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Limits of Conceivability in the Study of the Future. Lessons from Philosophy of Science
Get PDFIn this paper, the epistemological and conceptual limits of our ability to conceive and reason about future possibilities are analyzed. It is argued that more attention should be paid in futures studies on these epistemological and conceptual limits. Drawing on three cases from philosophy of science, the paper argues that there are deep epistemological and conceptual limits in our ability to conceive and reason about alternatives to the current world. The nature and existence of these limits are far from obvious and become visible only through careful investigation. The cases establish that we often are unable to conceive relevant alternatives; that historical and counterfactual considerations are more limited than has been suggested; and that the present state of affairs reinforces its hegemony through multiple conceptual and epistemological mechanisms. The paper discusses the reasons behind the limits of the conceivability and the consequences that follow from the considerations that make the limits visible. The paper suggests that the epistemological and conceptual limits in our ability to conceive and reason about possible futures should be mapped systematically. The mapping would provide a better understanding of the creative and critical bite of futures studies
What Should We Require from an Account of Explanation in Historiography?
Get PDFIn this paper, I explicate desiderata for accounts of explanation in historiography. I argue that a fully developed account of explanation in historiography must explicate many explanation-related notions in order to be satisfactory. In particular, it is not enough that an account defines the basic structure of explanation. In addition, the account of explanation must be able to explicate notions such as minimal explanation, complete explanation, historiographical explanation, explanatory depth, explanatory competition, and explanatory goal. Moreover, the account should also tell how explananda can be chosen in a motivated way. Furthermore, the account should be able to clarify notions that are closely connected with explanation such as historical contingency. Finally, it is important that the account is able to recognize when explanation-related notions and issues are so closely intertwined that we are in danger of not seeing the differences between them. In other words, I argue that a satisfactory account of explanation in historiography must have the power to explicate central explanation-related notions and to clarify discussions where the differences between the notions are obscure. In order to explicate these desiderata, I formulate a (version of the) counterfactual account of explanation and show how that account is able to explicate explanation-related notions and clarify issues that are connected with historiographical explanations. The success of the counterfactual account suggests that historiographical explanations do not differ fundamentally from explanations in many other fields
Understanding Futures of Science. Connecting Causal Layered Analysis and the Philosophy of Science
Get PDFIn this paper, I analyze the similarities and connections between the philosophy of science and causal layered analysis. I point out that the philosophy of science can be understood as a kind of causal layered analysis of science. The philosophy of science has mythic/metaphoric, structural/worldview, and causal levels that make science understandable. Moreover, the philosophy of science has analytic tools that correspond to the items in the so-called poststructural toolbox. These similarities and connections mean that the insights in the philosophy of science can be used to investigate the important but neglected topic of possible futures of science. This makes it possible (i) to open up the present and past to create alternative futures of science, and (ii) to reveal deep worldview commitments behind surface phenomena in science-related discourses. Connecting the philosophy of science with causal layered analysis also provides fresh insight into the nature of each approach
Cementing science : understanding science through its development
Get PDFIn this book, I defend the present-centered approach in historiography of science (i.e. study of the history of science), build an account for causal explanations in historiography of science, and show the fruitfulness of the approach and account in when we attempt to understand science.
The present-centered approach defines historiography of science as a field that studies the developments that led to the present science. I argue that the choice of the targets of studies in historiography of science should be directly connected to our values and preferences in an intersubjective process. The main advantage of this approach is that it gives a clear motivation for historiography of science and avoids or solves stubborn conceptual and practical problems within the field.
The account of causal explanations is built on the notions of counterfactual scenarios and contrastive question-answer pairs. I argue that if and only if we track down patterns of counterfactual dependencies, can we understand history. Moreover, I define the notions of historical explanation, explanatory competition, explanatory depth, and explanatory resources.
Finally, I analyze the existing historiography of science with the framework built in the previous chapter, and I show that this framework clarifies many first-order (i.e. concerning the history of science) and meta-level issues (i.e. concerning the nature of science in general) that historians and philosophers tackle. As an illustration of the philosophical power of the framework, I explicate the notion of local explanation and analyze the question of whether the developments of science were necessary or contingent.Tässä työssä puolustan nykyhetkikeskeistä (presentismi) tieteenhistoriografiaa, muotoilen tieteenhistoriografiaan soveltuvan mallin kausaalisesta selittämisestä ja osoitan sekä presentismin että selittämisen mallin hedelmällisyyden yrityksissä ymmärtää tiedettä.
Nykyhetkikeskeinen lähestymistapa määrittelee tieteenhistoriografian alana, joka tutkii nykyiseen tieteeseen johtaneita kehityskulkuja. Argumentoin, että tieteenhistoriografian tutkimuskohteiden valinnan tulisi yhdistyä arvoihimme ja preferensseihimme intersubjektiivisen arviointiprosessin kautta. Tämän lähestymistavan suurin etu on siinä, että se tarjoaa tieteenhistorialle selvän motivaation ja välttää tai ratkoo vaikeita käsitteellisiä ja käytännöllisiä ongelmia, jotka ovat vaivanneet tieteenhistoriografiaa.
Kausaalisen selittämisen malli, jonka esitän, perustuu kontrafaktuaalisille skenaarioille ja kontrastiivisille kysymys-vastaus-pareille. Argumentoin, että jos ja vain jos jäljitämme kontrafaktuaalisia riippuvuussuhteita erilaisten tekijöiden välillä, voimme ymmärtää historiaa. Lisäksi määrittelen sellaiset käsitteet kuin historiallinen selitys, kilpailevat selitykset, selityksen syvyys ja selittämisen resurssit.
