Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) Digital Library
Not a member yet
8797 research outputs found
Sort by
JUSPAO field memorandum number 54, July 20, 1968: text of notes used by Ambassador W. Averell Harriman at the thirteenth official conversation July 17 with the North Vietnamese.
No full text"As you know, we have made a significant number of concrete proposals that would advance these conversations and would move us closer to a peaceful settlement of the Viet-Nam conflict. And that, after all, is the reason we came to Paris. It is what the world expects of us. Yet each of these constructive proposals we have made has been rejected out of hand. Your only answer has been the repetition of a slogan: stop the bombing and pull American forces out of Viet-Nam. That, Your Excellency, is not a serious proposal because you refuse to even discuss any de-escalation on your side. Thus it is an absurd demand made for propaganda purposes.
JUSPAO field memorandum number 49, May 24, 1968: text of the notes used by U.S. Ambassador Harriman at the May 22 meeting with the North Vietnamese.
No full text"We hope -- we continue to hope -- that these talks can become a frank and candid exchange of views. For our part, we would like to see the talks freed from polemics. The DRV should understand, for example, that it is difficult for us to have candid discussions of the questions of restraint in any detail while you deny having major elements of your armed forces in South Viet Nam. Surely the time has come to begin discussing these problems on the basis of reality. In this spirit, I will keep my opening remarks short so that we can use our time for productive discussions of the issues which concern us both." - U.S. Ambassador Harrima
JUSPAO field memorandum number 52, June 26, 1968: excerpts of press briefing by US delegation spokesman William J. Jorden, June 19, 1968; text of notes used June 19 by Ambassador-at-large W. Averell Harriman during his ninth official conversation with representatives of North Viet Nam; text of an additional statement by Ambassador-at-large W. Averell Harriman at the ninth official conversation with North Vietnamese representatives June 19.
No full textExcerpt from document: "One of the main purposes for the establishment of the Demilitarized Zone in 1954 was to separate the military forces of both sides. It is for this purpose that we have proposed that it be reestablished. Our proposals for reactivation of the International Control Commission and re-establishment of the Demilitarized Zone are feasible military measures designed to separate the combatants, reduce the level of violence and establish through our mutual actions the good faith of both sides.
JUSPAO field memorandum number 56, July 31, 1968. Peace illusions: a VC/NVA vulnerability.
No full textThis material is issued to support programs in implementation of JUSPAO PSYOP policy guidance number 62 (PSYOP Program in Support of the President's Office of Negotiations with North Viet-Nam). "Peace illusions" in this context means to the communist leaders a mistaken belief that the war in South Viet-Nam can be settled through negotiations rather than on the battlefield. The document details the situation and background materials (diplomatic struggle, fighting while negotiating, peace illusions, and fighting harder)
JUSPAO field memorandum number 53, July 3, 1968: text of notes used June 26 by Ambassador Cyrus R. Vance during the tenth official conversation with representatives of North Viet Nam.
No full textExcerpt from document: "You have asked why the bombing cannot be stopped immediately. The answer is that instead of exercising restraint, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam has up to now intensified its war effort. When the appropriate circumstances are created, we will stop the bombing. The United States looks to the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam to help create those circumstances soon so that we can move toward peace.
Command and General Staff School, Class 1937-1938, Group B.
No full textGraduating class photo of 1937-38, Group B, of the Command and General Staff School, a predecessor of Command and General Staff College
Bearing and personal appearance.
No full textShort guide defining bearing and personal appearance and the elements that comprise these two characteristics
Decision briefing to the Commandant, 31 March 1966 : CGSC reply to CONARC on the Haines Board Report.
No full textGeneral Lemley, the purpose of the briefing this afternoon is to present to you for approval the College comments to CONARC on the Haines Board Conclusions and Recommendations. You will recall the briefing of Colonel Gates, that there are 275 conclusions and 75 recommendations. Now, although we have looked at all of these, we have singled out only 67 conclusions and 42 recommendations that have a direct impact or bearing on the Command and General Staff College, and it is those that we propose to present to you this afternoon; however, we will not present them individually, but in groups and we will not repeat any of those that have been presented to you by CAG
[WWII German map, Western Front, 08 August 1944].
No full textGerman Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) Western Front situation map. This map shows German positions (in blue) and Allied positions (in red) as of 08 August 1944 in France, the Netherlands, Belgium; Germany, and southern England in 1:1000000 scale
Antiaircraft action summary, June 1944. Information bulletin no. 24.
No full textAntiaircraft action summaries were issued on a bi-monthly basis- these more frequent publications presented timely statistics and studies of tactical and technical developments. Each publication also includes a discussion either of tactical or technical developments or intelligence reports on enemy AA developments. This publication details the Sicilian operation of July 1943, and later summaries will include discussions of actions at Salerno and Anzio, Italy, the Gilberts, Bougainville, New Britain, New Guinea, and others. Table of contents: Chapter I- antiaircraft statistics for first two years of war. Chapter II- introduction to Pacific AA. Operations, January-February, 1944. Chapter III- antiaircraft actions of UGS convoys in Mediterranean. Chapter IV- antiaircraft during invasion of Sicily, July 1943