139,588 research outputs found
Urban unemployment, agglomeration and transportation policies
No full textWe study the role of unemployment in the context of the endogeneous formation of a monocentric city in which firms set efficiency wages to deter shirking. We first show that, in equilibrium, the employed locate at the vicinity of the city-center, the unemployed reside at the city-edge and firms set up in the city-center. We then show that there is a ‘spatial mismatch’ between location and jobs because the further away from jobs the unemployed, the larger the level of unemployment. Finally, we derive some policy implications. We show that a policy that improves the city transportation network (by subsidizing the commuting costs of all workers) reduces urban unemployment, increases utilities of all workers but raises inequality whereas a policy that supports the transportation of the unemployed only (by subsidizing their commuting costs) increases urban unemployment, does not always raise workers’ utilities but reduces inequality
Juvenile delinquency and conformism
No full textThis article studies whether conformism behavior affects individual outcomes in crime. We present a social network model of peer effects with ex ante heterogeneous agents and show how conformism and deterrence affect criminal activities. We then bring the model to the data by using a very detailed data set of adolescent friendship networks. A novel social network-based empirical strategy allows us to identify peer effects for different types of crimes. We find that conformity plays an important role for all crimes, especially for petty crimes. This suggests that, for juvenile crime, an effective policy should be measured not only by the possible crime reduction it implies but also by the group interactions it engenders. © 2009 The Author. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved
Spatial dependence in local unemployment rates
No full textBy explicitly considering the spatial dimension of local regional labor markets, we develop a simple dynamic model that explains the spatial correlation between unemployment rates. We then test this model by using UK local data. Our evidence shows a significant spatial dependence that has been growing over time and characterized by a low distance decay. Highly localized effects are explained by commuting flows. These results are consistent with the theoretical model
Peer effects and social networks in education
No full textThis paper studies whether structural properties of friendship networks affect individual outcomes in education. We first develop a model that shows that, at the Nash equilibrium, the outcome of each individual embedded in a network is proportional to her Katz-Bonacich centrality measure. This measure takes into account both direct and indirect friends of each individual but puts less weight to her distant friends. We then bring the model to the data by using a very detailed dataset of adolescent friendship networks. We show that, after controlling for observable
individual characteristics and unobservable network specific factors, the individual’s position in a network (as measured by her Katz-Bonacich centrality) is a key determinant of her level of activity. A standard deviation increase in the Katz-Bonacich centrality increases the pupil school performance by more than 7 percent of one standard deviation
Racial beliefs, location and the causes of crime
No full textThe aim of this paper is to show that both location and stereotype racial beliefs matter for explaining the high criminality rate among blacks in cities. In our model, blacks and whites are identical in all respects. However, if, for no economic but for extrinsic reasons, every-body (including blacks) believes that blacks are more criminals than whites, then we show that blacks (for rational reasons) become more criminals than whites, earn lower wages and reside in ghettos located far away from legal activities. There is a vicious circle in which blacks cannot escape because both location and labor market outcomes re-inforce each other to imply high crime rates among blacks living in cities. In this context, we show that a transportation policy that subsidizes the ‘access’ to legal activities for blacks can lead to a sharp decrease in their crime rate
Endogenous Peer Effects: Local Aggregate or Local Average?
No full textWe develop a unified model embedding different behavioral mechanisms of social interactions and design a statistical model selection test to differentiate between them in empirical applications. This framework is applied to study peer effects in education (effort in studying) and sport activities for adolescents in the United States. We find that, for education, students tend to conform to the social norm of their friends while, for sport activities, both the social multiplier and the social norm effect matter
Who is the key player? A network analysis of juvenile delinquency
No full textThis article presents a methodology for empirically identifying the key player, whose removal from the network leads to the optimal change in aggregate activity level in equilibrium [Ballester, C., Calvó-Armengol, A., and Zenou, Y. (2006), “Who’s Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player,” Econometrica, 74: 1403–1417], allowing the network links to rewire after the removal of the key player. First, we propose an IV-based estimation strategy for the social-interaction effect, which is needed to determine the equilibrium activity level of a network, taking into account the potential network endogeneity. Next, to simulate the network evolution process after the removal of the key player, we adopt the general network formation model in Mele [(2017), “A Structural Model of Dense Network Formation,” Econometrica, 85: 825–850] and extend it to incorporate the unobserved individual heterogeneity in link formation decisions. We illustrate the methodology by providing the key player rankings in juvenile delinquency using information on friendship networks among U.S. teenagers. We find that the key player is not necessarily the most active delinquent or the delinquent who ranks the highest in standard (not microfounded) centrality measures. We also find that, compared to a policy that removes the most active delinquent from the network, a key-player-targeted policy leads to a much higher delinquency reduction.</p
Who is the key player? A network analysis of juvenile delinquency
No full textThis article presents a methodology for empirically identifying the key player, whose removal from the network leads to the optimal change in aggregate activity level in equilibrium [Ballester, C., Calvo-Armengol, A., and Zenou, Y. (2006), "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player," Econometrica, 74: 1403-1417], allowing the network links to rewire after the removal of the key player. First, we propose an IV-based estimation strategy for the social-interaction effect, which is needed to determine the equilibrium activity level of a network, taking into account the potential network endogeneity. Next, to simulate the network evolution process after the removal of the key player, we adopt the general network formation model in Mele [(2017), "A Structural Model of Dense Network Formation," Econometrica, 85: 825-850] and extend it to incorporate the unobserved individual heterogeneity in link formation decisions. We illustrate the methodology by providing the key player rankings in juvenile delinquency using information on friendship networks among U.S. teenagers. We find that the key player is not necessarily the most active delinquent or the delinquent who ranks the highest in standard (not microfounded) centrality measures. We also find that, compared to a policy that removes the most active delinquent from the network, a key-player-targeted policy leads to a much higher delinquency reduction
Ethnic Identity and Labor-Market Outcomes of Immigrants in Europe
No full textWe study the relationship between ethnic identity and labor-market outcomes of non-EU immigrants in Europe. Using the European Social Survey, we find that there is a penalty to be paid for immigrants with a strong identity. Being a first generation immigrant leads to a penalty of about 17 percent while second-generation immigrants have a probability of being employed that is not statistically different from that of natives. However, when they have a strong identity, second-generation immigrants have a lower chance of finding a job than natives. Our analysis also reveals that the relationship between ethnic identity and employment prospects may depend on the type of integration and labor-market policies implemented in the country where the immigrant lives. More flexible labor markets help immigrants to access the labor market but do not protect those who have a strong ethnic identity.First and second-generation immigrants; assimilation; integration policies
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