Lopuksi analysoin olemassa olevaa tieteenhistoriografiaa aiemmin muotoillun viitekehyksen läpi ja osoitan, että kyseinen viitekehys selventää monia ensimmäisen kertaluvun (ts. tieteenhistoriaa koskevia) ja meta-tason (ts. tieteen luonnetta yleisesti koskevia) ongelmia, joiden parissa historioitsijat ja filosofit työskentelevät. Osoittaakseni muotoillun viitekehyksen filosofisen potentiaalin analysoin käsitettä lokaali selitys ja kysymystä siitä, onko tieteen kehitys ollut välttämätöntä vai kontingenttia.ei tietoa saavutettavuudest
When It Comes to the Future, Realism and Antirealism Do Make A Difference
Get PDFIn this paper, I argue that scientific realism and antirealism lead to different scenarios of the future. I discuss a recent line of arguments in the scientific realism debate that concerns the consequences of scientific realism for our understanding of the future. I point out where recent works on the topic have seemingly reached a stalemate. I solve the stalemate by focusing on the scenarios of the future that realism and antirealism imply. I argue that focusing on the probability, possibility, desirability, and especially trackability of the scenarios can help us see systematic differences between the positions
Cementing Science. Understanding Science through Its Development
No full textIn this book, I defend the present-centered approach in historiography of science (i.e. study of the history of science), build an account for causal explanations in historiography of science, and show the fruitfulness of the approach and account in when we attempt to understand science.
The present-centered approach defines historiography of science as a field that studies the developments that led to the present science. I argue that the choice of the targets of studies in historiography of science should be directly connected to our values and preferences in an intersubjective process. The main advantage of this approach is that it gives a clear motivation for historiography of science and avoids or solves stubborn conceptual and practical problems within the field.
The account of causal explanations is built on the notions of counterfactual scenarios and contrastive question-answer pairs. I argue that if and only if we track down patterns of counterfactual dependencies, can we understand history. Moreover, I define the notions of historical explanation, explanatory competition, explanatory depth, and explanatory resources.
Finally, I analyze the existing historiography of science with the framework built in the previous chapter, and I show that this framework clarifies many first-order (i.e. concerning the history of science) and meta-level issues (i.e. concerning the nature of science in general) that historians and philosophers tackle. As an illustration of the philosophical power of the framework, I explicate the notion of local explanation and analyze the question of whether the developments of science were necessary or contingent
Frameworks in Historiography: Explanation, Scenarios, and Futures
Get PDFIn this paper, I analyze how frameworks shape historiographical explanations. I argue that, in order to identify a sequence of events as relevant to a historical outcome, assumptions about the workings of the relevant domain have to be made. By extending Lakatosian considerations, I argue that these assumptions are provided by a framework that contains a set of factors and intertwined principles that (supposedly) govern how a historical phenomenon works. I connect frameworks with a counterfactual account of historical explanation. Frameworks enable us to explain the past by providing a backbone of explanatory patterns of counterfactual dependency. I conclude by noting that both counterfactual scenarios and scenarios of the future require frameworks and, therefore, historiographical explanation generates a set of possible futures. Analyzing these possible futures enables us to reveal the theoretical commitments of historiography
The Philosophy of the Future of Science
Get PDFIn this paper, I argue that the philosophy of science has not paid enough attention to the future of science. Even though the philosophy of science has deepened our understanding of science, explicit conceptual tools to understand the estimating of possible futures of science are missing from its repertoire. I argue that the philosophy of science can achieve two main objectives of the futures research: enhancing understanding and challenging conventional thinking. While there are legitimate concerns about the epistemic and ethical impossibility of predicting scientific innovations and discoveries, it is nevertheless possible to investigate a wide range of questions concerning the future of science. I sketch structural taxonomies as a tool for the estimating of possible futures of science. A structural taxonomy is a map of scenarios that are possible according to some philosophical theory of science. I show how the merits of such taxonomies can be assessed and how the assessment sheds new light on the existing philosophy of science. I conclude by noting that future-oriented thinking is highly valuable for our current understanding of science
Pursuitworthiness in the Scheme of Futures
Get PDFIn this paper, I argue that analyzing pursuitworthiness in science requires that we study possible futures of science. The merits of different criteria of pursuitworthiness need to be assessed against scenarios of the future of science. Different criteria recognize and ignore different scenarios. As a consequence, different criteria enable us to manage different future possibilities. While it might be impossible to predict the future of science, there are still many interesting things we can say about the possible futures of science. We can construct scenarios of the future of science on the basis of philosophical accounts of science. I point out that the topic of pursuitworthiness is not the only topic that can be approached by connecting philosophy of science with the construction of scenarios
Tulevaisuudentutkimus tutuksi – Perusteita ja menetelmiä
Get PDFTässä artikkelissa käsittelen tieteen tulevaisuuksien ennakointia. Keskeisyydestään huolimatta tieteen tulevaisuuksien ennakointia ei ole kartoitettu systemaattisesti. Tuon esiin siihen liittyviä mahdollisuuksia mutta myös erityisongelmia. Monet tieteen tulevaisuuksien ennakointiin liittyvät seikat, kuten ennakoinnin rajat ja eettinen päätöksenteko, ovat tärkeitä myös muussa ennakoinnissa, ja tämän vuoksi tieteen tulevaisuuksien ennakoinnin tarkastelulla on myös laajempaa relevanssia tulevaisuudentutkimuksen kentällä. Tuon myös esiin, miten tieteen tulevaisuuksista voidaan muotoilla teorialähtöisiä skenaarioita, mikä mahdollistaa tiettyjen skenaarioiden tarkastelun kuvauksina teoreettisesti mahdollisista tulevaisuuksista.</p
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