114 research outputs found

    SYMBOLS OF THE FAIRY TALE "THE OLD MAN AND THE WOLF" (FROM THE "HISTORY OF THE SYMBOLS OF SLAVIC MYTHOLOGY")

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    This report is part of a research work in the field of symbolism of Slavic mythology. Developments on this topic were repeatedly presented by the author at various conferences of past years [Zaporozhets 2020 a), b), c), d), e)]. Today we will continue to study the symbols of the figurative mythological struc-ture based on the fairy tale "The Old Man and the Wolf" in the processing of A.N. Tolstoy [Tolstoy 1992]. This fairy tale is a version of the fairy tale "Hut on the forest edge", which the author considered at a conference in 2020 [Zaporozhets 2020)]. In our report, we will carry out a comparative analysis of two versions of a fairy tale, and reveal new details of the characters' symbolism. The version of the tale interested the author with additional information, which introduced the missing elements into the studied area of mytholog

    The political economy of fixed regional investment shares with an illustration for Belgian Railway investments

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    Many local public goods are allocated by federal governments using fixed regional shares: every region is entitled a fixed share of the total budget for a particular type of public good. This paper compares this fixed regional sharing rule with two alternative allocation rules: first best and common pool allocation. We find that the fixed regional sharing rule performs relatively well if the regional shares are reasonable. Legislative bargaining theory is used to study the determination of the fixed regional shares.local public goods, political economy, railways

    THE SYMBOLISM OF THE FORMULA "OVER THREE-NINTH LAND IN THREE-TENTH KINGDOM" (FROM THE "HISTORY OF THE SYMBOLS OF SLAVIC MYTHOLOGY")

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    This report is part of the research work on deciphering the symbols of Slavic mythology. Developments on this topic were repeatedly presented by the author at conferences of past years [Zaporozhets 2020 a), b), c), d), e)]. Today we will look at the symbolism of one fairy-tale formula, which is known as "Over three-ninth land in three-tenth kingdom". What does it mean? Where did it come from? What changes have been made? All these questions, which interested the author at one time, will be considered in our repor

    The political economy of fixed regional investment shares with an illustration for Belgian railway investments.

    No full text
    Many local public goods are allocated by federal governments using fixed regional shares: every region is entitled a fixed share of the total budget for a particular type of public good. This paper compares this fixed regional sharing rule with two alternative allocation rules: first best and common pool allocation. We find that the fixed regional sharing rule performs relatively well if the regional shares are reasonable. Legislative bargaining theory is used to study the determination of the fixed regional shares.

    "OH, LET’S REMEMBER, YOU, OH KUBAN BROTHERS" MARCHING SONG OF THE DON COSSACKS (FOLKLORE OF THE WAR YEARS)

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    In this report, dedicated to the folklore of the war years, we will consider the transformation of one military song that exists among the Cossacks of the Kuban [historical references No 1 - 10] and, as it turned out in the process of research, in other regions of Russia [comments No 1, Internet No 1]. The song is very popular, it is included in the repertoire of the Kuban Cossack Choir and the ensemble of the "Cossack Circle" organization [Internet No 1]. However, research shows that the song is not being played quite right. The author has repeatedly heard this song from her father, Zaporozhets Vasil Andreevich, a hereditary Kuban Cossack. The song "Oh, let’s remember, you, oh Kuban brothers" was constantly performed on holidays, especially on May 9, Victory Day, by a chorus or ensemble consisting of the author's relatives, the lead singer and leader of which was the author's father. I must say that Zaporozhets Vasily Andreevich was one of the active participants in the stanitsa Cossack choir, which regularly performed at the local house of culture. He was one of the brightest performers of folk songs and the lead singer in the choir. Having gone through the Great Patriotic War as a simple soldier, he was wounded, had awards, so the song was especially loved by them and was often simply sung at home, both solo and together with the villagers. As a true natural performer and connoisseur of folk art, he knew not only the melody of his part, but also the voice leading of any choir member and could replace everyone at any moment. Later, while studying professionally in musical institutions, the author realized that such a skill is a rare natural gift. But my father knew not only folk songs, in scientific journals the author more than once published stories, legends, tales, jokes, proverbs, etc., heard from her father, mother (members of the labor front), grandfather (order bearer, the second grandfather died in a concentration camp ), grandmothers and other relatives. [Zaporozhets 2003, 2005 a), b) 2006; 2009 a), b); 2010 b); 2011; 2012; 2014; 2017 a), b); 2020 b.]. My father told me how in his youth, before the war, he self-taught to play various folk instruments: balalaika, mandolin, guitar (accordion - the dream of his life, he never mastered, to buy, in those years - there was no financial opportunity). He told me how he played in a folk ensemble, consisting of relatives. Unfortunately, the author never managed to hear the instrumental music performed by his father, since he came from the war with a damaged hand and could no longer play. But he was a great master of singing. Until now, his portrait hangs in the house of culture on the board of honor, as an excellent performer of folk songs. Following in her father's footsteps, the author first graduated from a music school in the village, then a music institute in the city of Krasnodar, and then in Moscow, which was a huge incentive to further engage in ethnography in general

