Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) Digital Library
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Mission command in the division and corps support area.
During warfighter exercises, it had become apparent that division and corps commanders were challenged with mission command of forces in their support areas. The commander of United States Army Forces Command directed commanders to establish a support area command post (SACP) to improve mission command. The Army’s new Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (06 OCT 2017), incorporates this guidance by modifying the geographical organization of an area of operations. FM 3-0 scales down the size of the support area and adds a consolidation area. The consolidation area will be assigned to a maneuver brigade or division. This enables the maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) to perform its traditional mission and focus efforts on operations in the support area. FM 3-0 formalizes the requirement for divisions and corps to establish a SACP (its doctrinal name, which is used throughout this handbook) to assist in controlling operations in the support and consolidation areas. This handbook provides divisions, corps, and their enablers several ways to implement recent guidance and doctrine for mission command in their support and consolidation areas. It provides the new doctrine that has been released in FM 3-0 as well as examples of how divisions and corps have employed their SACPs.
TOC: Introduction; current SACP operations compared to current and future doctrine; corps and division SACP organization; planning considerations for SACP operations; maneuver enhancement brigade mission and capabilities; command post layout examples from past doctrine; notes from the 3rd ID assistant division commander-support; acronyms and initials; references
Ten fundamental brigade combat team skills required to win the first fight.
This newsletter consists of ten chapters focusing on ten fundamental skills designed to communicate doctrinal solutions to the persistent observations from the National Training Center. The goal is to better prepare brigade combat teams to decisively win the first fight of the next war. These fundamental skills will enable leaders at echelon to quickly understand issues and change their training strategies, as required.
1. Commander-driven operations process
2. Combined arms breaching
3. Decisive action in an urban environment
4. Operations in a cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA)-denied environment
5. Reconnaissance and security
6. Digital fires capability (sensor to shooter)
7. Counterfire
8. Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) in decisive action
9. Joint force integration and interoperability
10. Sustainment in decisive action
These ten fundamental skills were derived from senior leader input, persistent observations, and trends. They will be re-evaluated and updated regularly to ensure the National Training Center operations group provides the best feedback to the force that will enable brigade combat teams’ success
Refocusing counterinsurgency (COIN)-centric fire support.
The United States and its allies must close the fire support gap to achieve a position of maneuver advantage if faced with a large-scale combat operation against a conventional peer threat. The gap must not only be closed in terms of organizing, equipping and manning. Commanders and their staffs must close this gap by refocusing the COIN-centric fire support mindset and begin to synthesize the targeting effort through the lens of a combined arms formation
Report on Fourth Army Maneuvers, 1941.
Reports on the Fourth Army Louisiana Maneuvers made by Lt. Col Ostrom C.A.C, Lt. Col. Pashley, Q.M.C., and Major Ellerthorpe, C.A.
Immediate Report No. 65 (Combat Observations): Report for CG, 2d Infantry Dvision to CG, VIII Corps.
Report from the 2nd Infantry Division on combat operations and close air support of the ground forces around Brest for the period from 23 July 1944 until resistance ceased
Central Europe, victory, 82d Airborne Division.
In late March 1945, the 82d Airborne Division was engaged in training activities at its base camps at Sissone, Suippes and Leon, France. Late in the afternoon of 30 March, the division commander, Major General James M. Gavin was called to XVIII Corps (Airborne) Headquarters at Epernay, France. Here he received instructions to the effect that the 82nd and the 101st Airborne Divisions were to concentrate southwest of Bonn, Germany. On 31 March, the 82nd Airborne Division was attached to the Fifteenth U.S. Army at 1400 and given the mission to patrol a section of the West bank of the Rhine River. Table of contents: action on the Rhine; action east of the Elbe; miscellaneous information and maps; and distribution
Selection and final interment of the World War II unknown.
Basic procedures for the selection of the World War II unknown
Interview of Captain M.B. Gardner, USN, Chief of Staff, ComAirSouPac in the Air Information Branch, Bureau of Aeronautics, 13 January 1943.
Captain Gardner covers the problems of establishing advanced air bases, with particular reference to recommendations for laying out new ones, and also to touch on pilot fatigue and tactics and other subjects appropriate
A Guide to the Employment of the Engineer Special Brigades.
This guide covered the organization, organization, logistics, chain of command, communication, and common mistakes to be avoided