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The normativity of rationality
Get PDFThis article is an introduction to the recent debate about whether rationality is normative – that is, very roughly, about whether we should have attitudes which fit together in a coherent way. I begin by explaining an initial problem – the “detaching problem” – that arises on the assumption that we should have coherent attitudes. I then explain the prominent “wide-scope” solution to this problem, and some of the central objections to it. I end by considering the options that arise if we reject the wide-scope solution
The symmetry of rational requirements
Get PDFSome irrational states can be avoided in more than one way. For example, if you believe that you ought to A you can avoid akrasia by intending to A or by dropping the belief that you ought to A. This supports the claim that some rational requirements are wide-scope. For instance, the requirement against akrasia is a requirement to intend to A or not believe that you ought to A. But some writers object that this Wide-Scope view ignores asymmetries between the different ways of avoiding irrationality. In this paper I defend the Wide-Scope view against recent objections of this sort from Mark Schroeder and Niko Kolodny. I argue that once we are clear about what the Wide-Scope view is committed to—and, importantly, what it is not—we can see that Schroeder and Kolodny’s objections fail. <br/
Holland Way Collection
No full textPhotograph of four housekeepers sitting on some steps outside Army Nurse Corps barracks in Manila. Three of the women are dressed in all white while the woman on the bottom right is dressed in a dark spotted dress and dark shoes
The Turing Way: A handbook for reproducible, ethical and collaborative research
No full textThe Turing Way is an open source community-driven guide to reproducible, ethical, inclusive and collaborative data science. The Turing Way book is collaboratively developed by its diverse community of researchers, learners, educators, and other stakeholders.
The Turing Way project is openly developed and any and all questions, comments and recommendations are welcome at our github repository: https://github.com/alan-turing-institute/the-turing-way. In 2020, the project underwent a major overhaul categorising chapters into 5 guides on reproducible research, project design, collaboration, communication and ethical research. Additionally, we added a community handbook to document all the practices designed and implemented towards the development of the project and community.
This release in 2021 includes additional chapters developed by our contributors across five guides and the community handbook. In addition, all the project documents from the project are provided as they appear on The Turing Way GitHub repository including the Zenodo metadata: https://github.com/alan-turing-institute/the-turing-way.
Release log
v1.0.1: Zenodo metadata information and additional chapters
v1.0.0: Five guide expansion of The Turing Way with a community handbook
v0.0.4: Continuous integration chapter merged to master.
v0.0.3: Reproducible environments chapter merged to master.
v0.0.2: Version control chapter merged to master.
v0.0.1: Reproducibility chapter merged to master.
Full Changelog: https://github.com/alan-turing-institute/the-turing-way/compare/v1.0.0...v1.0.1 (Previous release: https://github.com/alan-turing-institute/the-turing-way/compare/v0.0.3...v1.0.0)This work was supported by The UKRI Strategic Priorities Fund under the EPSRC Grant EP/T001569/1, particularly the "Tools, Practices and Systems" theme within that grant, and by The Alan Turing Institute under the EPSRC grant EP/N510129/1
Defending the wide-scope approach to instrumental reason
Get PDFThe Wide-Scope approach to instrumental reason holds that the requirement to intend the necessary means to your ends should be understood as a requirement to either intend the means, or else not intend the end. In this paper I explain and defend a neglected version of this approach. I argue that three serious objections to Wide-Scope accounts turn on a certain assumption about the nature of the reasons that ground the Wide-Scope requirement. The version of the Wide- Scope approach defended here allows us to reject this assumption, and so defuse theobjection
Broome on reasoning
No full textAmong the many important contributions of John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning is an account of what reasoning is and what makes reasoning correct. In this paper we raise some problems for both of these accounts and recommend an alternative approach
Two accounts of the normativity of rationality
Get PDFRecent views of reasons and rationality make it plausible that it can sometimes be rational to do what you have no reason to do. A number of writers have concluded that if this is so, rationality is not normative. But this is a mistake. Even if we assume a tight connection between reasons and normativity, the normativity of rationality does not require that there is always reason to be rational. The first half of this paper illustrates this point with reference to the subjective reasons account of rationality. The second half suggest that this point may have been missed because of certain similarities between the subjective reasons account and the importantly different transparency account. On the transparency account, rationality seems not to be normative. I think it is often assumed that what goes for the transparency account goes for the subjective reasons account as well. But I argue that this is a mistake. A corollary is that the subjective reasons account has an important advantage over the transparency account, given how plausible it is that rationality is normative
Self-knowledge and the limits of transparency
Get PDFA number of recent accounts of our first-person knowledge of our attitudes give a central role to transparency - our capacity to answer the question of whether we have an attitude by answering the question of whether to have it. In this paper I raise a problem for such accounts, by showing that there are clear cases of first-person knowledge of attitudes which are not transparent
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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