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Using Consumption Data to Derive Optimal Income and Capital Tax Rates
Get PDFWe study optimal tax design based on the idea that policy-makers face trade-offs between multiple margins of redistribution. Within a Mirrleesian economy with earnings, consumption and retirement savings, we derive a novel formula for optimal income and savings distortions based on redistributional arbitrage. We establish a sufficient statistics representation of the labor income and capital tax rates on top income earners in dynamic environments, which relies on the observed distributions of both income and consumption. Because consumption has a thinner Pareto tail than income, our quantitative results suggest that it is optimal to shift a substantial fraction of the top earners' tax burden from income to savings
Using Advice Without Considering Its Quality: A Laboratory Experiment of Demand for Advice
No full textWe experimentally test how the content of advice, namely, its alignment with common priors, influences beliefs about its quality and future demand for it. We reject the theoretical hypothesis that demand for advice can be increased by giving advice in alignment with common priors. We find, furthermore, that such alignment has hardly any impact on the participants’ beliefs about quality of advice. Nevertheless, advice influences participants’ guesses in an incentivized task, regardless of their beliefs about the quality of advice itself
Stress discounting
No full textStandard evaluations of public policies involve discounting the flow of expected net benefits at a unique discount rate. Consequently, they systematically ignore the insurance benefits of policies that hedge the aggregate risk, and the social cost of projects that raise the aggregate risk. Normative asset pricing theory recommends adjusting the discount
rate to the project’s risk, but few countries have attempted to implement this complex solution. We explore the equivalent "stochastic discount factor" approach based on the expected value of its state-contingent NPV, using the relevant state-contingent Ramsey discount rate. Under our "stress discounting" approach, projects are evaluated under two polar risk-free economic scenarios, one business-as-usual scenario, and one low-probability
catastrophic scenario. Inspired by the recent asset pricing literature on macro catastrophes, we show that this approach adequately values assets’ risk premia under a minimal, intuitive, and operationally simple departure from the standard risk-free approach with a unique discount rate. We carry out benchmarks to check the accuracy of this approach, then apply it to value a nuclear waste disposal
Analyse fiscale : des obligations déclaratives des prestataires de services sur crypto-actifs
No full textCapital Sunk, Emissions Locked: The Economics of Energy Transitions under Carbon Constraints
No full textDéfinir le groupement catégoriel : de la qualification aux enjeux
No full textEn l’absence de définition légale, la notion de syndicat catégoriel demeure incertaine et largement façonnée par le contentieux de la représentativité. Longtemps appréhendée à travers le seul prisme des règles d’audience électorale, elle renvoie pourtant, plus fondamentalement, à l’identification statutaire d’une communauté d’intérêts professionnels fondée sur l’appartenance à une catégorie déterminée, au premier rang desquelles figurent, du côté des salariés, les cadres. Mais plus largement, la notion de syndicat catégoriel invite à étendre la réflexion au champ patronal, où elle pourrait bousculer les frontières de l’interprofession
Self-Revealing Renegotiation
No full textWe revisit the tension between the legal doctrine of renegotiation and economic efficiency. We introduce self-revealing mechanisms that combine bidirectional communication (the agent sends and receives information) with conditional disclosure (communication remains private during renegotiation but becomes verifiable at contract execution). In the canonical Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) framework, we design a self-revealing mechanism that fully mitigates the renegotiation threat by uniquely implementing the second-best allocation. Thus, the construction achieves the full-commitment outcome while satisfying renegotiation-proofness. Our optimal mechanism is structurally simple, and exploits signal disclosures to the agent to
construct incentive-compatible off-path punishments, which she activates after observing a renegotiation offer. It verifies standard commitment assumptions by only conditioning decisions on public information, without requiring any third-party enforcement. In practical terms, it can be implemented with existing smart-contract techniques. Our results extend to general settings of renegotiation
