1,720,964 research outputs found
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Regulating Driving Automation Safety
Over forty thousand people die in motor vehicle crashes in the United States each year, and over two million are injured. The careful deployment of driving automation systems could prevent many of these deaths and injuries, but only if it is accompanied by effective regulation. Conventional vehicle safety standards are inadequate because they can only test how technology performs in a controlled environment. To assess the safety of a driving automation system, regulators must observe how it performs in a range of unpredictable, real world edge cases. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is trying to adapt by experimenting with a novel regulatory strategy. Instead of setting standards, the agency is using its statutory powers in unprecedented ways—ordering automation developers to report crashes daily and directing rapid recalls that require changes to defective software. NHTSA is betting that intense monitoring and the credible threat of recalls will push developers to prioritize safety. This Article argues that NHTSA’s experimental strategy could be transformed into effective safety regulation. Regulators should (1) require that all new vehicles be equipped with telematics that can send safety data and receive software updates over the air; (2) mandate universal crash reporting; and (3) use recalls to force developers of driving automation systems that create unreasonable risks to restrict where their systems can operate until they can develop safer code
Moonshots
In the last half-century, technological progress has stagnated. Rapid advances in information technology disguise the slow pace of productivity growth in other fields. Reigniting technological progress may require firms to invest in moonshots—long-term projects to commercialize innovations. Yet all but a few giant tech firms shy away from moonshots, even when the expected returns would justify the investment. The root of the problem is corporate structure. The process of developing a novel technology does not generate the kind of interim feedback that shareholders need to monitor managers and managers need to motivate employees. Managers who anticipate these agency problems invest in incremental innovations instead.
In the last few years, a new structure designed to commercialize long-term innovations has emerged—the venture carveout. A venture carveout is a private company with one or two public company parents, outside private investors, and employee ownership. The parents provide intellectual property and a long-term strategic commitment. The private investors supply patient capital that insulates the project from short-term shareholder pressure. The employees’ equity motivates them to bring a product to market. The first venture carveouts are attempting to commercialize autonomous vehicles. If they succeed, they will validate a new model for innovation. This Article argues that venture carveouts could enable more companies to invest in moonshots, compete with the tech giants that dominate our economy, and accelerate technological progress
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Regulating Driving Automation Safety
Over forty thousand people die in motor vehicle crashes in the United States each year, and over two million are injured. The careful deployment of driving automation systems could prevent many of these deaths and injuries, but only if it is accompanied by effective regulation. Conventional vehicle safety standards are inadequate because they can only test how technology performs in a controlled environment. To assess the safety of a driving automation system, regulators must observe how it performs in a range of unpredictable, real world edge cases. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is trying to adapt by experimenting with a novel regulatory strategy. Instead of setting standards, the agency is using its statutory powers in unprecedented ways—ordering automation developers to report crashes daily and directing rapid recalls that require changes to defective software. NHTSA is betting that intense monitoring and the credible threat of recalls will push developers to prioritize safety. This Article argues that NHTSA’s experimental strategy could be transformed into effective safety regulation. Regulators should (1) require that all new vehicles be equipped with telematics that can send safety data and receive software updates over the air; (2) mandate universal crash reporting; and (3) use recalls to force developers of driving automation systems that create unreasonable risks to restrict where their systems can operate until they can develop safer code
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
We provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
Regulation of Emerging Risks
Why has the EPA not regulated fracking? Why has the FDA not regulated e-cigarettes? Why has NHTSA not regulated autonomous vehicles? This Article argues that administrative agencies predictably fail to regulate emerging risks when the political environment for regulation is favorable. The cause is a combination of administrative law and interest group politics. Agencies must satisfy high initial informational thresholds to regulate, so they postpone rulemaking in the face of uncertainty about the effects of new technologies. But while regulators passively acquire more information, fledgling industries consolidate and become politically entrenched. By the time agencies can justify regulation, the newly entrenched industries have the political capital to thwart them. This Article offers a prophylactic against this predictable regulatory failure. It defends an experimentalist model of regulation, in which agencies are empowered to impose moratoria on risky emerging technologies while regulators organize experiments to learn about the risks they pose and the means to mitigate them. The agency-coordinated experiments would expedite the promulgation of empirically informed rules. The moratoria would extend the political window for regulatory action and protect the public in the interim. The Article applies this experimentalist model to the regulation of fracking, e- cigarettes, and autonomous vehicles. It also identifies legal strategies for implementing experimental regulation under existing law. It challenges the conventional wisdom that agencies should postpone regulation until they can confidently predict the effects of new risky technologies
Regulating Driving Automation Safety
Over forty thousand people die in motor vehicle crashes in the United States each year, and over two million are injured. The careful deployment of driving automation systems could prevent many of these deaths and injuries, but only if it is accompanied by effective regulation. Conventional vehicle safety standards are inadequate because they can only test how technology performs in a controlled environment. To assess the safety of a driving automation system, regulators must observe how it performs in a range of unpredictable, real world edge cases. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is trying to adapt by experimenting with a novel regulatory strategy. Instead of setting standards, the agency is using its statutory powers in unprecedented ways—ordering automation developers to report crashes daily and directing rapid recalls that require changes to defective software. NHTSA is betting that intense monitoring and the credible threat of recalls will push developers to prioritize safety. This Article argues that NHTSA’s experimental strategy could be transformed into effective safety regulation. Regulators should (1) require that all new vehicles be equipped with telematics that can send safety data and receive software updates over the air; (2) mandate universal crash reporting; and (3) use recalls to force developers of driving automation systems that create unreasonable risks to restrict where their systems can operate until they can develop safer code
Recommended from our members
Moonshots
In the last half-century, technological progress has stagnated. Rapid advances in information technology disguise the slow pace of productivity growth in other fields. Reigniting technological progress may require firms to invest in moonshots—long-term projects to commercialize innovations. Yet all but a few giant tech firms shy away from moonshots, even when the expected returns would justify the investment. The root of the problem is corporate structure. The process of developing a novel technology does not generate the kind of interim feedback that shareholders need to monitor managers and managers need to motivate employees. Managers who anticipate these agency problems invest in incremental innovations instead.
In the last few years, a new structure designed to commercialize long-term innovations has emerged—the venture carveout. A venture carveout is a private company with one or two public company parents, outside private investors, and employee ownership. The parents provide intellectual property and a long-term strategic commitment. The private investors supply patient capital that insulates the project from short-term shareholder pressure. The employees’ equity motivates them to bring a product to market. The first venture carveouts are attempting to commercialize autonomous vehicles. If they succeed, they will validate a new model for innovation. This Article argues that venture carveouts could enable more companies to invest in moonshots, compete with the tech giants that dominate our economy, and accelerate technological progress
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