2,442 research outputs found
Cutting'aesthetic teeth' : Flannery O'Connor's habit of art
No full textDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Comunicação e ExpressãoEste trabalho foi sugerido pela afirmação de Flannery O'Connor que sua "dedicação estética" nasceu através do contato com Art and Scholasticism de Jacques Maritain. O propósito foi chegar a uma interpretação do sentido da frase. Uma investigação detalhada foi feita do conteúdo de Art and Scholasticism, posteriormente contrastada com os resultados de uma pesquisa feita em seus ensaios e suas cartas, o que revelou numerosos ecos de diversos trechos constando no texto de Maritain. Três pontos principais foram escolhidos como critérios na análise do hábito artístico de O'Connor: 1) a prática de arte implica uma luta; 2) a arte somente pode ser percebida pelos sentidos; e 3) a prática de arte exige do artista a dedicação indivisa à obra nascente. O estudo conclui que, para O'Connor, o brotar da dentição estética, através da leitura de Art and Scholasticism, significou que, ao perceber na análise da natureza da arte algo com que podia concordar, ela reconheceu tanto sua própria capacidade de tornar-se uma artista literária, quanto sua vontade de assumir a tarefa de desenvolver em sua pessoa o hábito de arte
Factor structure and psychometric properties of the Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale among Chinese adolescents
No full textObjectives: Resilience refers to psychological characteristics that promote effective coping and positive adaptation in adversity. This study investigated the factor structure and psychometric properties of the Chinese version of the Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (CD-RISC) among adolescents
White, Marie (Death, 1885-02-05)
No full textAddress: City HospitalAge at death: 47 yrsPg.18/1885/126/F W W/Ireland/Dr. P. Connor/Jones/City CemeteryOriginal record filed in drawer labeled 'WHITE- WIDRIG'
White, Lucinda (Death, 1875-10-19)
No full textAddress: 254 Hopkins St.Age at death: 25 yrsPg.283/1875/258/F W S/City/Dr. R. Connor/J. Wiltsee/Spring GroveOriginal record filed in drawer labeled 'WHITE- WIDRIG'
PRICE-FIXING OVERCHARGES: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC EVIDENCE
No full textThis paper surveys hundreds of published social-science studies of private, hard-core cartels that contain 699 observations of long-run overcharges. The primary finding is that the median cartel overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 25%: 19% for domestic cartels, 32% for international cartels, and 31% for all successful cartels. Thus, international cartels have historically been about 68% more effective in raising prices than domestic cartels. Cartel overcharges are skewed to the high side, pushing the mean overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods to 42%. "Peak" cartel overcharges are typically double those of the long-run averages. These results are generally consistent with the few, more limited, previously published works that survey cartel overcharges. There is no evidence that convicted cartels are markedly less effective than unpunished ones. The results of a second survey of final verdicts in decided U.S. horizontal collusion cases, only three of which were international cartels, show an average median overcharge of 21% and an average mean overcharge of 30%. Outside the United States, 62 decisions of competition commissions cited median average overcharges of 25% and a mean of 47%. There are three significant policy implications. First, there is a view among some antitrust writers that there is little evidence that cartels raise prices significantly for a period long enough to justify the height of current U.S. cartel penalties. This survey's results, which are based upon an extraordinarily large amount of data spanning a broad swath of history of all types of private cartels, sharply contradict these views. In fact, the data suggest that U.S. penalties ought to be increased. Mean overcharges are three times as high as the level presumed by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Surprisingly, bid rigging was no more injurious than other forms of collusion, which suggests that the USSC should amend its Guidelines that currently treat bid rigging more harshly than other forms of collusion. Second, the principal antitrust authorities abroad often base their typical or maximum fines on a 10% harm presumption. Average fines imposed since 1995 by Canada and the EU on identical cartels have been lower than U.S. government fines, yet overcharges generated by cartels discovered outside the United States are higher than North America-centered cartels. Consequently, anticartel laws and fine-setting practices abroad are in even greater need of strengthening. Third, cartels with multi-continental price effects are the most harmful type. Despite the evident increases in cartel detection rates and the size of monetary fines and penalties in the past decade, a good case can be made that current global anticartel regimes are under-deterring. While the recent worldwide trend towards the intensification of cartel penalties has been desirable, global cartels are more difficult to detect, have less fear from entry of rivals, achieve higher levels of sales and profitability, and systematically receive weaker corporate sanctions than comparable domestic cartels. Antitrust sanctions worldwide should be higher for global cartels than for other types.International Relations/Trade,
EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF THE SHERMAN ACT AND DETERRENCE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL CARTELS
No full textThis paper presents two major economic arguments relevant to a decision facing the U.S. Supreme Court in early 2004. In Empagran v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche the Court must decide whether companies like Empagran, an Ecuadorian animal-feed manufacturer, ought to be permitted to sue for treble damages under the 1890 Sherman Act, even though Empagran bought vitamins from a convicted global cartel wholly outside U.S. territory. Because of ineffective antitrust enforcement in its home country, Empagran and similarly situated buyers favor having this right, whereas Roche and 19 other members of the vitamins cartel oppose it. The first argument in favor of extraterritorial expansion concerns the effects on U.S. consumers and the competitiveness of U.S. markets. I argue that in the context of international price-fixing conspiracies, conduct relating to “wholly foreign” purchases necessarily affects domestic commerce. This is because international cartels must prevent international geographic arbitrage in order to succeed in controlling prices in any targeted national market. Second, this paper assembles empirical evidence that, should non-U.S. transactions be excluded from U.S. antitrust protection, the global aspirations of contemporary cartels offer an insuperable challenge to a core aim of the antitrust laws: Deterrence. The broad geographic harm generated by the scores of modern global price-fixing conspiracies has overwhelmed the ability of current laws about corporate antitrust sanctions to provide enough financial disincentives to discourage the formation of similar cartels in the future. Permitting foreign buyers who purchased the products of international cartels abroad to pursue civil antitrust damages actions in U.S. courts is necessary to yield the level of legal punishment needed to protect the U.S. economy and its consumers from future cartel injuries. Territorial expansion will also increase the probability of discovery of clandestine cartels by multiplying the number of jurisdictions in which private parties have an incentive to investigate collusive behavior.extraterritoriality, antitrust, cartel, price fixing, deterrence
Extraterritoriality of the Sherman Act and Deterrence of Private International Cartels
No full textThis paper presents two major economic arguments relevant to a decision facing the U.S. Supreme Court in early 2004. In Empagran v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche the Court must decide whether companies like Empagran, an Ecuadorian animal-feed manufacturer, ought to be permitted to sue for treble damages under the 1890 Sherman Act, even though Empagran bought vitamins from a convicted global cartel wholly outside U.S. territory. Because of ineffective antitrust enforcement in its home country, Empagran and similarly situated buyers favor having this right, whereas Roche and 19 other members of the vitamins cartel oppose it. The first argument in favor of extraterritorial expansion concerns the effects on U.S. consumers and the competitiveness of U.S. markets. I argue that in the context of international price-fixing conspiracies, conduct relating to "wholly foreign" purchases necessarily affects domestic commerce. This is because international cartels must prevent international geographic arbitrage in order to succeed in controlling prices in any targeted national market. Second, this paper assembles empirical evidence that, should non-U.S. transactions be excluded from U.S. antitrust protection, the global aspirations of contemporary cartels offer an insuperable challenge to a core aim of the antitrust laws: Deterrence. The broad geographic harm generated by the scores of modern global price-fixing conspiracies has overwhelmed the ability of current laws about corporate antitrust sanctions to provide enough financial disincentives to discourage the formation of similar cartels in the future. Permitting foreign buyers who purchased the products of international cartels abroad to pursue civil antitrust damages actions in U.S. courts is necessary to yield the level of legal punishment needed to protect the U.S. economy and its consumers from future cartel injuries. Territorial expansion will also increase the probability of discovery of clandestine cartels by multiplying the number of jurisdictions in which private parties have an incentive to investigate collusive behavior.International Relations/Trade,
A comparative study of form and theology in the works of Flannery O'Connor and Simone Weil
No full textIn this comparative study of the form and theology of Flannery O'Connor and Simone Weil I interrogate how Weil's philosophical writings and her theology illuminate O'Connor's use of both narrative and non-fictional forms, and her Catholicism. The Introduction analyses how Weil's concept of superposed reading provides a new method of approaching both O'Connor, her writings, and O'Connor
studies, and focuses on how such apparently different women interconnect. Chapter One explores how both Weil and O'Connor attempt to write their theologies on the
souls of their readers yet are each subject to constraints imposed by form. Weil's concept of locating equilibrium between incommensurates is discussed, and her
