1,721,034 research outputs found
Coordination of Advertising Strategies in a Fashion Licensing Contract
No full textThe aim of this paper is to characterize cooperative and noncooperative advertising strategies of a licensor and licensee involved in a licensing contract in the fashion business. Licensing is the process of leasing a legally protected entity (brand, name, logo, etc.) in conjunction with a product or product line. It is based on a contractual agreement between two business entities: the owner of the property, called licensor; and the renter of the rights, called licensee. Licensing is seen as a win-win strategy, in which the two partners can achieve their objectives (e.g., expanding the brand, its market reach, etc.). We show that, if the licensor, who acts as the leader, uses an incentive strategy that depends on the licensee advertising, then it can reach the jointly optimal solution in a decentralized way
Lapointe, A. et Zaccour, G., eds.-Ajustements structurels et gestion du secteur énergétique en Afrique, 1993
No full textLerat Serge. Lapointe, A. et Zaccour, G., eds.-Ajustements structurels et gestion du secteur énergétique en Afrique, 1993. In: Cahiers d'outre-mer. N° 196 - 49e année, Octobre-décembre 1996. Vietnam. p. 435
Advertising Strategies in a Differential Game with Negative Competitor's Interference
No full textWe consider a duopolistic industry where the current sales of each firm is proportional to its goodwill stock. The evolution of the latter depends positively on own advertising effort and negatively on competitor's advertising. A standard assumption in the literature in differential games of advertising is that the players remain active throughout the whole (infinite) duration of the game. We relax this assumption and characterize the circumstances under which a firm finds it optimal to remain or exit the industry. Among other things, it is shown that, if both players are "strong", then the unique Nash equilibrium is the same that one would obtain in the absence of interference from competitor's advertising
A selective survey of game-theoretic models of closed-loop supply chains
No full textThis paper surveys two key issues in closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) research: return functions and coordination mechanisms. The return function provides the rule according to which end-of-life/use products are returned to a collector. The coordination mechanisms consist of the adoption of a certain mechanism (e.g., a contract) to align the closed-loop supply chain members’ objectives. We describe latest thinking in these two major CLSC-related fields and suggest future research directions to be undertaken
Optimal quality improvements and pricing strategies with active and passive product returns
No full textA manufacturer invests in product quality to encourage consumers who have purchased in the past to substitute their current product version with a new release. Since price deters the adoption of an upgraded quality product, consumers evaluate both the quality improvements and the new release price before deciding whether to return a good. The returns can be either voluntary (passive returns) or dependent on the firm’s controls (active returns), while the pricing strategies can be either fixed (constant intertemporal pricing) or varying over time (updated intertemporal pricing) depending on the quality improvements. By combining these two ingredients (return type and pricing policy) we formulate a two-period model in which a manufacturer invests in quality improvements and sets the product prices over time. Our results show that when consumers passively return old product versions, the manufacturer should always update its pricing strategies according to the quality improvements. However, when consumer returns are sensitive to quality improvements and price, the manufacturer can be indifferent between setting a constant or an updated pricing policy depending on the effect that quality has on returns. If the manufacturer can choose between a market in which consumer returns are passive or active, it decides according to how quality impacts the returns: When the consumers’ willingness to return according to the quality effect is negligible, the manufacturer prefers to work in a market with passive attitudes towards returns. While the choice of updating the price is always dominant from an economic point of view, it turns out to be suboptimal from an environmental perspective when the effects of quality and price on returns are balanced. When the price effect on returns also depends on the discount granted to consumers, then the discrepancy between economic and environmental returns is amplified
Inverted-U aggregate investment curves in a dynamic game of advertising
Full text linkWe revisit the relationship between market power and firms' investment incentives in a noncooperative differential oligopoly game in which firms sell differentiated goods and invest in advertising to increase the brand equity of their respective goods. The feedback equilibrium obtains under open-loop rules, and aggregate expenditure on goodwill takes an inverted-U shape under both Cournot and Bertrand behaviour, provided product differentiation is sufficiently high. Total industry expenditure is higher under Cournot competition
Incentive strategies for an optimal recovery program in a closed-loop supply chain
No full textWe consider a dynamic closed-loop supply chain made up of one manufacturer and one retailer, with both players investing in a product recovery program to increase the rate of return of previously purchased products. End-of use product returns have two impacts. First, they lead to a decrease in the production cost, as manufacturing with used parts is cheaper than using virgin materials. Second, returns boost sales through replacement items. We show that the coordinated solution can be implemented by using so-called incentive strategies, which have the property of being best-reply strategies if each player assumes that the other is also implementing her incentive strategies. A numerical example illustrates the theoretical results
Cheaptalk, gullibilty, and welfare in an enviromental taxation game
No full textDawid H, Deissenberg C, Sevcik P. Cheaptalk, gullibilty, and welfare in an enviromental taxation game. In: Haurie A, Zaccour G, eds. Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications. 2005: 175-192
A two-period model of Closed-loop Supply Chain
No full textWe consider a two-period closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) game where a remanufacturer appropriates of the returns' residual value and decides whether to exclusively manage the end-of-use product collection or to outsource it to either a retailer or a third-service provider (3P). We determine that the manufacturer outsources the product collection only when an outsourcee performs environmentally and operationally better. On the outsourcees side there is always an economic convenience in managing the product returns process exclusively, independently of returns rewards and operational performance. When outsourcing is convenient, a manufacturer always chooses a retailer if the outsourcees show equal performance. Overall, the manufacturer is more sensitive to environmental performance than to operational perfomance. Finally, there exists only a small region inside which outsouring the collection process contributes to the triple bottom line. © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved
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