Malaysia
Full text linkMotivation: The need to diversify their economies is an enduring challenge for fossil fuel-dependent countries, one which will become evermore important as the world seeks to decarbonize. But the conditions under which major oil-producing countries (petrostates) seek to diversify their exports—and those under which their attempts succeed—are poorly understood.Purpose: This article tests competing explanations for the successes and failures of petrostates' export diversification. Methods and approach: We employ a comparative case study approach using qualitative evidence from two comparatively successful diversification cases—Egypt and Malaysia—and one less successful case—Kazakhstan—selected using a Theil index of export concentration. Findings: The evidence indicates that Egypt and Malaysia's more successful outcomes stemmed more from necessity and policy design than from differences in domestic institutions and interests. All three countries were motivated to diversify by price volatility and declining revenues at various points from the 1980s to the 2000s and beyond, but reserve depletion was a greater threat in Egypt and Malaysia. As such, they adopted a more balanced approached to diversification, one that combined liberalization with state intervention. Policy implications: These cases suggest that petrostates may be will-ing and able to diversify as the global shift toward renewables raises the prospect of unburnable oil reserves. Petrostates can diversify efficiently by using a basket of policies that includes a mix of economic liberalization and government intervention to create investment and incentives in non-oil tradeable sectors and nurture infant industries. Opposition to reforms in petrostates can be addressed by selectively compensating vested interests.When do petrostates diversify their exports? Urgency, interests, and policy design in Egypt, Kazakhstan, and MalaysiapublishedVersionpublishedVersio
The Arctic Barometer: Measuring Expert Predictions on the Arctic Region
Full text linkMaking predictions in a highly uncertain environment is always a hazardous enterprise. Confronted with global warming, the future of the Arctic region has been often debated, both in terms of the scope and the speed of expected changes, including the future of resource development, the opening of shipping routes, and the evolution of multilateral fora. These predictions have come from different sources: governments through different policy papers and statements, the media, civil society, and academics, to name but a few. It can be difficult to account for this vast and diverse array of predictions, considering that each actor has interests to promote. We decided to develop a survey asking different actors to make predictions about possible Arctic geopolitical developments. Instead of letting individuals make their own predictions on the topic of their choice, we selected plausible scenarios and prompted respondents to evaluate if these developments were likely or unlikely to happen. Scenarios were developed to be both visible and concrete: we can evaluate if the scenario unfolded or not during a certain time period. For example, we can observe if Russia violated the airspace of another Arctic state, if Greenland reached state sovereignty, or if the U.S. deployed a freedom of navigation operations in the Arctic region. In total, our scenarios covered two dimensions: governance and security. On governance, potential developments around diplomatic initiatives or multilateral cooperation were tested. On security, the possibility of military conflict in the region or of military intrusions were considered. Two main objectives justified this approach. First, we wanted to evaluate if experts were correct in their predictions. Related to this, we were curious to know which type of issues caused incorrect assessments. Second, we repeated the same scenarios in multiple waves: the objective was to analyze if specific geopolitical developments occurring between waves would change predictions, moving the needle on experts’ predictionsThe Arctic Barometer: Measuring Expert Predictions on the Arctic RegionpublishedVersio
The defence of northern Europe: new opportunities, significant challenges
Full text linkWith Finland and Sweden joining NATO, the Nordics will be united for the first time in a military alliance encompassing not only northern Europe but also the broader transatlantic region. It will eventually fortify northern European security, but several obstacles must be overcome first. NATO has done a formidable job since 2014 in updating its defence plans, cumulating in the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) family of plans approved in Vilnius 2023. Now Finland and Sweden need to be incorporated into these plans. A more challenging task is to implement NATO's New Force Model which is tremendously ambitious. Finland and Sweden's contributions will be important, but new investments must be made. NATO's Command Structure is yet to be fully reformed and fitted to the DDA. Joint Force Command Norfolk must urgently be staffed, without undue politicization in NATO. Nordic defence buildup can draw on regional cooperation in particular in five areas: in strengthening the area's command design through functional double-hatted headquarters; developing close air power cooperation through e.g. a Combined Joint Air Operations Centre; strengthening total defence cooperation across borders and expanding logistical infrastructure; establishing joint intelligence task forces; and joint training and exercises. The contributions of the United States and United Kingdom are indispensable when it comes to upholding the alliance's guarantee in northern Europe. The recent signing of Defense Cooperation Agreements between the US and the Nordics reinforces this—together with an increased presence of air and naval assets in the region. The same applies to the UK and the Joint Expeditionary Force which now has shifted its focus towards northern Europe. This engagement is a crucial addition to Nordic and NATO plans and activities in a period when growth in Nordic defence structures is occurring at a relatively slow pace. Only after the weaknesses and hurdles are addressed will the deterrence and defence of the region attain a fully credible level.The defence of northern Europe: new opportunities, significant challengespublishedVersio