distinctively philosophical approach to fictions and fictionality is used to investigate O'Connor's notion of prophetic fictions and the writer's role. Chapter Two assesses how both writers revivify Christian paradoxes. Weil's monstrous concept of affiiction, and O'Connor's use of the grotesque genre to jolt secular man into an
awareness of the sacred are scrutinised. Chapter Three studies how both writers consider an encounter between God and man is possible through the action of grace. My Conclusion interrogates how Weil's work can deepen our understanding of O'Connor's writings, and examines how successful O'Connor is at realising a truly
Christian literature. I conclude that despite being a writer of powerful fictions, O'Connor can not be totally successful in her mission as writer-prophet because
ultimately fiction escapes orthodoxy
The Econometrics of Cartel Overcharges
No full textConnor and Lande (2006) conducted a survey of cartel overcharge estimates and found an average in the range of 31% to 49%. By examining more sources, Connor (2010b) finds a median of 23.3% for all type of cartels and a mean of 50.4% for successful cartels. However, the data used in these studies are estimates rather than true observations, since the true illegal profits of cartels are rarely observable. Therefore, these data are subject to model error, estimation error and publication bias. A quick glance at the Connor database reveals that the universe of overcharge estimates is asymmetric, heterogenous and contains a number of influential observations. Beside the fact that overcharge estimates are potentially biased, fitting a linear OLS model to the data without providing a carefull treatment of the problems raised by the publication bias, outliers, asymmetry, and heterogeneity will necessarily produce distorted results. We conduct a meta-analysis of cartel overcharge estimates in the spirit of Connor and Bolotova (2006), but providing a sound treatment of the matters raised above. We find a mean bias-corrected overcharge estimate of 13.8% for all cartels, and of 13.6% for cartels with initial estimates lying between 0% and 50%. Connor et Lande (2006) survolent la littérature sur les majorations de prix imposées par les cartels et concluent à une augmentation moyenne variant entre 31 % et 49 %. Considérant un échantillon plus grand, Connor (2010b) trouve une médiane de 23,3 % pour tous les types de cartel et une moyenne de 50,4 % pour les cartels dont les majorations de prix estimées sont positives. Cependant, les échantillons utilisés dans ces études sont constitués d’estimations et non pas d’observations directes. De ce fait, ces échantillons héritent possiblement d’erreurs de modélisation et d’estimation, ainsi que d’un biais de publication. Une analyse sommaire des majorations dans l’échantillon de Connor révèle une distribution asymétrique, de l’hétérogénéité et la présence d’observations aberrantes. Ainsi, au-delà du fait que les estimations d’augmentation de prix par les cartels sont potentiellement biaisées, l’estimation d’un modèle par MCO avec de telles données sans un traitement adéquat de l’asymétrie, de l’hétérogénéité et des données aberrantes produirait des résultats déformés. Nous réalisons une nouvelle méta-analyse dans le même esprit que celui de Connor et Bolotova (2006), mais en proposant une prise en compte adéquate des problèmes mentionnés ci-dessus. Après correction du biais d’estimation, nos résultats suggèrent que la moyenne des majorations de prix estimées est de l’ordre de 13,8 % pour tous les types de cartels et de 13,6 % pour les cartels dont les estimations de majoration de prix se situaient initialement entre 0 % et 50 %.Cartels, overcharges, Cartels, majoration de prix.
Athlete support personnel and anti-doping: knowledge, attitudes, and ethical stance
No full textAthlete support personnel (ASP) failing to meet responsibilities under the World Anti-Doping Code risk sanction. It is unclear whether the poor knowledge of responsibilities seen in sports physicians and coaches applies to other ASP (e.g., administrators, chiropractors, family, nutritionists, physiotherapists, psychologists, and trainers). A purposive sample of Australian ASP (n = 292) responded to a survey on knowledge of anti-doping rules (35 true/false questions), ethical beliefs and practice, and attitudes toward performance enhancement. Some ASP declined to participate, claiming doping was irrelevant to their practice. Physicians were most knowledgeable (30.8/35), with family and trainers the least (26.0/35). ASP reported that improvements were needed to support anti-doping education (e.g., basis for anti-doping) and practice (e.g., rules). ASP also had a slightly negative attitude toward performance enhancement. Linear regression showed that being a sports physician, providing support at the elite level, and 15 years of experience influenced knowledge. The results confirm gaps in knowledge, suggesting that stronger engagement with ASP anti-doping education and practice is needed. Applying the principles of andragogy could help foster active engagement through emphasis on active inquiry, rather than passive reception of content. Future work on the context within which ASP experience anti-doping is needed, exploring acquisition and translation of knowledge into practice
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