1,720,981 research outputs found
Other-serving double standards: people show moral hypercrisy in close relationships
No full textExtending research on self-serving double moral standards (hypocrisy), we examine the reverse pattern of other-serving hypercrisy toward close relationship partners. In three studies (N = 1,019), for various imagined transgressions, people made more lenient moral judgments for their close friends (Studies 1 & 2) and romantic partners (Study 3) compared to themselves. This hypercrisy effect emerged both for transgressions toward third parties (Study 1) and toward each other (i.e., within the relationship; Studies 2 & 3). Moreover, it was moderated by perceptions of the relationship: Participants who more strongly believed their relationship to be a zero-sum game (i.e., needs can only be met competitively) showed greater leniency for themselves and attenuated hypercrisy for mutual transgressions (Studies 2 & 3). Investigating people’s close others rather than strangers as targets of moral judgment thus suggests that other-serving hypercrisy is more prevalent than previously thought, but sensitive to people’s conceptualizations of their relationships
Judging those who judge: perceivers infer the roles of affect and cognition underpinning others' moral dilemma responses
No full textWhereas considerable research examines antecedents of moral dilemma judgments where causing harm maximizes outcomes, this work examines social consequences: whether participants infer personality characteristics from others' dilemma judgments. We propose that people infer the roles of affective and cognitive processing underlying other peoples' moral dilemma judgments, and use this information to inform personality perceptions. In Studies 1 and 2, participants rated targets who rejected causing outcome-maximizing harm (consistent with deontology) as warmer but less competent than targets who accepted causing outcome-maximizing harm (consistent with utilitarianism). Studies 3a and 3b replicated this pattern and demonstrated that perceptions of affective processing mediated the effect on warmth, whereas perceptions of cognitive processing mediated the effect on competence. In Study 4 participants accurately predicted that affective decision-makers would reject harm, whereas cognitive decision-makers would accept harm. Furthermore, participants preferred targets who rejected causing harm for a social role prioritizing warmth (pediatrician), whereas they preferred targets who accepted causing harm for a social role prioritizing competence (hospital management, Study 5). Together, these results suggest that people infer the role of affective and cognitive processing underlying others' harm rejection and acceptance judgments, which inform personality inferences and decision-making
I don't feel ya: how narcissism shapes empathy
No full textThose who tend towards a self-absorbed personality are less likely to “feel others.” Indeed, subclinical narcissism has been linked to decreased empathy: Individuals high in narcissism seem to neglect what other people are thinking and feeling and are less likely to emotionally share others’ mental states. Three studies (N = 1,008) extend the literature on narcissism and empathy in some important ways. We suggest that the empathy deficit among narcissists does not make an exception for close friends, that it manifests not only in less, but also in discordant affect, and that it is mainly driven by the antagonistic dimension of narcissism (Studies 1 and 2). Moreover, employing an experimental manipulation, the present findings offer a novel way of attenuating this empathy deficit among narcissists: the experience of trust (Study 2). Finally, a pre-registered laboratory study documents a “bright” consequence of narcissists’ empathy deficit with respect to parochial altruism (Study 3). Hence, as unfortunate as narcissists’ empathy deficit might be, it is not set in stone. Additionally, a narcissistic spotlight that shines exclusively on the self can reduce some of the parochialism that empathy for specific, often close others entails
Two-faced morality: distrust promotes divergent moral standards for the self versus others
No full textPeople do not trust hypocrites, because they preach water, but drink wine. The current research shows that, ironically, when we distrust, we become moral hypocrites ourselves. We argue that experiencing distrust alerts us to the possibility that others may intent to exploit us, and that such looming exploitation differentially affects moral standards for the self versus others. Four studies (N = 1,225) examined this possibility and its underlying motivational dynamic. Study 1 established a relationship between dispositional distrust and flexible, self-serving moral cognition. In Studies 2 and 3, participants experiencing distrust (vs. trust) endorsed more lenient moral standards for themselves than for others. Study 4 explored the role of the motivation to avoid exploitation in these effects. Specifically, participants’ dispositional victim sensitivity moderated the effect of distrust on hypocrisy. Together, these findings suggest that individuals who distrust and fear to be exploited show self-serving, and hence untrustworthy, moral cognition themselves
Surprise me! On the impact of unexpected benefits on other-praising gratitude expressions
