2,215,281 research outputs found
Cahier pédagogique de la coordination provinciale de la philosophie
No full textPubl. comme le vol. 2, no. 2 de la revue Cahier pédagogique de la coordination provincial de la philosophi
A simple questionnaire can change everything: Are strategy choices in coordination games stable?
Get PDFThis paper presents results from an experiment designed to study the effect of self reporting risk preferences on strategy choices made in a subsequently played 2x2 coordination game. The main finding is that the act of answering a questionnaire about one's own risk preferences significantly alters strategic behavior. Within a best response correspondence framework, this result can be explained by a change in either risk preferences or beliefs. We find that self reporting risk preferences induces an increase in subjects' risk aversion while keeping their beliefs unchanged. Our findings raise some questions about the stability of strategy choices in coordination games. --coordination game,questionnaire,risk preferences,beliefs,best response correspondence
Mexico : Institutional Coordination for Regional Sustainable Development
No full textThis report analyzes, through a review
of the regulatory framework, case studies, and international
experiences, current arrangements for coordination of
government programs in priority regions in Mexico, as well
as opportunities for better addressing the development needs
of those regions via enhanced coordination. The broad
hypotheses underpinning the analysis are: 1) Poor
coordination (within government and between government and
civil society) impedes the effective use of government
resources (and the mobilization of private ones) in backward
regions. 2) Participatory planning fora at the regional
(i.e., inter-municipal) level may provide an institutional
and operational framework through which those impediments
can be removed. The report is organized as follows: Chapter
2 reviews the recent evolution of regional development
policies. Chapter 3 develops a conceptual framework for
analyzing horizontal and coordination problems as they
relate to regional policies. Chapter 4 discusses the
normative framework for coordination developed in
Mexico's laws and regulations. Chapter 5 analyzes
current challenges to, and opportunities for, effective
coordination in Mexico on the basis of four case studies.
Chapter 6 discusses international experiences with
horizontal and vertical coordination in several Latin
American countries, as well as the relevance and
applicability of those lessons to Mexico. Finally, chapter 7
develops tentative recommendations
Competition as a Coordination Device. Experimental Evidence from a Minimum Effort Coordination Game
Get PDFThe problem of coordination failure, particularly in 'team production' situations, is central to a large number of mircroeconomic as well as macroeconomic models. As this type of inefficient coordination poses a severe economic problem, there is a need for institutions that foster efficient coordination of individual economic plans. In this paper, we introduce such a rather classical economic institution: competition. In a series of laboratory experiments, we reveal that the true reason for coordination failure is strategic uncertainty, which can be reduced almost completely by introducing a appropriately designed mechanism of (inter-group) competition.coordination failure, team production, competition
Coordination of Mobile Labor
Get PDFWe study coordination failures in many simultaneously occurring coordination problems. Players encounter one of the problems but have the outside option of migrating to one of the remaining ones. Drawing on the global games approach, we show that such a mobile game has a unique equilibrium that allows us to examine comparative statics. The endogeneity of the outside option value and of the migration activity leads to non-monotonicity of welfare with respect to mobility friction; high mobility may hurt players. We apply these “general equilibrium” findings to the problem of the labor market during industrialization as described by Matsuyama [11].Coordination, General Equilibrium, Global Games, Globalization, Industrialization, Mobility.
Cooperation Spillovers in Coordination Games
Get PDFMotivated by problems of coordination failure observed in weak-link games, we experimentally investigate behavioral spillovers for order-statistic coordination games. Subjects play the minimum- and median-effort coordination games simultaneously and sequentially. The results show the precedent for cooperative behavior spills over from the median game to the minimum game when the games are played sequentially. Moreover, spillover occurs even when group composition changes, although the effect is not as strong. We also find that the precedent for uncooperative behavior does not spill over from the minimum game to the median game. These findings suggest guidelines for increasing cooperative behavior within organizations.coordination, order-statistic games, experiments, cooperation, minimum game, behavioral spillover
Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
Get PDFLecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004This paper explores predictability of behavior in coordination games with multiple equilibria. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects' certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Attitudes towards strategic uncertainty in coordination games are related to risk aversion, experience seeking, gender and age. From the distribution of certainty equivalents among participating students we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of coordination games. For many games success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response of a risk neutral player is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Data indicate that subjects have probabilistic beliefs about success or failure of coordination rather than beliefs about individual behavior of other players.
Coordination in Software Agent Systems
Get PDFThe objective of this paper is to examine the crucial area of coordination in multi-agent systems. It does not attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the coordination literature; rather, it highlights the necessity for coordination in agent systems and overviews briefly various coordination techniques. It critiques these techniques and presents some conclusions and challenges which we draw from this literature
Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
Get PDFLecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004This paper explores predictability of behavior in coordination games with multiple equilibria. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects' certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Attitudes towards strategic uncertainty in coordination games are related to risk aversion, experience seeking, gender and age. From the distribution of certainty equivalents among participating students we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of coordination games. For many games success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response of a risk neutral player is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Data indicate that subjects have probabilistic beliefs about success or failure of coordination rather than beliefs about individual behavior of other players
Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games
Get PDFThis paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects’ certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age. From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects’ behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.Belief Formation, Coordination Games, Global Game, Lotteries, Risk Aversion, Strategic Uncertainty, Leex
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