1,720,990 research outputs found
Just in time - dreamless sleep experience as pure subjective temporality: A commentary on Evan Thompson
In this commentary, I propose a strategy for extending Evan Thompson's argument on the existence of dreamless sleep experience. My first aim is to show that the Indian debate on reports of having slept peacefully is importantly similar to debates in scientific dream research and contemporary Western philosophy on the trustworthiness of dream reports. This analogy leads to a surprising conclusion: the default view of conscious experience as that which disappears in dreamless sleep, though widely accepted in cognitive neuroscience, is in fact inconsistent with the methodological background assumptions of scientific dream research. Importantly, the methods already used in scientific dream research, as well as the theoretical justification on which they are based, can be extended to the investigation of dreamless sleep experience. Second, I sketch the outlines of a conceptual model of dreamless sleep experience as involving pure subjective temporality, or phenomenal experience characterized only by the phenomenal now and the sense of duration, but devoid of any further intentional content. I suggest that understood in this manner, dreamless sleep experience is a candidate for minimal phenomenal experience, or the simplest form in which a state can be phenomenally conscious. This model also extends existing work on minimal phenomenal selfhood in dreams. Third, I discuss three empirical examples that I take to be particularly promising candidates of dreamless sleep experience. These are certain forms of minimal or imageless lucid dreams, white dreams, and sleep-state misperception of the type most dramatically seen in subjective insomnia
What’s up with Prefrontal Cortex?
The prefrontal cortex is perhaps one of the most intriguing areas of the brain, and considered by many to be involved in a whole battery of higher cognitive functions. However, evidence for a direct involvement in conscious perception, although often postulated, remains inconclusive. In his paper, John-Dylan Haynes presents results from experiments using multivariate decoding techniques on human functional magnetic resonance imaging data that speak against the assertion that prefrontal cortex broadcasts the contents of consciousness throughout the brain. I consider potential reasons for these null results, as well as where else we may look for the neural correlates of consciousness. Specifically, I propose that conscious perception arises when distributed neurons are bound into coherent assemblies —a process that does not require relay through specific brain areas
Should we be Epigenetically Proactive?
"Can we be epigenetically proactive?”, is the question asked by Evers in her paper in this collection. After describing an original approach to using insights from the epigenesis of neural networks to develop new training and treatment programs, in particular to educate children and adolescents to become less violentand more sympathetic, the author suggests that there is a naturalistic responsibility for using science in this manner. In this commentary, I relate her proposal to the human enhancement debate at large, with a focus on the prevalent concept of human wellbeing. After a discussion of the factors that account for people’s quality of life and the role of research that allows them to decide the priorities for a good life themselves, three caveats against Evers’s approach are presented: (1) that epigenetic intervention carries the risk of psychological side-effects; (2) that people’s autonomy must be respected; and (3) that the world’s situation may not be as bad as suggested by the author when describing the benefits of her proposal. It is therefore concluded that, at least for the time being and until these challenges are met, we should not be epigenetically proactive
Should we be Epigenetically Proactive?
"Can we be epigenetically proactive?”, is the question asked by Evers in her paper in this collection. After describing an original approach to using insights from the epigenesis of neural networks to develop new training and treatment programs, in particular to educate children and adolescents to become less violentand more sympathetic, the author suggests that there is a naturalistic responsibility for using science in this manner. In this commentary, I relate her proposal to the human enhancement debate at large, with a focus on the prevalent concept of human wellbeing. After a discussion of the factors that account for people’s quality of life and the role of research that allows them to decide the priorities for a good life themselves, three caveats against Evers’s approach are presented: (1) that epigenetic intervention carries the risk of psychological side-effects; (2) that people’s autonomy must be respected; and (3) that the world’s situation may not be as bad as suggested by the author when describing the benefits of her proposal. It is therefore concluded that, at least for the time being and until these challenges are met, we should not be epigenetically proactive
Should we be Epigenetically Proactive?
"Can we be epigenetically proactive?”, is the question asked by Evers in her paper in this collection. After describing an original approach to using insights from the epigenesis of neural networks to develop new training and treatment programs, in particular to educate children and adolescents to become less violentand more sympathetic, the author suggests that there is a naturalistic responsibility for using science in this manner. In this commentary, I relate her proposal to the human enhancement debate at large, with a focus on the prevalent concept of human wellbeing. After a discussion of the factors that account for people’s quality of life and the role of research that allows them to decide the priorities for a good life themselves, three caveats against Evers’s approach are presented: (1) that epigenetic intervention carries the risk of psychological side-effects; (2) that people’s autonomy must be respected; and (3) that the world’s situation may not be as bad as suggested by the author when describing the benefits of her proposal. It is therefore concluded that, at least for the time being and until these challenges are met, we should not be epigenetically proactive
Should We Be Epigenetically Proactive? A Commentary on Kathinka Evers
“Can we be epigenetically proactive?”, is the question asked by Evers in her paper in this collection. After describing an original approach to using insights from the epigenesis of neural networks to develop new training and treatment programs, in particular to educate children and adolescents to become less violent and more sympathetic, the author suggests that there is a naturalistic responsibility for using science in this manner. In this commentary, I relate her proposal to the human enhancement debate at large, with a focus on the prevalent concept of human wellbeing. After a discussion of the factors that account for people’s quality of life and the role of research that allows them to decide the priorities for a good life themselves, three caveats against Evers’s approach are presented: (1) that epigenetic intervention carries the risk of psychological side-effects; (2) that people’s autonomy must be respected; and (3) that the world’s situation may not be as bad as suggested by the author when describing the benefits of her proposal. It is therefore concluded that, at least for the time being and until these challenges are met, we should not be epigenetically proactive
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
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