No full textGratitude reinforces social bonds. This relationship-regulating function depends on whether and how it is expressed. People can express gratitude in different ways: Beneficiaries may emphasize how they profited from a benefit (self-benefiting) or focus on the benefactor’s actions and characteristics related to it (other-praising). What underlies these expressive styles remains unclear. Based on findings that other-praising gratitude expressions have unique positive effects on interpersonal relationships, four studies (N = 1,188) investigated a novel antecedent of these expressions: unexpectedness of the benefit. In Study 1, we content-coded participants’ thank-you notes for an actual Christmas present. Path modeling revealed that unexpectedness of the benefit predicted other-praising, whereas happiness with the present predicted self-benefiting. These results were robust to relevant covariates and mirrored by participants’ self-reported self- benefiting and other-praising intentions. Studies 2-4 (preregistered) investigated samples from two different populations and experimentally manipulated (un)expectedness of recalled or imagined benefits. Given mixed experimental results, we conducted an internal meta-analysis. Across experimental studies, unexpected benefits increased other-praising, albeit weakly so, but not self-benefiting. In addition, the effect of unexpectedness on other-praising was significantly different from that on self-benefiting. We discuss potential processes and moderators of the effect of unexpected benefits on gratitude expressions
The experience of trust in everyday life
Full text linkIn this contribution, we review current research on daily-life experiences of trust in diverse and naturally occurring social interactions ranging from close relationships to complete strangers. Experience-sampling methodology allows the joint examination of situational, relational, dispositional, motivational and behavioral variables in their relation to trust. Thereby, these recent studies advance our understanding of how trust is shaped by important features of the social situation such as perceived conflict of interest. They elucidate how trust fluctuates according to stable traits, and how these traits interact with situational variables (e.g., social closeness to the target). Furthermore, trust connects social perceptions of trustees with trustors’ prosocial tendencies
Moralizing mental states: The role of trait self-control and control perceptions
Full text linkWhich attributes of a person contribute to their tendency to moralize others’ thoughts? Adopting an individual-difference approach to moral cognition, eight studies (N = 2,033) investigated how people’s ability for self-control shapes their moral reactions to others’ mental states. Specifically, Studies 1a-2b found positive predictive effects of trait self-control (TSC) on the moralization (e.g., blaming) of another person’s fantasies about different immoral behaviors. While ruling out alternative explanations, they furthermore supported the mediating role of ascribing targets control over their mental states. Studies 3a-3b provided correlational evidence of the perceived ability to control one’s own mental states as a mechanism in the relationship between TSC and ascriptions of control to others. Studies 4a-4b followed a causal-chain experimental approach: A manipulation of participants’ self-perceived ability to control their emotions impacted their control ascriptions to others over their immoral mental states (Study 4a), and targets perceived as high (vs. low) in control over their immoral mental states elicited stronger moralizing reactions. Taken together, the present studies elucidate why people moralize others’ purely mental states, even in the absence of overt behavior. More broadly, they advance our knowledge about the role of individual differences, particularly in self-control, in moral cognition
Taking the moral high ground: Deontological and absolutist moral dilemma judgments convey self-righteousness
No full textIndividuals who reject sacrificial harm to maximize overall outcomes, consistent with deontological (vs. utilitarian) ethics, appear warmer, more moral, and more trustworthy. Yet, deontological judgments may not only convey emotional reactions, but also strict adherence to moral rules. We therefore hypothesized that people view deontologists as more morally absolutist and hence self-righteous—as perceiving themselves as morally superior.In addition, both deontologists and utilitarians who base their decisions on rules (vs. emotions) should appearmore self-righteous. Four studies (N =1254) tested these hypotheses. Participants perceived targets as more self-righteous when they rejected (vs. accepted) sacrificial harm in classic moral dilemmas where harm maximizesoutcomes (i.e., deontological vs. utilitarian judgments), but not parallel cases where harm fails to maximizeoutcomes (Study 1). Preregistered Study 2 replicated the focal effect, additionally indicating mediation viaperceptions of moral absolutism. Study 3 found that targets who reported basing their deontological judgmentson rules, compared to emotional reactions or when processing information was absent, appeared particularlyself-righteous. Preregistered Study 4 included both deontological and utilitarian targets and manipulatedwhether their judgments were based on rules versus emotion (specifically sadness). Grounding either moralposition in rules conveyed self-righteousness, while communicating emotions was a remedy. Furthermore,participants perceived targets as more self-righteous the more targets deviated from their own moral beliefs.Studies 3 and 4 additionally examined participants’ self-disclosure intentions. In sum, deontological dilemmajudgments may convey an absolutist, rule-focused view of morality, but any judgment stemming from rules (incontrast to sadness) promotes self-righteousness perceptions
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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