    SYMBOLS OF THE FAIRY TALE "CHEREP-TEREM" (FROM THE "HISTORY OF SYMBOLS OF SLAVIC MYTHOLOGY")

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    This report is part of a research work in the field of symbolism of Slavic mythology. Developments on this topic were repeatedly presented by the author at various conferences of past years [Zaporozhets 2020 a), b), c), d), e)]. Today we will continue the study of the symbols of the figurative mythological structure based on the fairy tale "Cherep-terem" from the book by Yu G. Kruglov [Kruglov 1992], who published in his collection the best examples of Russian fairy tale folklore in the arrangements of A. N. Afanasyev, I. A. Khudyakov, D. N. Sadovnikov, N. Ye. Onchukov, D. K. Zelenin and other famous authors. In our report, we will briefly consider the symbolism of the characters in the fairy tale and note the pattern in the development of its plot

    Sequential legislative lobbying

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    In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies, Lobby 0 and Lobby 1, compete by bidding for legislators’ votes. In this model, the lobbyist moving first suffers from a second mover advantage and will make an offer to a panel of legislators only if it deters any credible counter-reaction from his opponent, i.e., if he anticipates to win the battle. This paper departs from the existing literature in assuming that legislators care about the consequence of their votes rather than their votes per se. Our main focus is on the calculation of the smallest budget that he needs to win the game and on the distribution of this budget across the legislators. We study the impact of the key parameters of the game on these two variables and show the connection of this problem with the combinatorics of sets and notions from cooperative game theory.Lobbying; cooperative games; noncooperative games

    Sequential Legislative Lobbying under Political Certainty

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    In this article, we analyse the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, based on Groseclose and Snyder (1996) , describing a legislature that votes on two alternatives and two opposing lobbies, lobby 0 and lobby 1, that compete by bidding for legislators' votes. In this model there is a strong second-mover advantage, so the lobbyist moving first will make offers to legislators only if he deters any credible counter-reaction from his opponent, i.e. if he anticipates winning the battle. Our main focus is on the calculation of the smallest budget that he needs to win the game and on the distribution of this budget across the legislators. We study the impact of game's key parameters on these two variables and show the connection of this problem with the combinatorics of sets and notions from cooperative game theory. Copyright � The Author(s). Journal compilation � Royal Economic Society 2009.

    Power Distribution in French River Basin Committees

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    I study the distribution of voting power between different decision-makers in French river basin committees over the period 1987-2007. To do so, in the first part of the paper, I apply different power measures traditionally used in the literature as well as some other ones lesser known in this context. I compare then the predictions of several indices for the relative power of different decision-makers in different voting situations. In the second part, I describe the methodology to design an optimal decision rule. A simple computational exercise based on this methodology suggests that the residential water users in Adour-Garonne river basin were under represented in the river basin committee during 1989-2006

    Voting Power and Decision Making in Environmental Committees: the Case of French Water Agencies

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    I employ different concepts of voting power to analyze how the composition of environmental committees and voting rules relate to the voting power of different decision makers in different voting situations. I demonstrate the use of the concepts on data for French river basin committees over the period 1987-2007. In the second part of the paper I discuss how the existing tools and methods can be adapted to examine the problem of fair representation of different interests within environmental committees. The analysis brings relevant insights to the recent water policy debates in France
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